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ABSTRACT 
Is it possible to get economic actors to work together in order to achieve mutually 
beneficial outcomes in unfavourable settings? 
Established theories of cooperation suggest that overcoming the obstacles to 
cooperation requires either a robust framework of formal institutions or a long-established 
culture of trust. Many places in the world are endowed with neither of those 
characteristics. Yet, in the presence of fragmented ownership structures, sustained 
cooperation among economic actors is important for processes of economic development, 
which themselves have major implications for domestic political dynamics. 
My dissertation approaches the puzzle of the emergence of cooperation in 
unfavourable settings by drawing on qualitative empirical evidence collected through 
fieldwork in four areas of Greece where specific types of cooperation were observed, 
compared to four otherwise similar (matching) cases where such patterns of cooperation 
failed to occur.  
I argue that for cooperation to emerge against the odds, the crucial variable is 
leadership. A small group of boundary-spanning leading actors can trigger a process of 
creating local-level cooperative institutions by performing three specific types of difficult 
and costly institutional work. Successful leaders tend to be translocally embedded, highly 
skilled, well connected actors, who have a subjective conception of their self-interest as 
encapsulating the interests of others. The institutional work of a small group of local-level 
leading actors can only catalyse broad-based, sustained cooperation if it is nested within 
a framework of facilitative overarching institutions. Crucially, supranational actors such 
as the EU can also provide such facilitative macro-level institutions, thereby to an extent 
compensating for deficiencies in national institutional frameworks. 
By combining analysis of local-level agency and processes, on the one hand, and 
macro-level institutional frameworks, on the other, my thesis makes a contribution to our 
understanding of institutional change, the emergence of cooperation, and the political 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Cooperation and local development  
Cooperation among economic actors is an important ingredient for local economic 
development. Douglass North’s famous book on institutions and economic performance 
begins with a chapter on the function that well-designed institutions should serve in an 
economy, namely to facilitate cooperation, which can help economic actors reduce the 
costs associated with the measurement, enforcement and policing of agreements, enabling  
them to reap the benefits from trade. Indeed, according to North, the persistence of 
disparate economic trajectories across space has not been well-explained by development 
economists, and “what is missing” from the explanation is precisely “an understanding 
of the nature of human coordination and cooperation” (1990: 11). William Ferguson 
echoes this conclusion: “successful market exchange, and, more fundamentally, 
successful economic development, both require some resolution of underlying collective 
action problems – that is, problems that arise when the individual pursuit of self-interest 
generates socially undesirable outcomes” (2014: 4). Similarly, McDermott points out that 
“growth and international competitiveness depend on the ability of a society to upgrade 
its firms and industries”, which in turn is “a function of local constellations of inter-firm 
networks and institutions” (2007: 104). A number of otherwise distinct strands of 
literature in economic geography, including the literatures on “industrial districts”, 
“clusters”, and “Regional Innovation Systems”, among others, have also long emphasised 
the role of “cooperation, networks, institutions, [and] trust” in improving economic 
performance (Asheim et al. 2011: 878). Indeed, scholars in different disciplines 
increasingly agree that the study of the obstacles to cooperation and their resolution is 
relevant for understanding why trajectories of economic development diverge from place 
to place. 
Cooperation is particularly important in economies that are characterised by 
strong land and business fragmentation, such as the Greek one (see Table 1). This is 
because by working together, small firms and small producers can collectively achieve 
certain capabilities that are unattainable for each of them individually, thereby mitigating 
some of the disadvantages of small size for productivity and potentially enabling those 
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producers and firms to compete internationally. And indeed, encouraging small firms to 
become more productive has never been more important for Greece in particular: with 
the collapse of the inward-oriented model of economic development based on big public 
spending, during the Eurozone crisis it became increasingly apparent that Greece will 
only be able to prosper if its economy becomes more competitive and export-oriented. In 
other words, the internationalisation of the economy and the lack of easily available 
inward-looking alternative paths to growth provide powerful incentives for increased 
coordination in fragmented economies, in Greece and beyond (Caloghirou et al. 2012: 
39). 
Table 1: The importance of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the Greek 
economy  
Source: European Commission, SBA factsheet 2019 
The particular focus of this project is on agri-food and tourism, two sectors that 
are crucial for economic development in many rural areas around the world. Even if many 
countries’ principal engines of growth are located in cities, economic development in 
rural areas is important, not least because the collapse of people’s economic chances in 
the countryside can lead to a highly destabilising type of political alienation. After all, as 
is increasingly recognised in the literature, populist voting outcomes often have “strong 
territorial foundations”, and are associated with an expression of discontent “against the 
feeling of lacking opportunities and future prospects” by people who “live” and “belong” 
in places facing declining socioeconomic trajectories (Rodríguez-Pose 2018: 189-190).  
In fragmented economies, cooperation among economic actors has the potential 
to yield major benefits in both the agri-food and the tourism sectors. In the Greek agri-
food sector it is common that firms which sell final goods such as olive oil and wine don’t 
actually own the land where their inputs are cultivated; as a result, producing goods of 
premium quality that can reach upscale markets requires cooperation among producers 
and firms. At the same time, most Greek agri-food firms are too small to build an 
internationally recognisable individual brand name; however, through cooperation they 
can create a collective reputation linked to the quality of the products of a particular place. 
The capability to produce and market upscale goods is particularly important for firms in 
the Greek agri-food sector, given that for geographical and climatic reasons, Greek agri-
 Share of persons employed in SMEs Share of value added by SMEs 
Greece  87.9% 63.5% 
EU-28 66.6% 56.4% 
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food goods are costly to produce, and cannot compete in international markets on the 
basis of price (Iliopoulos and Theodorakopoulou 2014: 670/ S6). 
The importance of cooperation in the tourism sector is widely acknowledged in 
the tourism literature, given that in the first instance, the decision of a consumer to buy a 
product from a particular firm “has nothing to do with the will or ability” of the individual 
entrepreneur, but depends on the tourist’s decision to visit a particular location in the first 
place (Brunori and Rossi 2000: 410; Healy 1994: 597). This is especially so in Greece, 
where very few areas are managed by large, all-inclusive hotels. Instead, most touristic 
areas are populated by a multitude of small businesses, each of which cannot significantly 
influence on its own the quality of the overall package available to the tourist. In 
traditional seaside touristic destinations, the “sun and sea” model may be enough to attract 
a satisfactory number of tourists during the peak season, but any attempts to prolong the 
touristic season or to appeal to upscale markets would require coordinated efforts among 
firms in the sector. Moreover, the uninhibited pursuit of self-interest by individual 
tourism firms may eventually lead to a degradation in services that would put off even 
the area’s usual clientele – a possibility that is well-studied in the literature on the “tourist 
area life-cycle approach” (Gordon and Goodall 2000: 298). On the other hand, in 
locations that have not yet developed as touristic destinations, but that have the potential 
to do so, coordinated efforts among stakeholders would be required in order to provide a 
set of services and experiences that could attract tourists. As a result of the important role 
that “spatial externalities” and “historic dependencies” play in the tourism sector, Gordon 
and Goodall have called for theoretically informed research on “the processes of 
interaction between tourism and sets of place characteristics”, including the patterns of 
“competitive/ cooperative behaviour of tourism businesses” and the factors that underpin 
them (2000: 291-292). 
1.2 Cooperation in unlikely settings: the research question 
Despite the potential benefits that producers and firms can gain by cooperating 
rather than acting alone, political economists have shown in a long line of literature that 
even the most economically sensible forms of cooperation may stumble on collective 
action problems that are difficult to resolve. These may arise from the difficulty of making 
credible commitments when the preferences of economic actors are time-inconsistent, the 
pervasiveness of the free-rider problem, the possible distributional consequences of 
strategies that may overall be efficient, problems of imperfect information, and the 
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possible lack of organizational capacity to implement complex cooperative solutions to 
joint problems (Ostrom 1990: 46-49; Ferguson 2013). 
Scholars of cooperation have argued that some of these problems may at least 
partially be alleviated in settings with robust formal institutions where the state acts as an 
effective third-party enforcer. According to North, the enforcement of agreements and 
property rights by a coercive state “has been the crucial underpinning of successful 
modern economies involved in the complex contracting necessary for modern economic 
growth” (1990: 35). Equally, “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost 
enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World” (1990: 54). Indeed, much of the 
literature “concerning local economic development and its governance in industrialized 
societies focus[es] mainly on advanced, knowledge-rich, high-tech sectors”, in settings 
with strong institutions (Burroni et al. 2008: 474).   
Alternatively, scholars from a range of disciplines consider that collective action 
problems are easier to resolve in societies characterised by a cultural propensity towards 
trust-based relations and cooperative norms of behaviour. Putnam argues that “voluntary 
cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social 
capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagements (1993: 
167). Some economic geography scholars also consider the role of culture to be 
important: for example, “the preservation of common motivational tracts, such as a bent 
towards trust and co-operation in reciprocal exchanges,” is seen as an indispensable 
characteristic of well-functioning industrial districts (Becattini et al. 2009: xix). In turn, 
those cooperative norms are widely considered to stem from the “civic traditions (…) and 
the manufacturing-artisan expertise which went back to the times of ‘communal 
civilisation’” in Central and Northern Italy (Musotti 2009: 439). Such arguments are also 
becoming increasingly popular with some economists: for example, Guido Tabellini has 
published several papers arguing that there is a link between norms of generalized trust, 
other cultural norms and economic development (Alesina and Giuliano 2015: 16-17). 
Finally, cultural arguments permeate the debate also in policy circles. For example, in a 
recent policy research paper of the World Bank, it was argued that “relative to Catholics, 
Protestants, and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital 
and prefer old ideas and safe jobs” (Djankov and Nikolova 2018). In the absence of 
favourable institutional and cultural preconditions, the prospects for collective action 
problems to be overcome are usually considered dim. 
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The troubling thing is that in many parts of the world, including in several 
countries of the semi-periphery, which don’t belong firmly to either the club of 
“advanced” nor the category of “developing” countries, neither of those favourable 
institutional and cultural preconditions for cooperation are considered to exist in a 
generalised way. Greece is a good example of such a setting. Regarding formal 
institutions, Greece is able to guarantee an essential level of property rights’ protection, 
and thereby does not fall under what North calls “the Third World”. On the other hand, 
the institutional elements that are required for the state to successfully play the role of 
“third-party enforcer” are not fully present in the country, distinguishing it also from 
North’s ideal-type category of a “developed country”. Indeed, the Greek framework of 
formal institutions has well-documented shortfalls with regard to the uniform 
implementation of the law, the existence of an effective judicial system, and the presence 
of a public administration that monitors and measures outcomes and produces and 
disseminates data and information, all of which are crucial for the emergence of 
cooperative relations (Doxiadis 2014: chapters 6, 11). 
Based on the literature on Greek political culture, a similarly bleak picture can be 
painted with regard to the country’s cultural context. Indeed, Greece scores very low on 
large-scale surveys that measure diffuse interpersonal trust, which are “the most common 
tool for measuring culture” in quantitative studies in economics (Alesina and Giuliano 
2015: 8) as well as in political science (Farrell 2009: 1). For instance, Table 2 shows that 
the share of Greek respondents who agreed that “most people can be trusted” in a recent 
Eurobarometer survey was about half of the EU average share. Some scholars consider 
such results as a powerful indicator that Greece has “very low levels of social capital and 
capacities for collective action” (Paraskevopoulos 2007: 15). The following passage by 
Greek economist Aristos Doxiadis is a telling example of a widely held scholarly and 
popular image about Greek political culture:  
“Greece is not a society with highly developed mutual trust. This is evident in 
everyday life when we violate the rules of coexistence in the city, from 
parking to throwing garbage. In business transactions, those who have the 
opportunity to compare, see that the Greek entrepreneur is more likely to lie 
or to shirk from an agreement than the Northern European one. We don’t trust 
our neighbour, our colleague, our supplier, apart from people who are very 
close to us, our relatives. (…) At the same time, we don’t want to be the 
willing punishers of our neighbour. On the contrary, we consider anyone who 
denounces waste and infractions as a snitch. This attitude of tolerance and 
complicity would have moral value against a foreign, oppressive power. But 
when the rules that are breached with our tolerance are those that sustain a 
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collective good, then the imaginary resistance is self-destructive.” (Doxiadis 
2014: 131)  
Making similar arguments as Putnam has put forward with reference to Southern Italy, 
some scholars attribute the lack of generalised trust in Greece to historical events that 
occurred centuries ago, and especially to the Greek experience under Ottoman rule, when 
“the abusive and arbitrary exercise of power” by the state bred among Greeks “a profound 
distrust of all concentration of power outside one’s own hands”, while “the extended 
family emerged as the foremost defensive institution capable of offering invaluable 
protection to its members at all levels of society” (Diamandouros 1983: 45-46).  
Table 2: Diffuse interpersonal trust in Greece  
Source: Special Eurobarometer 471, published by the European Commission in April 2018 using 
data from December 2017 
These institutional and cultural characteristics render Greece an unlikely setting 
for the emergence of cooperative relations among economic actors. And yet, despite this 
unfavourable context, several examples of intense cooperation among producers and 
firms do exist in the country and in some occasions they “have even managed to revitalise 
whole areas with their success” (Vakoufaris et al. 2007: 779). These cases are not well-
explained by existing theories of cooperation, giving rise to the research question that my 
dissertation addresses: Under what conditions can the obstacles to cooperation be 
overcome in institutionally thin, low-trust settings such as Greece, thereby enabling 
economic actors to engage in specific types of cooperative activities that can help 
them improve their economic performance?  
The existing literature on cooperation provides many rich insights into the formal 
and informal institutional mechanisms that can facilitate the resolution of collective 
action problems in different situations, on which the project draws heavily and builds (see 
North 1990, Ostrom 1990, Farrell 2009, Olson 1982). By focusing on the emergence of 
cooperative activities in places where little or no cooperation could be observed 
previously, I contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which the 
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aforementioned institutional solutions to collective action problems can be provided in 
the first place, a topic that is much less understood in the literature. As a detailed study 
of why, when and how local-level cooperative institutions emerge in places where they 
were previously absent, my dissertation also has implications for the way in which we 
approach the question of institutional change more generally. 
Moreover, the emphasis of my dissertation on the emergence of cooperation in 
unfavourable settings differs from the focus of the economic geography and innovation 
literature on clusters, industrial districts and Regional Innovation Systems. Indeed, much 
of that literature tends to analyse the characteristics, typologies, and effects of the most 
successful examples of linkages among economic actors, but not the factors that underpin 
their creation: “most studies analyse clusters from a static perspective, while questions 
such as where clusters initially emerge (…) are largely ignored” (Asheim et al. 2011, p. 
885). By systematically addressing the question of the origins of a key ingredient for 
economic upgrading in fragmented economies, namely cooperation, my dissertation 
makes a contribution to our understanding of the political economy of local economic 
development, which is relevant for comparative political economists, economic 
geographers, management scholars, scholars of international development, and any other 
audience interested in economic development as an outcome in itself. 
1.3 Studying the emergence of cooperation: research design 
1.3.1 Research approach and case selection  
In order to address the research question, I followed a comparative case study 
approach. In particular, I conducted four pairs of matching case studies in specific areas 
in Greece where intense cooperation among economic actors in the agri-food or tourism 
sectors emerged in the last 20-40 years, as well as in selected areas with similar resources, 
where cooperation could have had similar benefits, but where it did not occur (or it only 
occurred to a limited extent) (Collier 1993: 111-112). The unit of analysis in my project 
is a particular sector in a particular area – for example, the wine sector in the island of 
Santorini, the alternative tourism sector in the village of Nymphaio, and so on. The way 
in which I conceptualised the extent of cooperation in each case study was by observing 
whether specific types of cooperative activities that were relevant to the sector in question 
were taking place, such as stable relations for quality improvement among producers and 
firms in the agri-food sector, and joint marketing projects in both the agri-food and the 
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tourism sectors. In the presentation of my case study areas in section 4 below, the relevant 
cooperative activities for each pair of matching cases are presented in detail.  
Thus, within the broader context of a country that constitutes an unlikely setting 
for cooperation, I selected four pairs of matching cases which varied along the dependent 
variable, i.e. in terms of the extent of observed cooperative activities. In order to facilitate 
the selection of my case studies, I read a range of sectoral reports (e.g. National Tourism 
Organisation 2003; Theodorakopoulou and Iliopoulos 2012; ICAP 2009; Kotseridis et al. 
2015; Lioukas 2013/ S1; Spilanis 2017/ S20), articles in specialised journals (e.g. 
Lamprinopoulou and Tregear 2011; Vakoufaris et al. 2007: 779; Iliopoulos and 
Theodorakopoulou 2014/ S6), and newspaper articles to firstly identify the outliers where 
cooperation was relatively high. The four high-cooperation cases studied here were good 
examples of outlier cases where cooperation emerged against the odds within their 
respective sectors at a point sufficiently removed in time that one could meaningfully talk 
of sustained cooperation. As a next step, I used sectoral reports, background discussions 
with persons who had knowledge of the sectors in question, as well as my own knowledge 
to identify suitable comparison cases for each selected high-cooperation case study. In 
the comparison cases, cooperation could have had similar benefits for the stakeholders 
involved but occurred to a more limited extent, if at all. Overall, I selected two pairs of 
matching case studies in the agri-food sector (including one pair in an established sector, 
namely wine, and one pair in non-established sectors, namely saffron and mastiha), and 
two pairs of matching cases in the tourism sector (including one pair in mass tourism 
destinations, and one pair in alternative tourism destinations). During my fieldwork in 
each case study area, I used detailed questions about the type, cost and timing of 
cooperative activities in the local sector to check whether the extent of cooperation that I 
was expecting to encounter corresponded to the observed reality of the case.  
I conducted my analysis of the four pairs of Greek matching case studies in two 
steps. The basic comparisons that I conducted were between the cases within each pair. 
In other words, I firstly tried to understand why, even though cooperation could have 
been beneficial in both cases within each matched pair, a critical mass of cooperative 
activities was only observed in one of them. Furthermore, given that in my case studies 
where cooperation did emerge, it did so in recent decades, in addition to conducting 
across-case comparisons, I also examined the reasons for across-time variation in the 
extent of observed collaborative activities in the high-cooperation case studies. I thereby 
combined across-case and within-case analysis (Collier et al. 2004: 100; George and 
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Bennett 2005: chapter 8; Bennet and Checkel 2014: 28-29). Across-case comparisons 
allowed me to guard against the possibility of falsely attributing within-case variation to 
endogenous factors when it was really the result of exogenous factors such as changes in 
international demand, while across-time comparisons allowed me to minimise the risk 
that differences in the outcomes of matching cases were due to other unobserved 
differences among the cases than those identified in my study.  
As a second step, I exploited the sectoral variation among the different pairs of 
cases in order to ask what similarities and differences can be observed in the mechanisms 
through which the obstacles to cooperation were overcome in different sectors. After all, 
the different structural features and overarching institutional frameworks in each sector 
would lead us to suspect that there could be some sectoral variation in terms of how and 
why cooperation emerges in the different pairs of cases. Are there any similarities in the 
way in which cooperation emerges in the established and non-established agri-food 
sectors, and the alternative tourism and mass tourism sectors? What are the analytically 
relevant differences? 
Thus, the methodological choice to conduct a medium-n number of case studies 
entails a particular judgment about the best way to strike a balance between breadth and 
depth in my research. On the one hand, qualitative research appeared necessary in order 
to understand the configuration of variables that allowed local stakeholders to overcome 
the obstacles to cooperation, as well as the mechanisms that they used in doing so 
(Bennett and Elman 2006: 263-264). On the other hand, the study of more than just one 
or two very particular cases seemed important in order to help me “capture the essence” 
of the stories that I recount, distinguishing the features that were analytically relevant 
from those that were idiosyncratic to each case (Bates et al. 1998: 12). Moreover, 
studying cases in more than one sub-sector enabled me to draw some conclusions about 
the impact of sectoral institutional frameworks on the prospects for cooperation, thereby 
combining two levels of analysis: a micro- and a macro-level. Overall, my comparative 
case study design draws from the tradition of comparative politics and resembles the 
research design followed in several important empirical studies in the political economy 
of cooperation and economic development (e.g. Ostrom 1990; McDermott 2007). At the 
same time, the comparative approach of my thesis distinguishes it from some existing 
empirical studies of inter-firm networks in other disciplines, which focused on single case 
studies and “had difficulty in moving from a ‘thick’ model based on a few loci classici 
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(…) to a ‘thin’ one that might provide a better explanation of variation across cases” 
(Farrell 2009: 70; see also Gertler 2010: 12). 
1.3.2 Data sources and data analysis for the four pairs of case studies in Greece 
For each case study area, I collected information through a variety of sources 
about the potential benefits of cooperation to local economic actors, the extent of their 
attempts to engage in cooperative activities, the obstacles they encountered in that 
process, and the ways in which they overcame those obstacles.  
Firstly, in each area I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with 
relevant stakeholders, including producers, representatives of cooperatives, firms, inter-
firm associations, local authorities, and representatives of civil society groups, depending 
on the type of case study. These interviews were based on questionnaires which addressed 
each of the thematic areas mentioned above, but which also varied in order to reflect the 
specificities of the sectoral setting in question, and the thematic areas on which the 
stakeholder that I was interviewing could provide the most relevant information. I 
conducted between five and ten interviews for each case study area, while the length of 
the interviews varied according to the availability of interviewees and the extent to which 
they were in a position to provide relevant information. Before embarking on fieldwork 
in my four pairs of matching case study areas, I conducted preliminary fieldwork in the 
olive and olive oil sectors of three locations, which helped me to identify the best way to 
approach potential interviewees, adapt my questionnaire, and better target my efforts 
during the main stage of fieldwork. A large share of the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. In cases where I considered that asking for the permission to record the 
interview could act as a significant barrier to having an honest conversation with an 
interviewee about sensitive topics regarding their relations with other local actors, I did 
not record the interview, but I relied on detailed notes that I took during and completed 
immediately after the end of the interview. On a few occasions, interviewees declined to 
be recorded, in which case I once again relied on my notes during and immediately after 
the interview. A full list of the 86 interviews that the dissertation draws on can be found 
in Appendix A. 
In order to triangulate the information obtained from the interviews and access 
other types of information that my interviewees could not provide, I also utilised a number 
of other sources of data. In particular, in each case study area I collected relevant types 
of documentary evidence, such as the minutes of meetings among the local stakeholders 
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wherever those were available, and internal documents produced by relevant 
organisations. Moreover, for some of my case study areas, I scanned the local press for 
relevant articles during periods that were particularly important for local cooperative 
efforts.1 Finally, I collected and analysed a wide range of grey literature and other 
secondary sources about my case study areas, including policy reports, academic articles 
in a range of fields and books. All non-interview sources that I drew upon for my four 
pairs of matching case studies are listed in Appendix B2.  
Having collected empirical material from the aforementioned sources, I analysed 
it by manually assigning the pieces of information contained in each source to one of the 
following broad categories: “potential benefits of cooperation in the sector”; “extent of 
observed cooperation”; “obstacles to cooperation”; “mechanisms for overcoming the 
obstacles to cooperation”; and “supplying the mechanisms for overcoming the obstacles 
to cooperation”. Each category included a number of sub-categories, allowing me to 
easily trace emerging patterns as well as differences among the case studies. This process 
was followed for every single interview and document listed in Appendices A and B, and 
the resulting corpus of coded material formed the basis for the “analytic narratives” (Bates 
et al. 1998) developed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this dissertation.  
1.3.3 Additional data sources 
In addition to the empirical material collected for my four pairs of matching case 
studies in Greece, I also gathered evidence about two case studies in Southern Italy: a 
high-cooperation case study in the alternative tourism sector, and a high-cooperation case 
study in the agri-food sector. The two Southern Italian case studies helped me explore the 
question of generalisability: would the argument that I developed based on the Greek case 
studies turn out to also be relevant in explaining how cooperation emerged in an 
unfavourable geographical setting outsider Greece? (Hancké 2009: 51; Tarrow 2010: 
251). I collected the material for the case study in the alternative tourism sector through 
fieldwork, including ten semi-structured interviews conducted in Italian, all of which 
were recorded and transcribed, as well as through secondary sources. The material for the 
Southern Italian agri-food case study relies on the published work of Bianchi (2001) and 
 
1 My collection of material from the local press was interrupted by the COVID-19 outbreak, which resulted 
in the temporary closure of the Library of the Hellenic Parliament. As a result, I did not acquire press 
material for all my case studies. Nevertheless, the press material that I had already collected for some of 
my case study areas was very useful and is extensively referred to in the empirical analysis.  
2 Throughout the dissertation, when citing those sources I include their serial number as presented in 
Appendix B.   
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Locke (2002). Figure 1 below shows the location of my case study areas, including my 
four pairs of matching cases (depicted in purple, red, brown and yellow); the areas where 
I conducted preliminary fieldwork (depicted in green); and the location of my two 
Southern Italian case studies (depicted in blue). 
Given that my dissertation focuses on the examination of mechanisms of 
institutional change and the configurations of variables that enable the supply of those 
mechanisms, it is difficult to examine most aspects of my argument using quantitative 
evidence. Nevertheless, one particular aspect of the argument, which is examined in 
Chapter 4, concerns the place-based characteristics associated with the likelihood that a 
particular path to cooperation will be locally available. Those place-based characteristics 
are in principle quantifiable. Therefore, as an extension of the argument that I develop in 
that chapter based on my case study materials, I compiled a database with nation-wide 
statistical data about the degree of cooperation and the relevant place-based 
characteristics in each municipality of Greece. I examined the association among those 
variables in a preliminary statistical analysis that is included in the Appendix to Chapter 
4, and that can act as the foundation for a more comprehensive future study. 




1.4 The dissertation’s empirical setting: a brief presentation of the cases  
1.4.1 Locations of preliminary fieldwork 
Before conducting research on the four pairs of case studies that form the core 
empirical material of my dissertation, I did preliminary fieldwork in the olive and olive 
oil sectors of three locations, in order to help me better design and structure the main 
stage of my fieldwork. Based on the empirical material that I collected later, some of the 
insights that I gained during those first fieldwork trips turned out to be very relevant for 
explaining how cooperation emerges in unfavourable settings. For that reason, while 
developing the core argument of the dissertation in the next four chapters, I sometimes 
also refer to material from my preliminary fieldwork.  
The first fieldwork trip that I conducted for this project was in the Bläuel olive oil 
firm in Mani. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a vertical network of 350 farmers, 18 
olive processors and a single bottling plant was set up in Mani, Greece. The network was 
centred around the Bläuel firm and it produced organic olive oil. For about a decade, the 
Bläuel firm and the collaborating farmers were the only producers of organic olive oil in 
the country. They were able to export their production and attain substantially higher 
prices than if they had sold conventional olive oil in bulk, which remains the default 
option in Greece (Lamprinopoulou and Tregear 2011). Although it only concerned 
vertical cooperation between producers and a firm, and not horizontal cooperation among 
firms, the case yielded several interesting insights, particularly about the role of trust in 
quality upgrading. 
During my preliminary fieldwork, I also visited producers, representatives of 
cooperatives, and representatives of final firms in the table olive and olive oil sectors of 
the regions of Chalkidiki and Crete. In the green table olive sector of Chalkidiki, relations 
among producers and firms are governed exclusively via the market mechanism. 
Acrimonious fighting occurs every year regarding the prices and payment conditions for 
the olives, and there is only minimal cooperation for quality upgrading. Moreover, the 
olive-producing firms only engage in minimal horizontal cooperation to collectively 
market the product in upscale markets. On the other hand, Crete is Greece’s foremost 
olive oil-producing region, but there are significant variations in the degree of cooperation 
observed in different areas of the island. Some of my interviewees in Crete had 
participated in what was formerly one of Greece’s largest olive oil cooperatives in terms 
of market share, which, however, faced grave financial difficulties and nearly collapsed 
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during the Eurozone crisis. Although my fieldwork in the two regions was not sufficiently 
geographically focused to constitute full case studies, the empirical material collected in 
Chalkidiki and Crete generated a number of useful insights about the role of clientelism 
and recent experiences of mismanaged collective efforts on the prospects for local-level 
cooperation. 
1.4.2 Cooperation in an established agri-food sector: the cases of Santorini and Lemnos 
wines 
Turning to the main corpus of empirical material that my dissertation is based on, 
the first pair of matching case studies that I examined were cases in the wine sector.  For 
upgrading to be achieved in the wine sector, the most relevant forms of cooperation 
include vertical cooperation along the supply chain for quality improvement, and 
horizontal cooperation among local wineries to build a collective reputation. 
On the one hand, the island of Santorini produces the most expensive and perhaps 
the most recognisable Greek wines, mostly based on the white Assyrtiko varietal. 
Producers of the Assyrtiko grape receive more than €3/kg, which is extremely high by 
both domestic and international standards (interviews #33, #35, #36, #37). The Santorini 
wine sector has an obligatory cooperative that all grape producers must belong to, but 
they are only obliged to deliver a share of their production to the cooperative, and are free 
to trade the rest privately (Venizelou 2015: 17/ S5). Apart from the cooperative’s winery, 
there are approximately 18 other wineries on the island today (interviews #33, #37). The 
success of the sector was the result of a major restructuring that took place in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, with a major change in the way grapes were harvested and wine 
was produced (Vlahos et al. 2016/ S7). During the Eurozone crisis, the wineries of 
Santorini undertook a coordinated marketing effort (the “Wines of Santorini” project) and 
were very successful in diversifying their market by switching from domestic to US 
consumers (interview #29). As a result, Santorini’s wine sector continued to flourish 
throughout the crisis, despite a collapse in the domestic demand for wines. 
The island of Lemnos also produces high-quality white wine from the Muscat of 
Alexandria varietal, which was brought to the island by Lemnian expatriates in the early 
20th century. Lemnian wineries also produce red wine from the Kalambaki varietal, 
which has been cultivated on the island since antiquity and is praised in the Iliad. The 
sector consists of a voluntary cooperative, which absorbs nearly two-thirds of the grapes 
produced on the island, and about 8 private wineries of various sizes (interview #78). 
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Although from the mid-2000s onwards, the actors in the sector have undertaken 
significant steps to improve the quality of the white wine in particular, Lemnos’s wine 
still commands low prices, it is barely exported outside Greece, and a lot of it is sold in 
bulk to big firms outside the island (interviews #82, #85). The producers’ price in Lemnos 
is approximately 42-48 cents per kilo of grapes (interview #86). The level of cooperation 
among wineries is very low, and there are practically no collective efforts to create a 
regional brand name for the wine or to utilise the potential of the Kalambaki varietal 
(interviews #78, #79, #83). The sector suffered a severe blow during the Eurozone crisis 
due to the collapse of domestic demand, from which it has yet to recover (interview #83). 
1.4.3 Cooperation in non-established agri-food sectors: the cases of Chios mastiha and 
Kozani saffron  
My second pair of case studies focuses on Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron. 
Although they produce different goods, mastiha and saffron producers face a similar set 
of challenges: in order to succeed commercially, they must not only guarantee the quality 
of their goods, but they must also produce innovative, differentiated products utilising the 
local inputs and create new markets for those products. 
Mastiha is a resin that is gathered from mastic trees, which are cultivated 
exclusively on Chios island in the Eastern Aegean. Chios’s mastiha producers are 
organised in an obligatory cooperative, where they are required to deliver all of their 
production. For decades, most mastiha was exported in raw form to clients in the Middle 
East, while a small quantity was also used for the cooperative’s mastiha chewing gum. 
The price of mastiha was low and the cooperative was often unable to find clients for its 
entire mastiha production (Tsouhlis 2011: 142/ S2). Nevertheless, starting in 2001, a 
sustained effort by the cooperative to reorganise its activities, implement a strategic plan, 
and create and promote innovative products led to a remarkable rise in both the price and 
the quantity of mastiha (Vakoufaris et al. 2007; Lioukas 2013/ S1). These efforts were 
spearheaded by the cooperative’s newly founded subsidiary company, Mediterra SA, 
which established a network of MastihaShops selling a range of mastiha and other high-
quality agri-food products. These shops constitute one of the best examples of innovation 
and branding in the Greek agri-food sector. A number of private firms that started 
developing a variety of mastiha products also made major contributions to the 
advancement of the sector. For example, the firm Concepts SA spearheaded the revival 
and modernisation of the production of mastiha liquor, transforming it from something 
 27 
that was only consumed locally in Chios, to the equivalent “for Greece of what limoncello 
is for Italy” (interview #58). Throughout this period, the cooperative also worked closely 
with the producers in a process of constantly improving the quality of raw materials, while 
it made important steps in advancing mastiha as a pharmaceutical product (interviews 
#59, #60, #62). The Chios mastiha sector remained resilient throughout the Eurozone 
crisis. 
The saffron sector of Kozani, one of the few saffron-producing regions in Europe, 
faces many similar challenges as the Chios mastiha sector. The two cases share a similar 
starting point in the early 1990s of producing a good with very few domestic uses, which 
was mainly exported in bulk and was highly sensitive to the vicissitudes of international 
markets. The Kozani saffron sector faces particular difficulties during times when Iran is 
allowed to trade freely internationally, as Iran produces 90% of the world’s saffron at 
prices that are as much as ten times lower than Kozani’s (Siracusa et al. 2011: 152; 
interview #53). As a result, creating a brand name for the raw input as well as for other 
products made using Kozani saffron acquires particular importance. The Kozani saffron 
sector is governed similarly to the Chios mastiha sector, through an obligatory 
cooperative that has the monopsony of raw materials. While the saffron cooperative has 
made some efforts to expand the uses of Greek saffron, most recently through its 
collaboration with the cosmetics company Korres to produce herbal teas with saffron, the 
ecosystem of private firms processing saffron in Kozani remains extremely limited, and 
even this collaboration with Korres recently unravelled. The extent of the cooperative’s 
collaboration with the farmers to engage in quality improvement of inputs has also been 
more limited than in Chios, resulting in the persistence of certain problems in Kozani that 
were eliminated in Chios through the centralisation and mechanisation of production. 
1.4.4 Cooperation in the alternative tourism sectors of Nymphaio and Ambelakia   
The third pair of case studies concerns collective initiatives for the development 
of an alternative tourism sector in remote rural areas which are well-endowed to become 
touristic destinations.  
On the one hand, Nymphaio is a mountain village at 1350m. altitude in the region 
of Florina, Greece, which represents an “exemplary case of revival of a mountainous 
touristic settlement” (National Tourism Organisation 2003: 4-26). Like many other Greek 
villages, it was nearly deserted after the Second World War. However, from the 1980s 
until the 2000s, the locals made a concerted effort to restore traditional buildings, provide 
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touristic attractions, and market Nymphaio as a touristic destination, turning it into one 
of the most popular winter destinations in the country. Among the most notable attractions 
whose creation was supported by the community was an NGO-run shelter for brown 
bears, which are an endangered species, and a YMCA children’s camp. In 2007, 
Nymphaio had thirteen hotels, five restaurants, seven cafés, and two stores with 
traditional products (“Nymphaio: Fair-tale with a name”/ D7). Despite its remarkable 
success in the 2000s, Nymphaio was hit hard by the Eurozone crisis due to its reliance on 
domestic tourism, and it was unable to diversify its clientele to weather the shock in a 
resilient manner. As a result, it faces a number of challenges today.  
On the other hand, Ambelakia is a village 45 minutes from the town of Larissa in 
Thessaly, Greece. Ambelakia is exceptionally well-endowed to develop as a destination 
for alternative tourism, and yet such touristic development remains very limited today. 
The main attraction of the village is a set of marvellous 18th century mansions (especially 
the Schwarz mansion), which are among the rarest and most well-taught examples of 
Greek medieval architecture. Located on Mount Ossa, Ambelakia could also offer the 
tourist a set of experiences in nature, while its good accessibility from Greece’s main 
highway between Athens and Thessaloniki is an added advantage. The village has one 
hotel, a few tavernas, and a number of cultural and other types of associations, but little 
is done at a collective level to provide touristic attractions and stimulate economic 
development. The village’s mansions are left to decay, collapsing one after the other. Due 
to the reliance of its small tourism sector on domestic demand, the village fared 
particularly badly during the Eurozone crisis. 
1.4.5 Cooperation in the mass tourism sectors of Santorini and Chalkidiki  
Finally, my fourth pair of case studies consists of Santorini’s mass tourism sector 
and Chalkidiki’s mass tourism sector. In the presence of fragmented ownership structures, 
cooperation in the mass tourism sector enables economic actors to upgrade quality, 
lengthen the tourism season, and attract differentiated, upscale tourism flows. 
On the one hand, Santorini is best-known for being one of Greece’s most popular 
tourism destinations. In 2015, Santorini had approximately 300 hotels, 1250 rental rooms 
and rental villas businesses, and 2 camping businesses (Spilanis 2017: 19/ S20). Rather 
than simply satisficing with the high volumes of tourism that the island was already 
receiving due to its unique volcanic landscape, starting in the 1990s, Santorini’s tourism 
actors engaged in a process of quality upgrading, especially in the villages of Oia and 
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Imerovigli. As a result, Santorini attracts tourists with a substantially higher per capita 
spending than the country average (Vassilopoulou 2000). Moreover, Santorini was one 
of the first Greek destinations to attract conference and wedding tourism, and during the 
2010s, following the collective marketing campaign “Year of Gastronomy 2013”, it has 
also emerged as a gastronomical destination. As a result, Santorini has one of the longest 
tourism seasons in Greece, with several businesses staying open throughout the winter, 
and multiple others closing for two months only (Spilanis 2017: 23/ S20; interview #75). 
However, these activities have induced the participation of only a limited number of 
actors in the sector, while most actors are not involved in any type of cooperative activity. 
Moreover, partly as a result of these successes, Santorini currently faces a problem of 
over-tourism, which it has largely been unable to tackle through collective action to limit 
and distribute flows. As a result, even though Santorini is classified as the high-
cooperation case in the pair of mass tourism case studies, overall, the degree of 
cooperation among the tourism stakeholders can be characterised as medium. 
On the other hand, Chalkidiki is one of the earliest mass tourism destinations in 
Greece, and every summer it attracts hundreds of thousands of tourists. As an order of 
magnitude, Chalkidiki’s tourism sector consists of approximately 500 hotels, 2000 rental 
rooms businesses and 40 camping businesses (interview #24). The case study focuses on 
the peninsulas of Kassandra and Sithonia, where the bulk of beach tourism is 
concentrated. Despite the high volume of tourism, local economic actors feel strongly 
that the failure to upgrade quality and lengthen the season in Chalkidiki is affecting them 
adversely (interviews #21, #22, #23). Very few cooperative activities among firms have 
taken and are taking place to address these challenges. Whatever cooperation is observed 
is in the sphere of marketing, where the Union of Hoteliers in particular has engaged in 
notable efforts through the Tourism Organisation of Chalkidiki, but very little is done to 
manage the tourism product collectively and create activities that would attract higher-
end tourists for longer time periods. The anarchic evolution of the sector over time has 
also created clusters of over-development resulting in a degradation of the touristic 
product. The sector has not been able to tackle the issue through action to limit and 
distribute the tourism flows (Tsoulidou 2013: 44/ S27; Gounaris 2015: 30/ S26).  
As is evident from the above discussion, the extent of cooperation in my eight 
case studies in the last four decades has differed not only within each matching pair, but 
also across the matching pairs. In two cases, namely Santorini’s wine and Chios’s 
mastiha, sustained vertical and horizontal cooperation over time has resulted in a range 
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of producers and firms supplying to the market some of the most commercially successful 
Greek agri-food products. In the case of Nymphaio’s alternative tourism sector, an 
impressive concerted effort to provide touristic attractions led to a remarkable rise of 
winter tourism in the village, but these efforts have not been sustained to the same degree 
in the 2010s. Santorini’s tourism sector has benefited from a moderate degree of 
cooperation for upgrading and the attraction of alternative tourism flows, but only a 
limited share of the relevant actors have participated in such efforts, while some collective 
problems remain unaddressed. On the other hand, while, for the reasons explained 
previously, Lemnos’s wines and Kozanis’s saffron are classified as the low-cooperation 
cases within their matching pairs, the relevant actors in those sectors have nevertheless 
engaged in some degree of cooperation for quality upgrading and innovation, 
respectively. In contrast, in Chalkidiki’s tourism sector, hardly any cooperative activities 
are taking place for the management of the touristic product offered in the region.   
In order to summarise the extent of cooperation observed in each case study, I 
have used a numerical score out of 10 as a heuristic device. A score of 10 denotes a high 
degree of cooperative activities among the relevant actors cumulatively since 1985, while 
a score of 0 denotes no cooperation. The purpose of these scores is to easily communicate 
to the reader the ordinal classification of my eight case study areas in terms of the degree 
of cooperation observed in each, something that will be useful for analysing variations in 
the degree of cooperation not only between matching cases, but also across sectors. The 
cooperation scores for each case study area are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: The extent of cooperation in each case study area 
Note: The cooperation score is a heuristic device that summarises the cumulative degree of 
cooperative activities in each case study since 1985. A score of 10 denotes a high degree of 
cooperation over time, while a score of 0 denotes no cooperation. 
  
High-cooperation case Cooperation score Low-cooperation case Cooperation score 
Santorini wine 9 Lemnos wine 5 
Chios mastiha 9 Kozani saffron 5 
Nymphaio tourism 8 Ambelakia tourism 4 
Santorini tourism 5 Chalkidiki tourism 2 
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1.5 The argument  
The overall challenge that I set myself in writing this dissertation was to explain 
the differences in the degree of observed cooperation in my eight case studies, and on that 
basis, to develop an argument about the supply of cooperative local-level institutions, 
which are a key ingredient for the political economy of local development in fragmented 
economies. The basic contours of this argument are outlined here. 
1.5.1 The obstacles to cooperation from the perspective of a broad conception of rational 
action  
In order to explain how and why cooperation can emerge at the local level in 
places where it did not previously exist, it is necessary to first understand the precise 
nature of the obstacles to cooperation that economic actors face.  
In this dissertation, I adopt what Ostrom calls “a very broad conception of rational 
action”, where economic actors take decisions based on a calculation of the expected 
costs and benefits of different strategies, yet their conception of those costs and benefits 
is not predefined in a singular way, but is influenced by the shared norms and structural 
features of the environment that they operate in (1990: 37).  
Within the contours of this general model, I argue that economic actors must 
sequentially overcome two types of obstacles in order to successfully engage in 
cooperative activities. Firstly, they must overcome a set of cognitive obstacles to 
cooperation, which relate to the actors’ conceptualisation of the costs and benefits – and 
sometimes even the very character – of the locally applicable cooperative strategies, 
relative to the non-cooperative strategies which constitute the actors’ default option. 
Conceptualising the costs and benefits of cooperation may be hindered by the problem of 
entrepreneurial discovery, a process that is particularly demanding in contexts where the 
actors are habituated to thinking in different ways about the sources of prosperity. Social 
fragmentation can also inhibit actors from correctly calculating the costs and benefits of 
alternative strategies, as a perceived rift between their own interests and those of other 
social groups may hinder actors from imagining that broad-based cooperation could ever 
be mutually beneficial. 
Nevertheless, even if those cognitive obstacles are overcome, and the actors 
acquire a good understanding of the payoffs associated with the cooperative and 
noncooperative strategies, cooperative activities may still be hindered by classic 
collective action problems, where “the individual pursuit of self-interest generates 
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socially undesirable outcomes” (Ferguson 2013: 4). The precise collective action 
problems will vary depending on the type of cooperative activity and the sector in 
question. Actors cooperating vertically along the supply chain may face hold-up 
problems, which arise when the requirement to make early investments in specific assets 
puts one group of actors in a position of vulnerability to be exploited. Actors cooperating 
horizontally within a sector may also face a variety of collective action problems, such as 
public-good provision problems, which arise when the share of the benefit of following 
a cooperative strategy that can be captured by the individual firm is so small, that the 
dominant strategy is to always defect.  
In short, in order to understand the emergence of cooperation among economic 
actors in fragmented economies, cognitive obstacles to cooperation, and particularly the 
obstacles of entrepreneurial discovery and social fragmentation, must be studied jointly 
with classic collective action problems: for cooperation to emerge, both types of obstacles 
must usually be addressed, albeit in a sequential way. 
1.5.2 Leadership and institutional change 
Ostrom argues that for cooperation to emerge where it was previously absent, two 
requirements must be satisfied at the same time: firstly, a particular set of local conditions 
must be in place; and secondly, the actors involved must operate within a facilitative 
overarching institutional framework (1990: 137-142). 
However, the nature of the local conditions that can enable the supply of local-
level formal and informal cooperative institutions remains quite unclear in the literature. 
My thesis argues that for the aforementioned obstacles to be overcome and for sustained 
cooperation to be generated in unfavourable settings, the crucial variable is leadership. A 
small group of boundary-spanning leading actors can act as catalysts for triggering a 
process of local-level institutional change towards a cooperative equilibrium by 
performing three difficult and costly types of institutional work, a concept defined in the 
management literature as “the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at 
creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence et al. 2009: 1). Firstly, the 
leading actors must introduce informal and formal local-level cooperative institutions, as 
well as generate conceptions of shared interest among local actors by projecting a vision 
about shared prosperity via cooperation. Secondly, they must disseminate new ideas 
about collective entrepreneurial strategies. Thirdly, they must provide ways to cover part 
of the upfront costs of cooperation, which are often substantial. In the absence of 
 33 
leadership, these three types of necessary institutional work cannot be performed 
endogenously in low-cooperation areas. 
My argument about leadership builds on Crouch’s (2005) work on “institutional 
entrepreneurs”. Nevertheless, I use the terms “leadership” and “leading actor” because 
they connote both the idea of a pioneering actor “influencing others within a given 
context”, and the notion of the leader being “a person of eminent position and influence”, 
in other words someone who possesses an asymmetric degree of power, resources or 
information relative to others (Oxford English Dictionary 2020). Although the idea that 
cooperative institutions can arise in the presence of inequalities is controversial, I argue 
that without taking into account the institutional work performed by a few 
disproportionately well-endowed and well-positioned actors, it is difficult to account for 
the emergence of cooperation in unfavourable settings. At the same time, I use the term 
“leadership” rather than “hierarchy” because the concept of “hierarchy” implies a degree 
of inequality in power – defined here, following Farrell, in terms of “the options that 
actors have should they fail to coordinate” (2009: 142) – that renders weaker parties 
entirely dependent on the stronger ones. If the weaker parties in the settings in question 
had no outside options than to work with the stronger parties, then the relation between 
the two would be governed through the mechanisms of control and coercion; cooperative 
institutions would be unnecessary (Hancké 1998: 239). Nevertheless, in fragmented 
economies with many small firms, all actors typically have outside options, and indeed, 
in settings that are unfavourable to cooperation, the default option is typically to defect. 
As a result, regardless of any power differentials, the stakeholders studied here are bound 
by “relations of mutual dependency”, making the study of trust and cooperation relevant 
(Lorenz 1988: 197). 
1.5.3 Leading actors as in some way outsiders 
What type of actors would undertake the costly institutional work necessary to 
catalyse change towards a cooperative equilibrium in an unfavourable setting?  
My dissertation argues that successful leading actors have three characteristics. 
Two of those characteristics correlate with certain features of place, while the third is to 
a large extent randomly distributed. Firstly, actors are best placed to innovatively 
recombine elements of diverse institutional frameworks and bring about institutional 
change if they are in some way outsiders to the area, whether they are locals with 
significant translocal experience or non-locals who have moved into a place. Moreover, 
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potential leading actors are best placed to know about and be able to access diverse types 
of resources to subsidise the upfront costs of cooperation if they possess a high degree of 
know-how and belong in networks characterised by high linking social capital, i.e. if they 
have a set of analytical and information-gathering skills, on the one hand, and sets of ties 
and acquaintances with a range of political and economic elites, on the other (Hurrelmann 
et al. 2006: 223). Actors with these two characteristics are more likely to be found in 
places with many translocal links and high educational attainment in the population. Thus, 
unlike the portrayal of cooperation in some studies as an outcome that can be facilitated 
by homogeneity and stability, I suggest that it is the combination of diversity and social 
mobility that create the most favourable conditions for positive local-level institutional 
change.  
However, it is clear that not all highly skilled, translocally embedded outsiders 
become catalysts for cooperation, let alone catalysts for cooperation in fragmented rural 
economies: in fact, few do. Successful leading actors also need to have a strong 
motivation to engage in the costly institutional work required to trigger cooperation. I 
argue that most leading actors are motivated either by a broad conception of their self-
interest, which leads them to believe that they can only succeed as entrepreneurs if the 
local sector in which they belong succeeds as a whole, or by altruism towards other 
members of the local community, which is a type of other-regarding preference. The 
extent to which actors have a broad conception of self-interest as well as other-regarding 
preferences is an individual attribute that cannot be reduced to the characteristics of place. 
This introduces an important stochastic element in the geographical distribution of 
potentially successful leading actors. 
1.5.4 Combining micro- and macro-level analysis: the role of facilitative overarching 
institutions  
The strategies that a small group of boundary-spanning leading actors follow to 
reshape the rules, norms and habitual ways of doing things at the local level, are nested 
within broader, overarching institutional frameworks which can facilitate or hinder local-
level efforts to catalyse cooperation. The final part of my dissertation’s argument 
proposes a framework for analysing what role macro-level overarching institutions play 
in local-level processes of institutional change, by sometimes providing to local actors 
the tools that they need to catalyse cooperation, and other times exacerbating the obstacles 
to cooperation that the local stakeholders face. 
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In particular, following Ostrom, I argue that overcoming the obstacles to 
cooperation is considerably easier in the presence of a “facilitative political regime” 
(1990), i.e. an overarching institutional framework which facilitates cooperation by 
creating arenas for decision-making and dispute resolution, reducing the costs associated 
with enforcing local rules, and offering technical assistance for the management of the 
collective good. 
But how can local actors have access to a facilitative political regime if they are 
located in an unfavourable setting that does not have robust formal institutions? I argue 
that crucially, facilitative overarching institutions can be made available not only at the 
domestic level, but also by supranational institutions and even by private certification 
agencies. In many ways, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) currently 
functions as a facilitative political regime in the agri-food sector, as several aspects of its 
regulatory framework and system of subsidies empower producers and firms to overcome 
the obstacles to cooperation. A facilitative overarching sectoral framework of a similar 
type is lacking in the tourism sector, making it considerably more difficult for local actors 
to overcome the obstacles to cooperation in that sector. By combining analysis at the 
macro- and micro-levels to examine the implications of sectoral policies for the prospects 
of local cooperation, I propose a novel angle from which to study how the “transnational 
integration regimes” that govern trade arrangements among countries (Bruszt and 
McDermott 2012) have the potential to reshape domestic institutions and foster local 
economic development.  
Overall, overcoming the obstacles to cooperation in unfavourable settings 
requires costly action by a small group of boundary-spanning actors who operate in the 
framework of facilitative political regime which may, at least in part, be externally 
provided. In the absence of local-level leadership, no type of overarching institutional 
framework can successfully impose cooperation on local actors. In the absence of a 
sectoral framework that is at least to some degree facilitative, the obstacles to cooperation 
will be too great for a small group of leading actors to overcome. Jointly, the institutional 
work of a few leading actors and the tools provided by facilitative overarching institutions 
will suffice for local-level cooperation to emerge in places where it did not previously 
exist. I expect this mechanism for the emergence of cooperation among local economic 
actors to be available as long as no gravely unfavourable inhibiting factors are in 
operation, such as a civil war or the presence of organised, violent criminal networks with 
an interest in perpetuating the non-cooperative status quo, which would pose 
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insurmountable obstacles to positive, local-level institutional change in a cooperative 
direction. Moreover, I would expect the importance of the argument outlined here to be 
smaller, the more effective the state institutions, and the more deeply ingrained the 
cooperative norms that characterise a location, though even in settings with robust 
institutions and ingrained cooperative norms, the mechanism described in my dissertation 
can be expected to have some applicability. Nevertheless, in the many settings with 
fragmented ownership structures that fall within those scope conditions, the path to 
cooperation outlined here should be available to local actors, and should be of substantive 
importance for our understanding of the political economy of local development. Figure 
2 below summarises the argument of the dissertation. 
Figure 2: Overview of the argument   
 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation  
Each of the aspects of the argument outlined above are developed in turn in 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the dissertation. Chapter 2 analyses the nature of the obstacles 
to cooperation that economic actors face in fragmented economies. Chapter 3 shows that 
those obstacles can be overcome in unfavourable settings, but only if a small group of 
boundary-spanning leading actors perform three crucial types of institutional work. 
Chapter 4 argues that this small group typically contains actors who are highly skilled, 
highly connected and in some way outsiders to the locality in question, and whose 
conception of self-interest encapsulates the interests of other local actors. Chapter 5 
introduces a second, macro-institutional level to the analysis, and investigates the effects 
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of national and supranational overarching sectoral frameworks on the prospects of local-
level cooperation. All four chapters begin with a brief theoretical discussion, and 
substantiate the aspect of the argument that they focus on through a detailed comparative 
analysis of the dissertation’s four pairs of Greek case studies.  
Having developed the dissertation’s main arguments in Chapters 2-5, Chapter 6 
turns to the question of whether the findings from Greece can also shed light to the 
emergence of cooperation in different geographical locations. Utilising original empirical 
material and published case studies from the Southern Italian and Central and Eastern 
European contexts, the chapter argues that the path to cooperation described in earlier 
chapters also seems to be available to actors operating in unfavourable settings beyond 
Greece. As a result, a good case can be made that the dissertation’s relevance extends to 
other institutionally thin, low-trust settings with fragmented ownership structures, though 
ultimately, precisely how far the argument travels remains an open empirical question. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with an overview of the dissertation’s findings and a 




OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION 
2.1 Collective action problems and cognitive obstacles to cooperation                        
During my fieldwork on the island of Lemnos, I was surprised to find a 
remarkable degree of consensus among stakeholders in the wine sector that what would 
really guarantee success in the long-term was not individual promotion efforts: “the most 
important thing is to create lovers of Lemnos” (interview #85). Viewed from that angle, 
generating cooperation for joint marketing efforts among the island’s eight wineries 
almost seems like an open goal. And yet “there are no collective actions” to that end, 
“neither formal nor informal” (interview #79). Why? 
Despite the potential benefits that firms and producers can gain by cooperating 
rather than acting alone, even the most economically sensible forms of cooperation often 
appear beyond reach. But precisely what is the nature of the obstacles to cooperation that 
economic actors face? Addressing this question is a necessary first step for understanding 
which types of solutions would enable the emergence of cooperation in particular places.  
There are broadly two ways to approach the question. On the one hand, political 
economists often assume that economic actors aim and have sufficient cognitive capacity 
to engage in best-response maximization, i.e. that they operate in a framework of 
substantive rationality (Ferguson 2013: 11). From this theoretical starting point, political 
economists use game theory to analyse a range of collective action problems, where “the 
individual pursuit of self-interest generates socially undesirable outcomes” (Ferguson 
2013: 4). On the other hand, sociologists, among others, challenge the assumption of 
substantive rationality, and argue that boundedly rational actors, who may not realise that 
cooperation can be beneficial and may be unaware of the full range of alternative 
strategies that are in theory available to them, rely on heuristics rather than calculative 
processing to make decisions (Uzzi 1997: 45; Ferguson 2013: 12). Those heuristics may 
relate both to the actors’ assessment about the best available economic strategies in their 
sector, and to their expectations about the degree of commonality of their interests with 
those of other actors. The main challenge is to trigger a process of change in the relevant 
actors’ mental models, such that they overcome a series of cognitive obstacles to 
cooperation.  
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While these two approaches are sometimes presented as incompatible with each 
other (e.g. see Sabel 1993: 1142), the main argument of this chapter is that both must be 
employed to understand the types of obstacles that economic actors face in the field, but 
they apply in different situations. Specifically, the resolution of cognitive obstacles to 
cooperation must occur prior to the incidence and resolution of collective action 
problems. Until the actors acquire a basic understanding of the different strategies that 
are available to them and the payoffs associated with each, collective action problems 
remain inert; however, once the actors start operating within a problem-complexity 
boundary where the costs and benefits associated with different strategies can at least be 
estimated (Ferguson 2013: 122; North 1990: 23), collective action problems become 
manifest and require resolution. This argument is consistent with a “broad conception of 
rational action” (Ostrom 1990: 37), in which economic actors take decisions based on a 
calculation of the costs and benefits of different strategies, but at any moment in time 
may face high degrees of uncertainty about the nature of those costs and benefits. 
The chapter is organised as follows: in the rest of this section, I describe the 
difference in the kinds of obstacles to cooperation that can be usefully analysed from a 
substantive rationality and a bounded rationality perspective, and I present in more detail 
four types of collective action problems and two types of cognitive obstacles that the 
literature leads us to expect economic actors may face in the field. In the following four 
sections, I show empirically which types of obstacles apply in which types of field 
settings. I argue that in cases of radical innovation, cognitive obstacles, including 
problems of entrepreneurship and social fragmentation, must be resolved before 
collective action problems even arise. On the other hand, when it comes to more 
incremental types of innovation, where the payoffs of different strategies are clearer to 
the actors involved, collective action problems act as a direct and immediate obstacle. 
The relevant collective action problems vary by sector. In the agri-food sector, where 
upgrading requires vertical cooperation along the supply chain, hold-up problems pose a 
major challenge. In the tourism sector, which is characterised by pervasive horizontal 
externalities among firms, coordination and public-good provision problems constitute 
the major concern. Distributional conflicts can emerge in both sectors. A set of contextual 
features make it particularly difficult to resolve those cognitive obstacles and collective 
action problems in the Greek setting. 
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2.1.1 Two types of obstacles to cooperation 
Based on the complexity of a situation and the cognitive ability of the relevant 
actors to grasp the main contours of the full range of alternative strategies that are 
available to them, it is useful to distinguish between two types of obstacles that may 
prevent potentially mutually beneficial forms of cooperation from emerging. 
On the one hand, in many situations, actors are aware that cooperation can be 
beneficial. They also know that they and other actors can choose to follow specific 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies, and even if they cannot always precisely 
calculate the payoffs associated with different combinations of strategic choices for 
themselves and for other actors, they can usually at least estimate them. Such situations 
can be usefully analysed adopting a substantive rationality approach, which assumes 
“goal-oriented behaviour with sufficient cognitive capacity to engage in best-response 
maximization” (Ferguson 2013: 11). In other words, in a substantive rationality 
framework, actors have the cognitive capacity required, relative to the degree of 
complexity of the environment that they find themselves in, to allow them to “maximize 
expected utility or profits” (Ferguson 2013: 115). Best-response maximization can occur 
not only when all actors possess perfect information, but also in the presence of imperfect 
information, where the relevant actors engage in probabilistic risk analysis. Indeed, best-
response maximization can even take place in the presence of at least some types of 
incomplete information, such as the information asymmetries observed in adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems. Under some circumstances, such hurdles can be 
overcome through the adoption of commitment and internal enforcement mechanisms. In 
the remainder of this dissertation, when I refer to collective action problems, I do so in a 
framework of analysis that is based on substantive rationality. 
On the other hand, “outside the confines of a narrow problem-complexity 
boundary”, cognitive constraints may lead the relevant actors to “basic misinterpretations 
of the environment” (Ferguson 2013: 12, 115). The actors concerned may lack the 
cognitive tools required to imagine the potential benefits of cooperation, grasp the nature 
of the full range of strategies that are available to them and to other actors, and 
consequently also to make any kind of estimation regarding the likely payoffs associated 
with alternative strategies. In such cases, the actors face not just imperfect or incomplete 
information, but Knightian uncertainty, which implies that they “simply do not know the 
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probability distributions of important variables, rendering traditional risk calculus” – and 
therefore also best-response maximization – “impossible” (Ferguson 2013: 124).  
Substantive rationality models cannot accommodate these kinds of high cognitive 
obstacles: instead, in such cases, a bounded rationality approach must be used. Boundedly 
rational actors remain goal-oriented, but rather than selecting the utility-maximizing 
response, they make decisions relying on heuristics, or “mental procedures that readily 
combine various inputs from current and prior experience to produce impressionistic 
judgements”. They thereby limit the number of options considered to a “manageable 
number” (Ferguson 2013: 12, 126). By interpreting “key categories, patterns, and cause-
and effect relationships” using mental models that combine heuristics and proper 
cognition, the actors make decisions that may reflect “accumulated judgements derived 
from prior experience, cultural transmission, and education”, rather than the full picture 
of the available strategies and their implications (Ferguson 2013: 136). Situations 
involving cognitive obstacles are inherently dynamic, as the actors may discover new 
available strategies in time, engage in a process of “adaptive trial-and-error learning”, or 
pursue evolving goals (Ferguson 2013: 115). Those dynamic processes can be formally 
modelled using evolutionary and epistemic game theory, but doing so is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. Nevertheless, I discuss extensively a specific set of cognitive 
obstacles to cooperation, which I consider crucial for understanding why potentially 
beneficial forms of cooperation can fail to emerge in the settings under consideration.  
2.1.2 Collective action problems in the agri-food and tourism sectors 
Game theory provides a set of very useful tools for understanding the nature of 
the obstacles to cooperation that economic actors face when the range of available 
strategies and the associated benefits and costs are relatively clear to them, as is often the 
case in economic exchanges. 
Vertical cooperation along the supply chain is susceptible to hold-up problems, 
which arise when one party to an exchange is required to make investments in specific 
assets that later put her in a position of vulnerability to be “strategically held up”, i.e. to 
be stripped of part or all of the benefits of those early investments, by an opportunistic 
other party (Ferguson 2013: 13, 106-107; Sabel 1993: 1134; Lorenz 1988: 199). To use 
a typical example, product upgrading often requires a supplier to invest in specific assets, 
based on the promise of higher future returns by the firm that will sell the upgraded final 
goods. However, once the supplier has made the specific investment, which has more 
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value inside the relationship with the firm than outside of it, the firm will have the 
incentive to renege on the initial agreement about the distribution of the increased income 
from the upgraded good, keeping a higher share for itself: “for example, after a supplier 
has purchased expensive equipment, its client may offer it only a low price” (Ferguson 
2013: 13). Alternatively, after having enticed “a collaborator into dedicating resources to 
a joint project”, a firm may refuse “to dedicate the necessary complementary resources 
until the terms of trade are renegotiated in its favor” (Sabel 1993: 1134).  Anticipating the 
risks associated with the time inconsistency of the final firm’s preferences, as well as the 
supplier’s loss of bargaining power once the specific investment is made, the supplier 
will be reluctant to make the investment required for upgrading in the first place. This 
situation is illustrated using a two-player sequential game in Box 1 (adapted from 
Ferguson 2013: 107). As a result of hold-up problems, economic actors will find it 
difficult to successfully implement quality improvements that require costly decisions to 
be taken upstream in the supply chain, based on promises of rewards that are removed in 
time, and whose realisation will depend on future decisions by downstream actors at a 
time when they will enjoy superior bargaining power. Such hold-up problems appear 
frequently upstream in the agri-food sector, as quality-improving investments in 
cultivation take time to bear fruit (McDermott 2007: 110), and producers cannot easily 
and quickly redeploy their assets to different uses (Chappuis and Sans 1999: 4). 
On the other hand, horizontal cooperation among multiple firms in a sector is 
susceptible to problems arising from the disinclination of economic actors to bear the 
costs associated with strategies that have strong positive externalities for others. As 
illustrated using two-player games in Box 2, depending on the relative magnitudes of the 
benefits and costs of making an additional positive contribution to a collective strategy, 
one can usefully distinguish between two types of related problems. The first is a public-
good provision problem, where the share of the benefit of making an additional 
contribution that can be captured by each player is so small compared to the cost, that the 
dominant strategy of the player is always to defect, regardless of the other player’s 
strategy (Prisoner’s Dilemma game). As famously pointed out by Olson (1965: 9-15), in 
large groups, individual contributions to a good shared among all group members are so 
small that they are barely noticeable: as a result, rather than incurring a cost to contribute 
to the public good, each individual has the incentive to free-ride on others’ contributions, 
leading to underinvestment, or – in the extreme case – to the non-supply of the public 
good.  
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A distinct problem arises in situations where the adoption of the cooperative 
strategy by additional actors has increasing marginal returns, such that in a two-player 
game, a player can benefit by cooperating, but only as long as the other player also 
cooperates (assurance game) (Ferguson 2013: 30). In such a game, the combinations 
{cooperate, cooperate} and {defect, defect} are both Nash equilibria. Therefore, even 
though the cooperative equilibrium is stable, breaking away from an uncooperative 
equilibrium is challenging. In multi-player games with positive network externalities, 
there is a tipping point such that once a threshold number of players have decided to 
cooperate, cooperation becomes the dominant strategy. However, until that critical mass 
of cooperating players has been reached, each individual player has the incentive to defect 
(Ferguson 2013: 39). Both public-good provision and coordination problems are 
particularly acute in the tourism sector, where place characteristics play an important role 
in shaping the clients’ experience, resulting in major spatial externalities among tourism 
firms when property structures are fragmented (Gordon and Goodall 2000: 291; Healy 
1994: 597).  
Finally, in both cases of vertical and horizontal cooperation, economic actors may 
face distributional conflicts that arise when multiple cooperative strategies are available, 
but the choice of cooperative strategy affects the distribution of the payoffs from 
cooperation. This problem can be illustrated with a battle-of-the-sexes game (Box 3), 
where both players have an interest in adopting the same cooperative strategy, but if each 
player insists on coordination on their preferred strategy, a zero-payoff outcome may arise 
(Ferguson 2013: 32). Distributional conflicts can also arise as part of more complex 
challenges, such as common-pool resource management, which requires addressing 
similar free-rider problems as those which arise in public-good provision, but it also 
requires resolving distributional conflicts among the involved actors. Unlike public 
goods, common-pool resource settings are characterised by rivalry: the use of a common-
pool resource by one actor reduces its availability to others. As a result, in addition to 
resolving free-rider problems, addressing common-pool resource overuse requires 
brokering an agreement among the actors concerned about how to share the costs of 
decreasing the consumption of the common-pool resource. Clearly, the terms of such 




Box 1: Hold-up problem between a supplier and a firm 
 
Notation: 
Benefit or Cost when the supplier Cooperates or Defects, and the firm Cooperates or Defects
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i.e. the socially optimal outcome in the game is reached as long as the supplier 
chooses to upgrade, regardless of the strategy pursued by the firm at t2. What 
the strategy of the firm determines is the distribution of the surplus of the final 




Box 2: Coordination in situations with increasing returns and provision of public 
goods 
 Firm B 
Firm 
A 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate b(2)-c(2), b(2)-c(2) b(1)-c(1), b(1) 
Defect b(1), b(1)-c(1) 0, 0 
Notation: 
b(n) = each player’s benefit from the provision of a public good as a function of the 
number of contributors n 
c(n) = each player’s cost of contribution to the provision of a public good as a function 
of the number of contributors n 
Assumptions: 
b(2) ≥ b(1); c(1) ≥ c(2) 
Public-good provision problem (Prisoner’s Dilemma game) - conditions: 
1. b(1)-c(1) < 0 
i.e. the returns to a single contribution are negative. If one player defects, it is 
better for the other player to defect. 
2. b(2)-c(2) < b(1) 
i.e. there are large costs to the second contribution, such that if one player 
cooperates, it is better for the other player to defect. 
3. 2[b(2)-c(2)] > 2b(1)-c(1) 
i.e. mutual contribution generates higher total payoffs than a single contribution. 
This game has one Nash equilibrium at D,D. 
Coordination problem (assurance game) - conditions: 
1. b(1)-c(1) < 0 
i.e. the returns to a single contribution are negative. If one player defects, it is 
better for the other player to defect. 
2. b(2)-c(2) > b(1) 
i.e. there are large gains to the second contribution, such that if one player 
cooperates, it is better for the other player to cooperate. 
This game has two Nash equilibria at C,C and D,D. 




2.1.3 Cognitive obstacles to cooperation: The problems of entrepreneurial discovery and 
social fragmentation 
As will be shown in the next sections of this chapter, economic actors in field 
settings are often aware of the full range of strategies that are available to them and face 
collective action problems such as those outlined above. Nevertheless, the marginalist 
theoretical framework3 used in the analysis of collective action problems cannot account 
for the cognitive obstacles encountered in the pursuit of relevant cooperative activities in 
the field, as it cannot accommodate problems related to Knightian uncertainty, which is 
a fundamental attribute of processes of innovation (Crouch 2005: 90).  
One of the most important cognitive obstacles to cooperation has to do with 
entrepreneurial discovery. Indeed, economic actors typically have major knowledge gaps 
regarding the goods and services demanded in far-away markets (Shane 2000: 449-450). 
Habituated to specific production methods, producers and firms in particular places may 
 
3 I use the term “marginalist theoretical framework” to refer to an analytical framework that focuses on 
decision-making based on calculations about marginal costs and benefits. 
Box 3: Distributional conflict (battle game) 
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i.e. firm A benefits more from coordination on strategy i compared to coordination 
on strategy ii, while firm B benefits more from coordination on strategy ii 
compared to coordination on strategy i. 
This game has two Nash equilibria at {i,i} and {ii,ii} respectively. Both equilibria are 




fail to conceive of alternative, higher value-added cooperative strategies, or may be 
unable to correctly calculate the associated expected payoffs. After all, in a bounded 
rationality framework, the heuristics that actors utilise in their decision-making “tend to 
include strategies that arise repeatedly in [their] prior experience, ones that they often 
hear about, or strategies for which good circumstances are otherwise relatively 
noticeable” (Ferguson 2013: 134). What is more, “as compared with uncertain benefits 
and costs extending over time, upfront transformation costs are easier to calculate and 
sometimes are substantial” (Ostrom 1990: 208-209). Economic actors may pay more 
attention to easily calculable, immediate costs than to fundamentally uncertain benefits 
that they might enjoy at some point in the distant future. As a result, “firms, particularly 
with limited resources and backward traditions, are less likely to invest in new capabilities 
(…) because of the uncertainty of future returns and the experimental process itself” 
(McDermott 2007: 111; see also Ferguson 2013: 134). Entrepreneurial discovery is hence 
an important challenge, which must often be addressed before cooperation for upgrading 
can begin to take place. 
The proposition that processes of entrepreneurial discovery should be studied 
jointly with collective action problems may at first appear odd, as these two types of 
problems are usually studied separately. Nevertheless, studying those problems jointly 
makes theoretical sense. Even within a single sector and a single case of upgrading, some 
cooperative activities may be characterised by a high enough degree of problem 
complexity to require entrepreneurial discovery, while other activities may be purely a 
matter of resolving collective action problems. Ostrom’s study of the management of 
groundwater basins in California (1990, chapter 4) provides a good illustration of this 
argument. Governing the Commons mostly focuses on the nature of the rules adopted by 
appropriators of common-pool resources to resolve collective action problems leading to 
overextraction. Nevertheless, a close reading of Ostrom’s Californian case study reveals 
that understanding the physical attributes of the groundwater basins and discovering, 
following a series of experiments funded by local sources, that it was “technically and 
economically feasible” to build a freshwater barrier to prevent saltwater intrusion, were 
both crucial steps in the process of ensuring the long-term sustainability of the 
groundwater resources in the basin. Indeed, the producers’ previous efforts to resolve the 
problem by limiting water use were important but had not sufficed for providing a durable 
solution (1990: 115-128). Similarly, in order to understand the supply of cooperation for 
upgrading, the study of collective action problems cannot be entirely separated in 
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analytical terms from the study of entrepreneurial discovery: both are relevant. The 
relative importance of cognitive obstacles to cooperation can be expected to be greater, 
the more radical the innovation associated with the cooperative strategy. 
Apart from the difficulties associated with entrepreneurial discovery, scholars of 
social networks and participatory governance point to social fragmentation as another 
reason why boundedly rational actors may fail to correctly assess the benefits and costs 
of cooperative strategies. Social fragmentation can generate subjective perceptions of 
unbridgeable differences in strategy and mentality even in situations where objectively, a 
cooperative strategy could pay off. Indeed, depending on “how the boundaries of a 
particular community are drawn”, members of particular social groups may be totally 
oblivious to their shared interests with members of other groups: it is only through a 
process of “coming to a common, and generally surprising view of an economic situation 
which each thought it had understood fully, [that] mutually suspicious groups can 
redefine their relations and (prudently) begin to construct communities of interest (…) 
where none had seemed possible” (Sabel 1993:1139, 1149). In other words, social 
fragmentation may not only inhibit the resolution of collective action problems at a 
particular location, but more fundamentally, it may also cloud the actors’ assessment of 
the costs and benefits of alternative strategies, acting as a cognitive obstacle to 
cooperation. Consequently, for McDermott, the fundamental obstacle that needs to be 
overcome for upgrading to take place is the “balkanization” of society in contexts where 
the bonds within specific social groups are so strong that they become “self-limiting and 
exclusionary” (2007: 107; see also Granovetter 1993: 1378; Streeten 2002: 12; 
Meadowcroft and Pennington 2008: 123; Ferguson 2013: 271-275). This view is also 
supported by Richard Locke’s study on the subnational variation of economic 
performance in Italy, which concludes that “polarised” local economies consisting of “a 
small number of more parochial and organizationally underdeveloped interest groups and 
associations usually clustered together in two opposing camps”, are much less likely to 
prosper than “polycentric” economies, which lack such salient divisions (1995: 25-28).  
Taken together, the four types of collective action problems and two types of 
cognitive obstacles to cooperation discussed in this section provide a useful analytical 
framework for examining what factors may prevent the emergence of cooperation for 
upgrading in the agri-food and tourism sectors. The remaining sections of the chapter 
discuss how these obstacles manifested themselves in different sectoral settings, and how 
they were magnified by a set of Greek-specific contextual features.  
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2.2 Upgrading in the agri-food sector: hold-up problems and 
distributional conflicts in low-trust, competitive contexts  
2.2.1 Hold-up problems in a context of mistrust towards entrepreneurs and the state  
The importance of hold-up problems between producers and final firms in the 
implementation of quality improvement efforts already became readily apparent during 
my preliminary fieldwork in the Bläuel network of olive oil producers in Mani. Fritz 
Bläuel arrived to Mani from Austria in the 1980s, and soon he decided to start producing 
olive oil organically. Having no land or capital of his own, Bläuel entered into discussions 
with local olive producers in order to form an organic olive oil network. Convincing the 
producers to join him was no easy task (interview #2), as producing olive oil organically 
required taking an immediate hit in the form of lower yields, based on the promise of a 
higher future return when the organic transition period would end. In a market where 
Bläuel was the only buyer of organic olives, this situation generated a suspicion that once 
the olive producers had put in the effort to convert their cultivation according to organic 
standards, Bläuel would renege on his commitments. This was an issue particularly given 
a general climate of “suspicion of the merchant” in Greece – “the farmers even hate him 
because it’s so easy for him to make money, whereas they have to work hard in the fields 
all day”. This suspicion was exacerbated by attempts to discredit Bläuel, for instance by 
the representative of the ministry’s agronomy department responsible for spraying the 
olive trees with chemicals, who “would come and tell the farmers that I was lying”. 
Indicatively, Mr. Bläuel describes how one of his initial attempts to establish a network 
of organic producers failed after he accused one producer of having secretly used 
synthetic fertilizers and expelled him from the network. This led other producers to doubt 
Bläuel’s reliability, and the entire network unravelled (interview #1).  
In fact, according to two interviewees in the management boards of olive oil 
cooperatives in Crete and Chalkidiki, following past instances where the cooperatives 
failed to pay promised sums of money to their members, the olive producers are hesitant 
to even deliver conventional olive oil to cooperatives, let alone undertake risky 
investments on the promise of future reward: “when someone hears the word 
‘cooperative’ in Greece, their mind goes to clientelistic relations and mismanagement – 
reality has generated this association. ‘Cooperative’ is a bad word, like ‘unionist’” 
(interviews #5, #9). This observation introduces the history of clientelistic dealings and 
over-indebtedness in agricultural cooperatives as a key reason for the lack of generalised 
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trust in the Greek agri-food sector, which makes hold-up problems particularly salient, as 
producers are accustomed to expecting the buyers of their products to renege from 
agreements. 
2.2.2 Hold-up problems as a function of the changing bargaining power among producers 
and firms  
In the same context of widespread suspicion towards both private enterprise and 
real or imagined clientelistic backroom deals, in the late 1980s and 1990s, when 
Santorini’s wine sector started to upgrade, the island’s grape producers were very hesitant 
to undertake even minor costs to contribute to future quality improvement efforts. One of 
the requirements of the upgrading process, introduced by private winemaker Boutaris 
who had just arrived at the island, was to shift the timing of the harvest earlier by a month, 
from September to August. This change was necessary in order to produce lower-degree, 
lighter wines from Santorini’s Assyrtiko varietal, but it entailed a cost. The cost had to 
do with the emergence of “a conflict in the intra-household division of labour”, as the 
harvest now coincided with the peak tourism season (Vlahos et al. 2016: 7/ S7), and with 
a reduction in the weight of the grapes: 
“[When Boutaris changed the harvest rules], initially he was treated with big 
suspicion, because the low-degree grapes weigh less. So the producers thought 
that he’s moving up the harvest in order to pay for fewer kilos and give less 
money, whereas in reality it had to do with the quality of the wine.” (interview 
#30) 
The issue had been discussed in the General Assembly of Santorini’s obligatory wine 
cooperative (known as the Union), where opinions about the extent of the weight loss 
implied by early harvest varied, with the representative of the Boutaris winery claiming 
that the difference was 2 percent, and the Union’s agronomist saying “that there are no 
scientific data, but from my experience since 13 years here, the difference must be 10 
percent, depending of course on the year”. As mentioned by one of the producers’ 
representatives in the same meeting, the view of many was that “I would like the Union 
to determine the dates of the harvest with its agronomist and not with foreigners” (Act 
117, Jul. and Aug. 1989/ D5).  
This view reflected the scepticism with which Boutaris had been greeted by 
Santorini’s grape producers, which is remarkable particularly if one considers that 
Boutaris arrived on the island at a time when the cooperative faced major difficulties to 
find buyers for its wine and had large quantities of unsold reserves. According to a local 
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oenologist, “the worries peaked in 1983-84, when the queues for the receipt of the grapes 
were unending. (…) It was apparent that the Union was in despair” (Thiraïka Nea, Sept. 
1988, 380/ N3). Nevertheless, as was stated by two producers’ representatives in the 
Santo Wines General Assembly,     
“nearly no Santorinian viticulturers have seen the cooperation of the Union 
with Boutaris positively, and wherever you go, they are criticising the Union 
for that reason. I believe that Boutaris didn’t come to Santorini to save the 
Santorinians, but to save his pocket.”  
“The cooperative should offer Mr. Boutaris a price that is in the interest of the 
producers, and if it seems expensive to him, he should act accordingly. Let all 
the producers understand that Mr. Boutaris came to Santorini so that they work 
while he makes money. If it’s not in his interest, he should close down his 
factory and leave.” 
(Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 117, Jul. and Aug. 
1989/ D5) 
This climate of suspicion presented an obstacle to the implementation also of other costly, 
quality-improving measures, such as vineyard restructuring, which, similarly to organic 
olive cultivation, imposes an immediate cost in return for the promise of a future reward: 
“when new plants are put in, they have a full fruit yield five years later” (interview #84; 
see also Vlahos et al. 2016: 7/ S7). 
The pervasive suspicion of clientelism, ulterior political motives and 
mismanagement also made Santorini’s producers hesitant to agree to major quality-
improvement investments by the wine cooperative, which they would partly pay for via 
a levy per kilo of grapes delivered to the cooperative (Santo Wines General Assembly 
meeting minutes, Act 114, Mar. 1988/ D5). In particular, when it came to the construction 
of the cooperative’s new, modern winery, which in hindsight was a milestone investment 
for the upgrading of Santorini’s wine sector, “there was a lot of reaction, [the producers] 
thought that a lot of money is being spent for no reason” (interview #36; similar 
comments were made in interview #29). These inhibitions must be read in the backdrop 
of a widespread perception that past investments had at best been “useless”, and at worst 
were done for particular individuals to gain rather than for the long-term benefit of all the 
members of the cooperative (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 117, 
Jul. and Aug. 1989/ D5). It is interesting that despite the success of Santorini’s wine 
sector, such perceptions continue to persist among some producers:  
“Like everywhere in Greece, here everything is measured in terms of votes, 
and the cooperatives don’t act in the producer’s interest. The whole edifice is 
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rotten and it doesn’t change easily. (…) Everything is prearranged, rigged, 
agreed upon with the ministries.” (interview #31) 
“-[Me:] What is the role of the wine cooperative? –[Interviewee:] To eat.” 
(interview #32). 
As is frequently the case also in other sectors, when it comes to quality 
improvement in the agri-food sector, asset-specific investments and the attendant hold-
up problems do not only arise on the side of producers, but they also affect final firms. 
As firms invest to upgrade and market a product from a particular locality, their ability to 
substitute the inputs by their suppliers with other inputs declines, transforming “a 
situation of ex ante competitive supply” to a “bilateral monopoly” (Lorenz 1988: 200). 
The prospect of being strategically held up by local producers in the future may deter 
firms from investing on making local products known in the present. The following 
conversation among members of the management board of a Chalkidiki table olives 
cooperative exemplifies how such a situation may arise: 
“- Speaker A: If we don’t receive higher prices for our olives this year, we 
will decrease quality and we will send our olives for olive oil production. This 
would also ruin the merchants, since they have multiannual contracts with 
their clients. 
- Speaker B: I don’t think it would ruin the merchants – they will always be 
able to find olives from elsewhere.   
- Speaker C: Where else will they find them? If the merchants cannot find 
olives from Chalkidiki, they will be ruined.” (interview #5) 
In other words, a calculation on the side of the olive producers that they can exploit the 
final firms’ dependence on them to reap distributional gains, may subject the firms to 
pressure to increase their payments to producers, perhaps beyond what they had originally 
anticipated. 
Such pressure on the final firms is more effective, the greater the market success of 
the local product. Given the producers’ initial hesitation to invest in the quality 
improvement effort, this is in a way paradoxical. Nevertheless, the growing bargaining 
power of the producers as a local product succeeds can be seen clearly in the evolving 
relations among grape producers and wineries in Santorini. When Boutaris first arrived 
on the island, the producers did discuss threatening Boutaris to stop supplying him with 
grapes if he did not provide them with the prices they were asking for: as was mentioned 
in the cooperative’s General Assembly, “fortunately or unfortunately, we are in a position 
where Boutaris exists, and it depends on us whether he will survive or not” (Act 117, Jul. 
and Aug. 1989/ D5). Nevertheless, in the context of the crisis that Santorini’s wine sector 
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was facing at the time, those threats were not credible, as many individual farmers were 
keen to sell grapes to Boutaris outside the framework of the cooperative, and it would 
take an immense and unpopular enforcement effort to stop them from doing so. Today, 
however, given the incredible success of Santorini’s wines and the small surface area of 
the island, producers are in a position to constantly negotiate increases in grape prices, as 
winemakers struggle to secure enough local inputs. In the words of a producer, 
“If the wineries want to get grapes next year, they make sure to be OK with 
the payments. They are searching for me; I’m not searching for them. If the 
farmers understood things a bit better, they would be able to get even higher 
prices. (…) It’s unacceptable for the winemakers to sell the bottle for €20 and 
tell us that that they make a loss.” (interview #31) 
From the winemaker’s perspective, the uncertainty about the quantity and price of the 
grapes that they will be able to secure next year constitutes a disincentive for “investing 
on the vineyard”: after all, one can’t expect “the consumer to find a product on the shelf 
which he has associated in his mind with a value of €10, and within one year to change 
his mind and say it’s worth €14; he will care” (interview #33).  
The situation is different in Lemnos, where the grave financial problems of the wine 
cooperative and the consequent surplus of grapes relative to demand, stipulate that most 
producers are very eager to join the network of a private winery. As explained by a 
Lemnian winemaker, 
“even this year, how many producers called us who said, for example, ‘I have 
15 stremmata4 of land, I am a good grape-grower, I want to enter your team.’ 
There are many grape-growers who knock on our door and want to enter. And 
we can’t take all of them because our quantity is fixed.” (interview #79) 
In this context, not only are producers unable to successfully hold up winemakers by 
refusing to sell them grapes unless they get better terms, but the winemakers’ ability to 
strategically hold up producers does not constitute a real impediment to quality 
improvement either:  
“[Me:] How easy is it to find grapes at the specifications that you wish? –
[Winemaker:] It’s extremely easy. It’s the producers who are begging, they 
are begging to bring you grapes, you understand?” (interview #83) 
The difference between Lemnos today and Santorini in the 1980s is that with the 
crisis of Greece’s statist model of development in the late 2000s, the collapse of the 
Agricultural Bank, and the loss of the cooperatives’ ability to accumulate large loans, 
 
4 1 stremma is equal to 1000 square metres of land. 
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Lemnian producers no longer have the alternative that Santorinian producers had when 
Boutaris arrived on the island, namely to “define a price of 70 drachmas/ kilo”, compared 
to Boutaris’s price of 60 drachmas, and to burden the cooperative “with a certain amount 
– of course it’s not just a certain amount, it’s several millions – in order to overcome the 
problem of Boutaris” (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 117, Jul. 
and Aug. 1989/ D5). In other words, in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the Lemnian 
grape producers no longer have a viable alternative to upgrading in order to prosper. This 
situation increases their dependence on private winemakers and reduces the obstacles to 
quality improvement on the island, but it also creates the potential for very skewed 
distributional outcomes – at least until the moment Lemnos wines become more 
successful, restoring the balance between the demand and supply of grapes and enabling 
producers to demand better terms from the wineries. 
2.2.3 Distributional conflicts among wineries in Santorini and Lemnos  
Even though hold-up problems do not impede quality improvement in the Lemnos 
wine sector in the same way that they do in places where producers have satisfactory 
alternative sources of income and higher bargaining power, other collective action 
problems do inhibit upgrading in the sector. After all, improving the quality of the wine 
is only one of the requirements for climbing the added-value ladder, while promoting the 
wine and entering new markets is also a necessary but costly process: “foreign markets 
are something you have to pursue, you have to spend substantial amounts of money to be 
able to appear in a market and to show consistency” (interview #78). While Lemnian 
winemakers agree that such an effort can realistically only succeed at the level of the 
island rather than by each winery separately (interviews #78, #79, #80, #85), strong 
distributional conflicts among wineries prevent them from agreeing on any strategy that 
could benefit some wineries more than others:   
“Perhaps it’s a bit premature to go as five competitors to an exhibition and 
knock the same door, and say come, choose the best, we don’t mind. If you 
find a buyer, what will he tell you, that oh I’ll take an order with half his wines, 
and the other half yours? It’s not possible.” (interview #85). 
The salience of such distributional conflicts must be understood in the context of 
intense competition in Greece’s crisis-ridden, shrinking domestic market for wine 
(interview #78): 
“There is huge competition, a constant war out in the market. Even if you go 
in a shop in the morning and close an agreement, by lunchtime someone else 
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will have gone in and taken it from you. You leave from the appointment, you 
go back to your office thinking how nice, I closed the job, and by the time you 
cover the distance from the shop to the office, you’ve lost the job again.” 
(interview #85) 
Distributional conflicts also pose an obstacle to cooperation among wineries in 
Santorini. Characteristically, winemakers have faced distributional conflicts in the design 
of joint marketing projects, as different project designs can benefit some types of wineries 
(small or large, mid-range or upscale) more than others (interviews #29, #34). Those 
conflicts are also aggravated by a competitive environment in Santorini, though in this 
case the competition stems from the scarcity of inputs: “it’s a super competitive situation, 
because at the end of the day, in August each producer must have money to be able to 
buy grapes” (interview #33; this point was also made in interviews #29, #30, #31, #32, 
#34, #37, #71, #72; see also Nikos Schmitt consulting firm 2019: 72/ S19). Τhe tensions 
that are generated every year during the harvest season tend to spill over to all other areas 
of cooperation among winemakers on the island:  
“-[Winemaker:] We have this bug of our race, that we prefer for the goat of 
the neighbour to die, rather than to buy a goat ourselves. We’ve done common 
efforts for synergies at times, but things could be even better. 
-[Me:] What obstacles do such efforts encounter? 
-[Winemaker:] I’ll tell you. We have an issue with the raw material, the grapes 
are limited. This creates conflicts, and sometimes those conflicts create siloes. 
(…) These small weaknesses can impair a strong vineyard.” (interview #71) 
The phrase that this winemaker uses – “we prefer for the goat of the neighbour to die, 
rather than to buy a goat ourselves” – captures well the lose-lose character of a failure to 
cooperate in the presence of distributional conflicts.  
Overall, hold-up problems between suppliers and firms and distributional conflicts 
among final firms are two major obstacles to cooperation for upgrading in established 
agri-food sectors. These obstacles become harder to resolve in an atmosphere of suspicion 
towards both private enterprise and the state, which is pervasive in Greece, as well as a 
climate of intense inter-firm competition, which is more specific to particular sectors and 
locations. Nevertheless, economic actors in established agri-food sectors may also face 
some of the obstacles that are more dominant in other sectors, which will be analysed 
below. For instance, if the winemakers resolve their distributional conflict and decide to 
adopt a cooperative strategy (such as a joint marketing project) even though it may benefit 
some of them more than others, they will still face a public-good provision problem in 
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deciding how to share the cost of the cooperative strategy. Moreover, in cases where the 
upgrading effort is highly innovative – perhaps the first or one of the first equivalent 
attempts at upgrading in the relevant sub-sector nation-wide, as was the case both in the 
Bläuel network and in the Santorini wine sector – then the hurdle of entrepreneurial 
discovery must be overcome before the aforementioned collective action problems 
manifest themselves. 
2.3 Upgrading in the mass tourism sector: the management of horizontal 
externalities and the role of social fragmentation 
2.3.1 Coordination problems in the mass tourism sector  
Some similar distributional conflicts to those described in the previous section, 
which can be modelled as a battle-of-the-sexes game, also arise in efforts to upgrade in 
the mass tourism sector. For example, in describing an upcoming project to “create some 
infrastructure for hiking” to which it was hoped that both rental room businesses and 
hotels would contribute, the President of a local rental rooms association in the Chalkidiki 
region explained that 
“such collaborations become difficult when there is a divergence in terms of 
economic interests, and the one party starts pulling one way, and the other 
another way. It’s due to such economic interests that fighting begins. For 
example, if money comes from outside, we will want to protect the interests 
of the rental rooms.” (interview #21) 
Nevertheless, a close study of the Chalkidiki and Santorini tourism sectors makes 
it clear that the major collective action problems that hinder upgrading in the mass tourism 
industry are coordination and public-good provision problems.  
Coordination problems arise in the mass tourism sector when entrepreneurs are 
aware that it would be beneficial to them if all firms in the area upgraded the services 
they offer, but are reluctant to take the decision to upgrade individually, as they would 
not be able to reap the benefits of upgrading unless a critical mass of other firms also 
upgraded at the same time. Having pointed out that Chalkidiki lost its high-income 
tourists to the islands because “we thought that it was possible to only take their money, 
and didn’t offer them quality services,” a rental rooms owner explained the difficulty of 
breaking away from the low-quality equilibrium in the following way: 
“Quality is a little better than average. For example, retail shop owners have 
inundated the market with Chinese products. But they cannot do otherwise, 
because the clients don’t have money. We have been inundated by our 
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neighbours [i.e. tourists from the Balkans], and these poor people don’t even 
have enough money to buy a coffee.” (interview #22) 
A hotel owner in a nearby village corroborated this view:  
“Tourism of very low quality has developed. The shops also contribute to the 
problem, it’s not just the hotels; everyone must improve quality for the level 
of the clients to rise. There must also be a promotion of the historic 
monuments, etc.” (interview #25) 
In other words, without a simultaneous decision to upgrade by a broad range of 
stakeholders, firms were reluctant to upgrade individually for fear that they could not 
attract high-income clients alone. 
Similarly, in Santorini, the chef at an upscale restaurant explained that firms in the 
accommodation and restaurant sector are interdependent: “It’s not the restaurant owners 
and cooks who control the quality of tourism, the quality of the tourists who come. This 
is controlled by the hotels, depending on the prices and type of groups they book” 
(interview #69).  
Moreover, the Santorini case shows that some tourism entrepreneurs who went 
ahead and upgraded before a critical mass of other firms did so, paid a disproportionate 
cost while only reaping a fraction of the benefit generated by their decision. The founder 
of Selene restaurant, one of the first upscale restaurants to utilise traditional ingredients 
and upgrade Greek cuisine not just in Santorini, but nation-wide, is an example of such 
an entrepreneur. As explained by an interviewee in Santorini, the restaurant’s move from 
the capital of Fira to the village of Pyrgos in 2010 had large positive externalities on the 
local catering industry:  
“From then on, the gastronomy of the village started to rise. (…) I don’t know 
how many Golden Caps5 Chatzigiannakis has earned, but the result was that 
the village became a gastronomical destination. There were coffeeshops that 
were transformed into restaurants. Imagine that we don’t have a coffeeshop 
anymore in the village, all the traditional coffeeshops have become 
restaurants, restaurants…” (interview #70) 
Moreover, Chatzigiannakis remarks with some bitterness that creating a niche market 
opens the way for the entry also of firms with lower standards:   
“I’ll give you an example. Santorinian salad, you’ll find it wherever you go. 
I’m the godfather of this story – essentially it was a Greek salad, which I 
named Santorinian because it should include Santorinian products, i.e. the 
unwatered little tomato, the fava, the caper leaves, the fresh cheese that the 
housewives made here. This has developed like the Greek salad abroad, 
 
5 Golden Caps are the only Greek gastronomy awards, granted to restaurants by the Athinorama magazine. 
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everyone puts in whatever he likes plus a couple of caper leaves that are not 
even local.” (interview #35) 
In short, to the extent that the benefits of individual decisions to upgrade are widely 
dispersed, when it comes to upgrading, being the first mover comes at a disadvantage. 
In Greece, these coordination problems in the mass tourism industry arise in a 
sectoral institutional framework that make them particularly difficult to resolve. 
Specifically, the arrival of sharing platforms and the fact that to this day they are almost 
totally unregulated in Greece, suddenly introduced a large number of new actors in the 
accommodation sector, with whom any efforts to coordinate would have to begin from 
scratch:  
“Well, now that the utilisation of isolated houses has entered the picture, this 
has deteriorated the situation, because they may tolerate a hole etc. (…) It’s 
because those who have houses are not serious. (…) We take care of the 
visitors of the village, and they don’t even take care of the visitors in their own 
accommodation.” (interview #70) 
The arrival of these new actors compounded the pre-existing difficulty of orchestrating 
coordination among the large numbers of firms involved in mass tourism, which was 
already acute, particularly in settings where “tourism development came not just in leaps, 
but as a thunderbolt,” such that “the generation that is now 40-60 years old (…) didn’t 
even have time to realise what happened” (interview #68).  
2.3.2 Public-good provision and common-pool resource management problems in mass 
tourism destinations 
In addition to coordination problems, firms in the mass tourism sector also face 
public-good provision problems. Those have to do both with the supply of services that 
benefit all local firms, such as destination marketing campaigns or destination 
management programmes (EBRD 2019: 75/ S21), and with the imposition of sanctions 
on violators of the rules, such as on firms which fail to uphold standards or cheat on prices 
through tax evasion. These situations differ from the coordination problems described 
previously, because the share of the net benefit that a firm can capture from individually 
contributing to such public goods is lower than the share of the net benefit of individually 
upgrading, making free-riding the most appealing option regardless of the strategy 
pursued by the other actors.  
When it comes to the imposition of sanctions on stakeholders who flout the rules, 
the challenge is magnified by an institutional context of widespread non-implementation 
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of the law. The following excerpt from the local press of Santorini about the construction 
of unauthorised buildings (afthaireta) in the 1980s is telling in that regard: 
“As in the whole of Greece, so on our island the law-abiding citizens declared 
their afthaireta and paid not only the fine (charatsi6), but also engineers, 
photographers and others in order to complete the supporting documentation. 
These men of the people, who built the afthaireta almost overnight with their 
heart in their mouth, (…) are wondering whether the ‘smart’ individuals who 
didn’t declare theirs, who are of course the plutocrats who built luxury villas 
on misappropriated beaches, aren’t in a better position now.” (Thiraïka Nea, 
Oct. 1983, 330/ N4)  
According to the author of the article, the residents who constructed buildings illegally 
but later accepted to pay a fine are “law-abiding citizens” who break the law out of 
necessity and with a bad conscience, in contrast to a host of “plutocrats” engaging in 
significantly more severe rule infractions. This shows that in a context of widespread non-
implementation of the rules, people may consider it costly and even arbitrary to enforce 
a sanction against a specific individual. 
Firms in mass tourism destinations sometimes also have to address problems related 
to overtourism, which threaten their ability to even retain their current clientele, let alone 
upgrade (Healy 1994; Morgan 1991). Both Chalkidiki and Santorini have faced and 
continue to face problems of overtourism compared to the capacity of their infrastructure 
during peak season (OAOM consulting firm 1977/ D14; Gounaris 2015/ S26; interviews 
#19, #25; Spilanis 2017/ S20). Addressing overtourism poses a problem that structurally 
resembles the challenge of managing a common-pool resource (Blanco 2011: 37; 
Briassoulis 2002: 1068). Public-good provision and common-pool resource management 
share the characteristic of non-excludability, which gives rise to free-rider problems in 
both types of settings: “there is as much temptation to avoid contributing to the provision 
of a resource system as there is to avoid contributing to the provision of public security 
or weather forecasts” (Ostrom1990: 32). Like the public-good provision problem, 
common-pool resource management problems can be modelled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game where each actor would individually prefer not to reduce their clients, regardless of 
the strategy pursued by other actors (Ferguson 2013: 29). However, public-good 
provision and common-pool resource management problems differ when it comes to non-
rivalry, which is a characteristic of the former but not the latter: while the use of a public 
good by one actor does not subtract from its availability to other actors, the use of a 
 
6 Literally, charatsi was a tax levied on non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. 
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common-pool resource by one actor does make it less available to others, frequently 
giving rise to overuse problems. As a result, common-pool resource management requires 
not only addressing the incentive to free-ride, but also resolving the distributional conflict 
about which actors will reduce their resource use, and by how much. The same problem 
applies when it comes to addressing overtourism: as indicated by the perspectives below, 
agreeing on a way to limit the tourism flows is challenging, as each sub-sector prefers to 
pass on the burden of adjustment elsewhere.  
“- They have demonized the cruise sector, which brings an income of 6 million 
through the Fira cable car, of which 1.5 million goes straight as a gift to the 
Municipality. I have asked, how will this money be made up? And with what 
will the jobs of the 1600-2000 people who live directly off the cruise sector 
be replaced? -You mean in shops? -Shops, tours, escorts, buses, all these 
things that have been set up around the cruises.” (interview #68, cruise 
industry employee) 
“Overtourism is a big problem on the island. (…) There must be a stop. I am 
of the opinion that building should be immediately forbidden in the area 
outside the town plan, and that the building of new hotels should not be 
permitted; only renovations should be allowed.” (interview #75, owner of one 
of the first luxury hotels along the caldera) 
“Darzentas [a pool constructor] believes that, for Santorini’s survival, 
construction needs to be strictly regulated. ‘It needs to be fair, though. When 
everyone has done their own thing, you can’t just punish the last guy to come 
along.’” (Tsiros 2018: 28) 
In short, the problem with addressing overtourism is that “each institution or social 
subgroup has a view about tourism which promotes its own interests in the short term. 
This has as a result, to put it briefly, that each one sees the tree that he likes, and we all 
together fail to see the forest” (Thiraïka Nea, Oct.-Nov. 1996, 445/ N4). 
2.3.3 Social fragmentation among insiders and outsiders in touristic destinations 
Even though many challenging situations in the mass tourism sector can be usefully 
analysed in terms of collective action problems, when it comes to more innovative 
cooperative activities whose payoffs are not well-established, touristic areas are also 
susceptible to the antecedent obstacle of social fragmentation. This is due to the 
seasonality of tourism, which means that an unusual share of entrepreneurs in the sector 
do not permanently live in the area where their business is located, but regularly move in 
and out during the year. This social structure risks generating siloes.  
Indeed, in Chalkidiki there is a major polarisation between local entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurs or holiday makers from the nearby city of Thessaloniki (see also OAOM 
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consulting firm 1977/ D14; Antoniou 2015/ S29). From the point of view of an 
entrepreneur who is local to the village of Kallithea, “the problem is that not even 20% 
of entrepreneurs are locals, and the outsiders don’t care” (interview #22; a similar 
comment was made in interview #21). Conversely, from the perspective of an 
entrepreneur who migrated to Kallithea from Thessaloniki and who explained that she 
“has studied and has another job there, but took over the business a year ago in order to 
help out my mother,” the problem in the village is that  
“there is no vision. There are many reasons for that, but the principal one is 
that there is no touristic education, in fact there is no education more generally. 
On the other hand, in Mykonos, for instance, there is a vision, and 
entrepreneurs are constantly striving to improve the product.” (interview #23).  
Thus, “insiders” and “outsiders” in the village of Kallithea seem to be separated by the 
perception of a gulf in terms of their interests, abilities and worldview. 
As reflected in the following excerpt from the local press, such conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders have also been occurring in the tourism sector of Santorini: 
“THE ‘FOREIGNERS’: It is sad to observe that most businesses (hotels, 
restaurants, shops etc.) are in the hands of ‘foreigners’, i.e. non-Santorinian 
entrepreneurs. Few of those moved to our island for love of the place. Most 
came in order to make easy money as quickly as possible through exploiting 
tourism, with all the consequences this has for the defamation of our island. 
OUR ‘OWN’: On the contrary, it is pleasing to observe that all the touristic 
offices belong to Therans. (…) As a result, many of our ‘own’ young people 
stay, work and offer their services to the visitors with responsibility.” 
(Thiraïka Nea, Sep. 1983, 329/ N4) 
Interestingly, this column elicited an outraged response by the President of Santorini’s 
Association of Jewellers and Merchants of Popular Art, himself a non-local but 
permanent resident of the island, who accused the newspaper of  
“denigrat[ing] people who are in every way esteemed and useful to the small 
society of our island, because they had the bad luck not to all be born in 
Santorini, but ‘somewhere’ in Greece! (…) Are you, Mr. Lygnos [the 
newspaper editor], a Santorinian or an Athenian? If you are a Santorinian, then 
(…) why, as a young scientist, didn’t you come to work HERE, but you are 
trying to infiltrate and cultivate ‘racist’ hatred in the calm society of our island, 
from far away?” (Thiraïka Nea, Oct. 1983, 330/ N4) 
This exchange shows that the identities of “insiders” and “outsiders” can be malleable 
and negotiable. Nevertheless, if they crystallize and lead to the formation of siloes, actors 
from different groups may fail altogether to envision the contours and potential 
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advantages of mutually beneficial cooperation strategies, putting a halt to the prospects 
for cooperation before collective action problems can even manifest themselves. 
2.4 Creating innovative products in the agri-food sector: 
entrepreneurial discovery in a statist environment  
Case studies in established agri-food sub-sectors such as olive oil, wine and mass 
tourism highlight the different types of collective action problems that upgrading efforts 
face in the agri-food and tourism sectors. We now turn to two pairs of case studies of 
more radical innovation in the two sectors, where the challenge was to create totally new 
products and channel them into new markets. In such contexts, overcoming the hurdle of 
entrepreneurial discovery is central for cooperation to emerge among stakeholders. 
2.4.1 The challenge of entrepreneurial discovery in the Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron 
sectors 
Though they are different, Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron have an important 
similarity: they are both products which were traditionally exported in raw form to 
international clients and had very limited uses in the domestic market. This situation 
rendered mastiha and saffron highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international 
markets. Indeed, while for a long time, the biggest market for mastiha was Turkey, this 
market closed in the 1950s (Tsouhlis 2011: 141/ S2). Fortunately for the mastiha 
producers, the closure of the Turkish market coincided with the rise of the Iraq market, 
where mastiha started to be used in large quantities to produce the alcoholic drink arak. 
However, by the end of the 1970s the Iraqis replaced mastiha with a cheaper substitute, 
generating a major crisis in the sector (Tsouhlis 2011: 218-221/ S2). In turn, Kozani 
saffron is highly vulnerable to competition from saffron produced in Iran, which is by far 
the biggest saffron producer in the world and offers prices that as much as ten times 
cheaper than in Kozani (“Annual report 2000”/ D3; Palaiologos 2016). As a result, 
whether countries that demand saffron are free to trade with Iran or not has an important 
impact on the Kozani saffron producers: under circumstances of free economic exchange 
with Iran, “it was easier to sell stones than to sell saffron” (interview #53). 
As mentioned in a report that the then President of the Kozani saffron cooperative 
Patsilias had prepared in 2000, producing innovative products with Kozani saffron would 
be a way to reduce the sector’s vulnerability to international markets and enhance product 
differentiation (“Annual report 2000”/ D3). However, doing so was far from obvious in 
a context where local saffron consumption was practically inexistent (“PDO 
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Application”/ D2). Indeed, as mentioned by Patsilias in our interview, when he first took 
over the management of the cooperative, he read in the minutes of previous General 
Assembly meetings that a producers’ representative had once asked whether the 
cooperative could do research on the properties of saffron: 
“And the President replied –what if it turns out that the product is harmful for 
health? What do you want, do you want us to be ruined? They thought that 
some naïve people were buying saffron because they wanted to damage their 
health. I’m trying to say that these things had to be overcome, they were 
ridiculous.” (interview #53) 
Similarly, when in 2002, the Chios cooperative founded its subsidiary company 
Mediterra, “they had to look under the stones to find mastiha products – they started with 
five products of mastiha spoonful sweet and I don’t know, pasteli bars, and now they 
must have at least 220 mastiha products in the shop” (interview #59).  
Creating totally new products requires not only coming up with novel 
entrepreneurial ideas in places where they were previously absent from the relevant 
actors’ mental models of possible strategic repertoires, but also overcoming the power of 
inertia and convincing the producers to agree to invest on experiments with uncertain 
returns (interview #58). As a former President of the mastiha cooperative said, “another 
challenge was this taboo, that here everything is holy and sacred, we don’t touch it, we 
just come in and go with the flow.” He added that “we did experiments, but as you 
understand you can’t sell the experiment, you have to throw it away. So the farmers said 
‘oh, they throw away our wealth’, etc.” (interview #66; a similar point was made in 
interview #53). In other words, unlike its uncertain returns, the upfront costs of 
experimentation are easy to calculate and thereby salient, further adding to the hurdles to 
entrepreneurial discovery. 
These hurdles are particularly difficult to overcome in the context of a statist model 
of economic development, where actors are habituated to thinking differently about the 
sources of economic prosperity than in terms of entrepreneurship and innovation. Indeed, 
a strong statist orientation was one of the defining characteristics of Greek agricultural 
cooperatives. Not only was the mastiha cooperative rescued by the state a number of 
times when it faced financial troubles (Tsouhlis 2011: 102, 141, 195/ S2), but also the 
producers were accustomed to thinking of the cooperative as “our home: when we didn’t 
have money, we would go and take out a loan; (…) and we made houses thanks to this 
money, wherever you see a house in Chaïdari, it belongs to someone from [the mastiha-
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producing village of] Pyrgos” (interview #61). In this environment, at least prior to the 
Eurozone crisis and the collapse of the statist model in Greece, the idea that a cooperative 
was not a “social organisation” that would support the producers through handing out 
cheap loans, offering jobs to the producers’ children and providing cheap grocery items, 
but it was “a commercial business with the sole aim of making profit” (interview #63), 
was nothing short of radical.  
This state orientation plays a profound role in Kozani for the additional reason that 
the surrounding area’s development in recent decades has been highly reliant on lignite 
mining by the state electricity company DEH, generating the expectation that prosperity 
derives from the provision of well-paid jobs by a single large employer, the state. Indeed, 
the primary occupation of several saffron producers is actually in the DEH plants 
(interview #54). Moreover, it is characteristic that most of the discussion about economic 
development in Kozani’s press concerned either the future of the local lignite reserves, or 
the spending priorities of the so-called “local fund”, which is given by the Greek state to 
the region as compensation for the pollution generated by the mines (Kiriakatikos 
Chronos, e.g. 16/4/2000, 2896: 1/ N1). Rather than creating a fertile ground for 
entrepreneurial discovery, this context reproduces state-oriented mental models and 
strengthens the forces of inertia. The long embargo on Iran in the 2000s and early 2010s 
also encouraged complacency in Kozani, as it dramatically reduced the global supply of 
saffron. However, the partial removal of the embargo in the mid-2010s has created a new 
“headache” for the cooperative (interviews #53, #54).  
2.4.2 Social fragmentation among producers and firms in the Kozani saffron sector 
Social fragmentation can exacerbate the obstacle of entrepreneurial discovery if 
distinct groups within a sector, such as the producers in the village of Krokos and the 
agri-food entrepreneurs in the neighbouring city of Kozani, consider the distance that 
separates them to be so big, that it is almost inconceivable to them that mutually beneficial 
strategies are possible. As mentioned by a Kozani entrepreneur, “the problem [with the 
cooperative] is that there is no openness, there are no presidents with an open mind. So I 
seek personal benefits, I can’t open everyone’s eyes and lose out myself” (interview #52). 
In turn, when I asked her whether the cooperative works with local agri-food firms 
producing saffron products, the Director of the saffron cooperative remarked that  
“there is some cooperation, for example with a company that makes honey 
with saffron, and a local company that makes dips. But these links are very 
 65 
limited, and we don’t want them to expand. If consumers find everything 
ready, then they won’t buy saffron from us anymore. Also, we don’t want to 
do all the advertisement, and firms to benefit without paying” (interview #55). 
Thus, some agri-food entrepreneurs in the city of Kozani and some representatives of the 
obligatory saffron cooperative in the village of Krokos seem to consider their interests as 
antagonistic and their mentalities as incongruent. This situation inhibits the discovery of 
potentially beneficial collective entrepreneurial strategies. 
2.4.3 Hold-up problems in Chios and Kozani  
Finally, especially in the context of the mistrust that accompanied the statist model 
of development in the Greek agricultural sector, hold-up problems are a generalised issue 
when it comes to vertical cooperation for quality improvement, which also comes up in 
non-established agri-food sectors.  
Characteristically, the former President of the Kozani saffron cooperative Patsilias 
recounts that he had once proposed that the processing of the crocus flowers, from which 
saffron is derived, should no longer take place in the houses of the producers: “This was 
because - look at what happens now. The farmer sits down to extract the stigmas of the 
flowers, and as he is cleaning the saffron, he also puts a plate on the table to eat. And 
when he brings the saffron the cooperative, it’s mixed with breadcrumbs” (interview #53). 
Instead, Patsilias suggested that the processing stage should be centralised at the 
cooperative. Such a change would entail a transition cost, as farmers would initially get 
a lower kilo price in order to enable the cooperative to cover the cost of processing the 
flowers. Nevertheless, eventually “I think the prices would rise, because the product 
would be better.” However, the farmers were not convinced, fearing that after they had 
been stripped of a task through which they added value to the product themselves, the 
cooperative would have no incentive to deliver on the higher prices in the future: “they 
said, how will we know what quantity I delivered, how will the quality be assessed, how 
will this and that be measured - well, there was no trust. OK, I understand that” (interview 
#53). In fact, even today, the problem that Mr. Patsilias had tried to resolve persists, with 
the cooperative’s clients sometimes complaining that they find hair and other foreign 
bodies mixed with this very delicate and expensive product (field notes, interview #54).  
According to the CEO of Mediterra, similar obstacles were also faced in Chios, 
where “very many things have changed regarding quality [of the raw mastiha]”. The new 
quality standards “make the life of the producers harder,” and they also come with 
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requirements for additional controls, “whose cost is being passed on somewhere, right?” 
(interview #58).  
2.5 Creating an alternative tourism destination: supplying collective 
entrepreneurial strategies and public goods in a context of depopulation  
In remote, deprived areas which have experienced a period of depopulation and 
economic decline, bringing about economic regeneration through the creation of an 
alternative tourism sector is a complex endeavour that requires overcoming both profound 
obstacles related to entrepreneurial discovery and social fragmentation, along the lines 
analysed in the previous section, and substantial public-good provision problems, along 
the lines analysed in section 2.3. 
2.5.1 The challenge of entrepreneurial discovery  
My two case study areas in the alternative tourism sector, Nymphaio and 
Ambelakia, are both villages which thrived during the late Ottoman period but faced 
economic decline during most of the twentieth century and accelerated depopulation after 
the Second World War and Greek Civil War. In Nymphaio,   
“those who stayed after the wars were occupied in the utilisation of the 
communal forest, the cultivation of potatoes, and we also had some grocers. 
Some had 3-4 cows and were occupied in animal-herding but at the household 
level. They would also sell a calf to survive.” (interview #15) 
The final blow came with the development of the fur trade in the nearby town of Kastoria 
in the 1960s and 1970s, which generated a number of well-paid jobs: “Before the 
development of fur in Kastoria we had 1000 residents, whereas afterwards only 50 were 
left” (interview #15). Similarly, in Ambelakia, “many residents left as workers in [the 
nearby city of] Larisa, and they only came back during the weekend. Those who remained 
tried to survive with animal husbandry and agriculture: wines, chestnuts, small 
cultivations” (interview #48). 
In such contexts, envisaging that young and wealthy urbanites from Greece and 
abroad might wish to spend their holidays in the village, and conceptualising what types 
of activities could attract them there, are far from trivial challenges. As it happened, in 
Nymphaio, one of the core attractions that was created to generate a tourism flow was a 
sanctuary for brown bears, which are an endangered species, by the NGO Arktouros. As 
the former President of the Nymphaio Community recalls, in the beginning, the village 
residents found it difficult to imagine that anyone would be willing to visit a sanctuary 
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for brown bears: “at the start, the locals were mocking Arktouros, saying ‘hear, hear, the 
bears will come to feed us!’ But later they understood. Arktouros, which we mocked at 
the start, proved to be a goldmine for the village” (interview #14). More generally, in the 
words of Boutaris, the entrepreneur who opened the first two hotels in the village, “local 
communities are as a rule conservative, closed and I would dare say even phobic towards 
any change that comes from outside” (quoted in Tsalkou 2007: 111/ S14).  
In Ambelakia, these challenges are compounded by a widespread expectation that 
the actor responsible for resolving most of the village’s problems is the state. As 
mentioned characteristically by the President of the Folk Art and Historical Museum of 
Ambelakia in his opening remarks at an event, 
“the state has not showcased the history of the Ambelakia cooperative like it 
should have. In the past it was the responsibility of the prefecture, now it’s the 
responsibility of the periphery. Finally, they should come and see the 
[Schwarz mansion, the village’s most notable attraction], and preserve it. It’s 
their duty to preserve it, and also to preserve the however many other 
ramshackle mansions which still survive.” (book launch of Vassileios 
Tsolakis, 15/7/2018, field notes) 
As this quote indicates, part of the reason for people’s expectation of state intervention in 
Ambelakia has to do with the symbolic importance of the village in the Greek collective 
imaginary. After all, every primary school child in the country learns that Ambelakia is 
the place where “the first cooperative in the world” emerged and thrived in the 18th 
century. Moreover, one may surmise that the fact that the first attempt to develop tourism 
in Ambelakia was a top-down initiative implemented by the central government, which 
created and funded a women’s agri-tourism cooperative that never properly took off 
(interviews #47, #48), perhaps strengthened the locals’ anticipation that economic 
development was going to be a state-led process rather than the result of private 
entrepreneurial initiative.  
2.5.2 Social fragmentation among insiders and outsiders   
To make matters more difficult, the need to involve a broad range of diverse 
stakeholders in attracting alternative tourism flows generates similar insider-outsider 
dynamics as those encountered in the mass tourism sector, potentially resulting in the 
formation of siloes that inhibit the actors from perceiving the contours of possible 
mutually beneficial cooperative projects. Indeed, one of the interesting features of the 
society of Ambelakia is that it includes a surprising number of civil society groups: if one 
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were to measure social capital solely based on the number of local associations, the 
village would score very highly. However, the relations among those associations are 
characterised by suspicion and a sense of a social gulf. As mentioned by a member of one 
of the village’s associations, “[Association X] is a step for the political ascent of its 
members. Whereas we don’t do politics, we want the village to develop.” This view was 
reciprocal: according to a member of Association X, “the question about Association Y 
is whether they do what they do in order to attract tourists, or whether they do it to bring 
in their own acquaintances and friends” (interviews #50, #51). Underlying this conflict 
was an antagonism about who was most genuinely an insider. From the point of view of 
a non-local but permanent resident of Ambelakia,   
“Here in the village they have this mentality, that the outsider arrived and 
wants to show off. (…) But those at [Association X, who originate from 
Ambelakia], are not concerned with earning an income here, as most live in 
Larisa anyway. They don’t have to find ways for themselves and their children 
to stay at the village. Whereas I can either be an animal-herder or farmer, or I 
can in some way engage in the tourism industry.” (interview #50) 
These social dynamics can to some degree also be observed in Nymphaio. The first 
hotel owner of the village, Boutaris, who comes from Nymphaio but lived all his life 
elsewhere, argues that one of the reasons for the locals’ original resistance against the 
establishment of the bear sanctuary was that “they had a complex, that these guys will 
come to take over our village” (interview #13). Even today, a non-local who moved to 
Nymphaio to run a hotel, complains that while the local hotel owners “offer toast, we 
offer a royal breakfast. The others only have profit as an aim. How shall we do something 
together?” (interview #17)  
However, by now, Nymphaio’s village residents have by and large come to 
understand the broad contours of possible cooperative projects. Where social 
fragmentation can still really be observed in a stark way in Nymphaio is between the 
residents of Nymphaio and those of surrounding villages. Several interviewees stressed 
that the Nymphaiots are – and have been since generations – “bourgeois” (astoi), and not 
“farmers” or “contractors” like the inhabitants of surrounding villages: 
“We are dissimilar (anadelfoi) with these [neighbouring] villages, we don’t fit 
together. We were bourgeois, we have a different culture and education. They 
are villagers, and they care about agriculture and energy production, not 
tourism.” (interview #15) 
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From my brief visit to the nearby village of Limnochori, the feeling of social distance 
was shared: “Why are you staying in Nymphaio?” one of the clients at the local coffee 
house asked. “For x or y reasons Nymphaio acquired a reputation, received funds and 
developed, but there are other nice places to stay, and they are cheaper, too”. This social 
fragmentation hinders the scaling of Nymphaio’s alternative tourism sector, despite 
considerable potential for mutually beneficial broader synergies. 
2.5.3 Public-good provision problems 
Even if the considerable obstacles associated with entrepreneurial discovery and 
social fragmentation are overcome and the relevant actors acquire a good grasp of the 
approximate payoffs associated with cooperative and noncooperative strategies, creating 
alternative tourism flows is likely to stumble on significant public-good provision 
problems. Such problems are even more prominent in the case of alternative tourism in 
remote areas than in the case of mass tourism, as the generation of new tourism flows 
relies critically on the creation of new attractions, a costly process which generates 
benefits for all the local economic actors, regardless of who covers the cost. 
Indeed, the costs associated with providing the attractions that turned Nymphaio 
into one of the most popular winter tourism destinations in Greece were very significant. 
Apart from the bear sanctuary, some landmark activities included the creation of a 
children’s camp, a conference centre, a horse-riding centre, a silversmithing museum, a 
nature park, a network of signposted paths, and an amphitheatre (“Nympahio: Fair-tale 
with a name”/ D7). Moreover, nearly all of the village’s old houses and mansions were 
renovated at very high cost, as were some of the landmark public buildings of Nymphaio, 
such the church of Agios Nikolaos and the Nikeios School (interviews #14, #16). 
Nymphaio’s development as a tourism destination also required substantial public works, 
including new watering and sewage networks, underground telecommunication 
networks, the construction of a peripheral road and parking lots so that cars wouldn’t 
enter the village, and the restoration of the traditional cobbled paths in the village 
(“Nymphaio: Fair-tale with a name”/ D7). Implementing those activities required not just 
funds, but considerable time and effort: 
“– What was the greatest obstacle that you faced as President of the 
Commune? – The public administration. (…) In Florina the situation was 
insufferable. Everyone wanted to be the boss, they were sending around the 
papers to get a stamp here, a stamp there, it took two months to put all the 
stamps. (…) Giorgos Boutaris, who was the Commune’s Secretary at the time, 
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went every morning to find [the civil servants responsible] and force them to 
put the stamp, because at the time they were not in the office, they just swiped 
their cards in the morning and then they left.” (interview #14) 
In Ambelakia, finding the time and funds required to provide such public goods 
appears like an insurmountable obstacle. The cost of renovating the old houses and 
mansions appears prohibitive, particularly due to Ambelakia’s status as a protected 
settlement and the associated legal requirements regarding the preservation of the 
traditional architectural style (interview #47). At the same time, creating attractions 
requires time, effort and money that most actors either don’t have, or consider they should 
invest differently:  
“Last year I had time, and I engaged very much [with the organisation of a 
festival in Ambelakia]. The events lasted 10 days, and they had a lot of 
success. (…) We brought [the singer] Zervoudakis, we had music everywhere, 
we also organised a music camp. But this year I said that I don’t have time, 
I’m not going to abandon my work for this.” (anonymised Ambelakia 
interview) 
“– [Me:] Can’t you access EU funding, for example to renovate the Schwarz 
mansion? – [Interviewee:] I don’t know about EU funding. My partner in the 
association had attended a seminar about EU funds, and what she understood 
was that it requires so much work, that we can’t do it. We would have to hire 
a specialist, and with a budget of €1000 it’s not possible.” (anonymised 
Ambelakia interview) 
In turn, the few actors who contribute to activities with a public-goods character 
feel that they are pulling forward alone, as when it comes to realising jointly agreed 
projects and paying, other actors have a tendency to “pull out”. To my question about 
why that is, an interviewee replied that “the truth is that when someone gives a bit of 
money, he expects that the money will pay off immediately” (interview #49): without the 
prospect of reaping an immediate, personal economic benefit, people are reluctant to 
participate in common projects. As a result, while “both Ambelakia and the wider area, 
with the Tembi valley which is one of the biggest national parks in Greece, have a 
dynamism of which not even 5% has been utilised” (interview #49), realising this 
potential stumbles on seemingly insurmountable obstacles. 
Finally, as in the mass tourism sector, public-good provision problems in the 
alternative tourism sector also have to do with the imposition of sanctions on violators of 
the rules – especially the building rules – which is another costly process with a public-
good character. As the former President of Nymphaio Mertzos recalls, “though most 
locals accepted the idea of the protected settlement, of course there were some difficulties. 
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One day, I was crossing from the house at the edge of the settlement and saw some cement 
blocks. A guy wanted to build an out-house using cement,” something prohibited by the 
applicable architectural rules. As the responsible town-planning authorities informed 
Mertzos that “they don’t have employees to send” to enforce the law, inhibiting the 
violation of the building rules was far from straightforward. This was all the more so 
because, as shown in old photographs of the village, many of the existing buildings in the 
early 1990s already had violations of the required architectural style, which had to 
subsequently be corrected (“Nymphaio: its revival in images”/ D8). 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I set out to explain why cooperation among economic actors is so 
hard to obtain in a variety of settings, even though it often makes a lot of economic sense.       
Building on two bodies of theory, one derived from political economy and the other from 
sociology, I proposed a framework for analysing the obstacles to cooperation that 
stakeholders encounter in field settings. The findings of the chapter will act as the 
foundation for the next three chapters, which discuss different ways to overcome the 
obstacles to cooperation identified here. At the same time, this analytical framework has 
broader applicability, and can be used with some modifications stipulated by the sector 
and context of interest to analyse the obstacles to cooperation also in other sectoral and 
geographical settings. 
I have argued that particularly when it comes to cooperation for the production of 
highly innovative goods and services, the first obstacles that economic actors face are 
cognitive: they concern their ability to conceptualise the contours of the relevant 
cooperative and noncooperative strategies, and to estimate the expected payoffs 
associated with each. The first cognitive obstacle that needs to be overcome is the hurdle 
of entrepreneurial discovery, a dynamic process that is particularly demanding in contexts 
where the actors are habituated to thinking in very different ways about the sources of 
prosperity, for instance due to the dominance of a state-oriented model of economic 
development in their sector and area. Social fragmentation may also inhibit the relevant 
actors from imagining that cooperation with members of different social groups could 
ever be mutually beneficial, an obstacle that tends to be particularly pronounced in sub-
sectors where a broad range of stakeholders with distinct identities need to be brought 
together for cooperation to emerge.  
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While cognitive obstacles are crucial factors that may inhibit the emergence of 
cooperation for upgrading, overlooking the collective action problems that emerge when 
economic actors have the cognitive capacity to estimate the payoffs associated with the 
different available strategies, would lead us to neglect a crucial category of obstacles that 
need to be overcome for cooperation to be achieved. The types of dominant collective 
action problems that economic actors tend to face vary by sector, with hold-up problems 
being of particular concern when it comes to vertical cooperation for quality improvement 
in agri-food supply chains; coordination problems playing an important role in hindering 
horizontal cooperation for upgrading in mass tourism destinations; and public-good 
provision problems being the dominant issue when it comes to creating alternative 
tourism flows in remote areas. In contexts where firms face intense competition, 
distributional conflicts may also prevent actors from opting for a cooperative strategy, 
even if it can be mutually beneficial. A number of features of the Greek context make 
these problems particularly difficult to resolve. These include the legacy of state 
intervention and related generalised suspicion in agricultural cooperatives, the many gaps 
in the implementation of the law in Greece, and an institutional context in the tourism 
sector which favours opportunistic actors. These findings are summarised in Table 4 
below. 



















Santorini wine Hold-up problem 






Lemnos wine Hold-up problem 
(along the supply 
chain) 





















Chios mastiha Entrepreneurial 
discovery 
Legacy of the 
statist model, no 
local mastiha 
consumption 
Kozani saffron Entrepreneurial 
discovery 




































High cost of the 
public goods 





High cost of the 
public goods 














































Taken together, the aforementioned obstacles and contextual conditions constitute 
powerful impediments to potentially beneficial forms of cooperation among economic 
actors. The next three chapters set out to explain under what conditions those obstacles 
can be overcome in unfavourable settings. Chapters 3 and 4 address this question by 
putting at the centre of the analysis the concept of leadership by a small group of local-
level boundary-spanning actors, while taking the macro-institutional framework as a 
given. The latter assumption is then relaxed in Chapter 5, which examines the effects of 





LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPPLY OF LOCAL-
LEVEL COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
3.1 The role of leadership in local-level institutional change                        
In the mid-1980s, the Chios mastiha cooperative was characterised by “a climate 
of deep mistrust” among producers and the management board (Tsouhlis 2011: 185/ S2). 
The obligatory cooperative was heavily indebted, and a failure to pay producers in full 
during a number of years led to a large decrease in the quantity of mastiha produced and 
a significant growth in the black market. As a producers’ representative put it to the 
management board during a General Assembly meeting in 1983,  
“it is sad for us, the mastiha producers, who entrust our product to you, to hear 
those exasperating things. (…) The deficits are exasperating. We don’t even 
have the strength to gather the mastiha from the trees when the management 
board is in such a state of disarray. How are we supposed to believe you and 
trust you to sell our mastiha?” (quoted in Tsouhlis 2011: 184-185/ S2) 
Fast-forward thirty years, and the mastiha cooperative has become “an example of the 
tremendous potential of Greek co-operatives” (Vakoufaris et al. 2007: 789), and an 
“exceptional case of a social cooperative enterprise which was able to evolve through the 
foundation of a subsidiary company” (Lioukas 2013/ S1). The cooperative’s innovative 
retail stores, the MastihaShops, “have contributed to many people with an enquiring mind 
across Greece revisiting from the beginning what we call a Greek traditional product: 
how to remake it, how to package it, how to groom it” (interview #58). In the meantime, 
mastiha has been transformed from a purely local affair to one of the most recognisable 
Greek agri-food products. How did this remarkable change come about? 
An important literature in political economy provides the tools to analyse the nature 
of the local formal and informal institutional arrangements that currently allow the 
mastiha producers, and many other economic actors engaged in cooperative activities 
around the world, to overcome the obstacles to cooperation that they face (e.g. Ostrom 
1990; Olson 1982; Farrell 2009). But how do such institutional solutions become adopted 
in the first place?  
While it is clear that local context must in some way affect the likelihood that 
institutional solutions to collective action problems will be supplied, the precise way in 
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which it does so remains ill-understood in the literature. The most frequently repeated 
approach comes from “history as destiny” accounts (Sabel 1993: 1136), according to 
which there are two stable equilibria in society, “never cooperate” and “reciprocate help”, 
and these are reproduced not only across decades, but across multiple centuries (Putnam 
1993: 179). According to this view, cooperative local-level institutions are most likely to 
be supplied organically in local communities with a set of inherited sociocultural bonds. 
Although the cultural approach remains remarkably influential in certain academic and 
policy circles (Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Djankov and Nikolova 2018), it has been 
convincingly criticised in a long line of literature. Firstly, at least in its most deterministic 
versions, the cultural approach cannot explain institutional change (Crouch 2005: 74; 
Piattoni 1997: 314). Secondly, the proponents of longue-durée cultural approaches tend 
to select historical events that fit with their argument within long, complex histories that 
include both periods of harmony and prosperity, and periods of conflict and decline. 
Thirdly, culture-based arguments fail to account for some important instances of observed 
variation in patterns of cooperation, such as the greater reliance of economic actors on 
trust-based bonds in northern Italy than in Germany, despite the fact that “the political 
culture approach to comparative politics has treated Italy as its paradigmatic example of 
how an advanced industrialized democracy may have an unhealthy political culture” 
(Farrell 2009: 98).  
Drawing on theories that emphasise the importance of action for institutional 
change, and particularly on Crouch’s concept of “institutional entrepreneurs” as actors 
who, under certain circumstances, can bring about institutional innovation despite the 
constraints associated with path dependence (2005: 3), the main argument of this chapter 
is that the adoption of local-level cooperative institutions in particular places relies 
heavily on three difficult and costly types of institutional work done by a small group of 
boundary-spanning leading actors. Specifically, leading actors ignite successful processes 
of local-level change by introducing new cooperative norms and formal institutional 
arrangements; disseminating new ideas about collective entrepreneurial strategies; and 
identifying ways to cover the associated upfront costs of cooperation. In the absence of 
leadership, those three types of work cannot be performed endogenously in low-
cooperation areas. While the local-level institutional status quo in which the leading 
actors find themselves determines the extent of the obstacles that they need to overcome 
in order to catalyse change towards a cooperative equilibrium, I argue that it is events and 
patterns of interaction in recent memory, rather than in the longue durée, which play a 
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crucial role in shaping the prevailing local-level institutional contexts. In turn, local-level 
institutional contexts are subject to change in relatively short time periods.  
The chapter is structured as follows: in the rest of this section, I analyse a set of 
local-level institutions described in the literature as potential solutions to the obstacles to 
cooperation outlined in the previous chapter, and I develop a theory about three types of 
institutional work that leading actors must perform in order to introduce such solutions 
locally. In the following four sections, I show empirically which types of institutional 
solutions were utilised in which types of field settings, and I demonstrate the importance 
of the three types of institutional work undertaken by a small group of boundary-spanning 
leading actors in supplying those solutions in my case study areas. I argue that trust, 
negative selective incentives and arenas for discussion are particularly important for the 
resolution of hold-up, public-good provision and distributional problems respectively, 
while mechanisms of incremental “proof of concept” are an effective way of altering the 
heuristics through which local actors evaluate alternative economic strategies. 
Furthermore, I argue that while leading actors can catalyse a degree of cooperation in all 
sectors, the extent to which they can do so varies by the size of the relevant group of 
economic actors. While in the agri-food sector, where the benefits of cooperative 
strategies are club goods, a small set of leading actors can go far in terms of catalysing 
productive synergies within a local sector, in the tourism sector, where the benefits of 
cooperative strategies are essentially public goods, there are limits to the extent of 
productive synergies that a small set of local leading actors alone can trigger. 
3.1.1 Local-level institutional solutions to the obstacles to cooperation 
A number of important studies in political economy point to a range of tools that 
economic actors can use to overcome collective action problems. Firstly, when it comes 
to addressing problems that are linked to time inconsistencies in actors’ preferences and 
to risks of opportunistic behaviour, such as hold-up problems, trust, defined as an 
expectation that others will behave in a trustworthy manner in future situations involving 
uncertainty (Farrell 2009: 24), can be an important solution, providing an “effective 
lubricant” in the economy (Lorenz 1988: 198; see also Sabel 1993: 1133; Alesina and 
Giuliano 2015: 10; Meadowcroft and Pennington 2008: 121; Uzzi 1997: 43-45). 
Secondly, when it comes to addressing problems that stem from behaviours with strong 
externalities, such as coordination and public-good provision problems, then Olson’s 
concept of selective incentives, that is, incentives that apply “selectively to individuals 
 77 
depending on whether they do or do not contribute to the provision of the collective good” 
(1982: 21), is particularly relevant for understanding how to prevent free-riding in a 
community. Ostrom’s emphasis on the importance of functional systems for mutual 
monitoring and the imposition of graduated sanctions is also related: sanctions, which are 
a form of negative selective incentive, have been shown to matter crucially for preventing 
behaviours with negative externalities, as “reputation and shared norms are insufficient 
by themselves to produce stable cooperative behaviour over the long run” (1990: 94). 
Thirdly, when it comes to addressing distributional conflicts, such as in battle-of-the-
sexes games and common-pool resource (CPR) settings, the literature suggests that 
having in place inclusive arenas for discussion and conflict resolution, which offer to 
local stakeholders frequent opportunities to interact and bargain, can be important for 
achieving negotiated solutions and avoiding a breakdown of cooperation (Ostrom 1990: 
58-100; Ferguson 2013: 209). 
The literature on participatory governance also emphasises the importance of 
inclusive arenas for discussion, but for a different reason. The idea here is that to 
overcome cognitive obstacles to cooperation, and particularly the hurdles of 
entrepreneurial discovery and social fragmentation, what is important is to create 
informal networks of economic actors “who together discover ways to bring resources to 
bear efficiently to the problems at hand” (Sabel 1993: 1154). Such networks can be 
created through “associative”, network-forging subnational policy initiatives like the 
1989 Manufacturing Innovation Networks project in Pennsylvania described by Sabel 
(1993: 1154). By bringing “previously disparate and even antagonistic” groups together 
and jointly incorporating them in the stages of policy design and implementation, 
participatory policy projects allow economic actors to “study their industries jointly”, 
incrementally “experiment with new roles and rules”, and ultimately “construct 
communities of interest (…) where none had seemed possible” (Sabel 1993: 1149, 1158; 
McDermott 2007: 105).  
3.1.2 Three types of institutional work performed by local-level leading actors 
The trouble with the aforementioned cooperative institutional solutions is that 
they are difficult and costly to create. By increasing the aggregate welfare of all economic 
actors, they essentially provide a public good to local communities. The supply of local-
level institutional solutions to the obstacles to cooperation therefore often stumbles on 
similar collective action problems as those that they are supposed to resolve (one may 
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call those second-order collective action problems, following Ferguson 2013: 5; see also 
Ostrom 1990: 42; Meadowcroft and Pennington 2008: 122; Putnam 1993: 166). 
While the weaknesses of culturally deterministic approaches to the question of 
local-level institutional supply are well understood in the literature, the conditions under 
and processes through which cooperative local-level institutions can be provided in places 
where they were previously absent remain understudied. Ostrom argues that cooperative 
institutions are more likely to be supplied in settings where the actors have similar 
interests and low discount rates, face low information, transformation and enforcement 
costs, and share “generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial 
social capital” (1990: 211). Among these factors, the last one is not very helpful, as it 
requires that cooperative informal institutions already be in place for further cooperative 
institutions to be supplied. The other factors are plausible, but their origin is under-
specified: are the interests of the actors objectively defined in a singular way, or can the 
actors’ perception of their interests change, depending on the types of information that 
are available? Beside the objective properties of the common-pool resources, regional 
products or other collective goods, do any other factors influence the extent of 
information, transition and enforcement costs in different local areas?  
Similarly, Farrell’s book on trust is considerably more detailed when it comes to 
the mechanisms of trust creation, than on the circumstances under which the incremental 
process of changing expectations about the trustworthiness of particular classes of actors 
will actually be triggered. Farrell argues that informal institutions change when actors 
with sufficient bargaining power find it in their interest to initiate such change, usually in 
response to exogenous factors that alter the costs and benefits of cooperating (2009: 140-
5). But why do similar exogenous changes, such as the growing incentives to increase 
coordination as the economy becomes more internationalised, only precipitate 
institutional change in some areas, but not in others?  Under what circumstances would 
“initiating actors” find it in their interest to start cooperating, instead of continuing to 
pursue non-cooperative strategies? Would an increase in trust-based bonds require the 
less powerful parties in the relationship to acquire more bargaining strength for the 
process of positive institutional change to begin? When would the cooperative strategies 
of initiating actors be “taken up by most or all other actors belonging to the same general 
class as the initiator” (2009: 143), thereby triggering a generalised process of institutional 
change? 
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I argue that the conduct of three specific types of institutional work by a small 
group of boundary-spanning actors, including economic actors, local politicians, local 
administrators and/ or members of the civil society, is a necessary condition for 
sustainable local-level cooperative institutions to be supplied in places where they were 
previously unavailable. In developing this argument, I draw on three strands of literature: 
the political economy literature on cooperation and institutional change; the literature on 
participatory governance; and the management literature on institutional work and 
entrepreneurial discovery. In bringing together concepts and arguments from these 
diverse streams of literature, I aim to build on studies that have a sophisticated 
understanding of the institutions that shape the character of “place”, as well as on studies 
that have a sophisticated understanding of the role of action in processes of change, 
hoping to provide a rounded account of how local-level institutions can be reshaped to 
facilitate cooperation. 
In the management literature, institutional work is defined as “the purposive 
action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutions” (Lawrence et al. 2009: 1). The first type of institutional work that leading 
actors must do in order to trigger a durable process of positive institutional change is to 
introduce cooperative norms, cooperative formal institutional arrangements, and new 
conceptions of shared interest among diverse groups of actors: without leadership, these 
novel institutions and conceptions are very difficult to supply in low-cooperation settings. 
As Acemoglu and Jackson have argued, “prominent individuals” who possess a central 
position in a network can trigger changes in historically inherited social norms through 
the disproportionate visibility of their actions, which can generate powerful 
demonstration effects and thereby result in a change of expectations across the rest of the 
network (2015: 423-425). This mechanism is similar to Farrell’s account of trust creation, 
whereby changes in informal institutions are triggered by the actions of a few powerful 
actors, which incrementally start shifting others’ expectations about the likelihood of 
trustworthy behaviour by actors belonging to particular classes. Eventually, those initially 
aberrant actions become generalised norms of behaviour (Farrell 2009: 140-5; see also 
Lorenz 1988: 207). Furthermore, in the absence of the regional-, state- or national-level 
policy initiatives to forge new networks among economic actors that the participatory 
governance literature focuses on, leading actors can play an important role in 
disseminating conceptions of shared interest among diverse groups. They can do so 
indirectly, by creating arenas where economic actors can “study their industries jointly” 
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(Sabel 1993: 1158). Importantly, they can also broaden the other actors’ conceptions of 
their self-interest directly, by effectively projecting a vision about shared prosperity and 
market-oriented, inclusive economic development via cooperation, by showing that 
cooperation can pay off (demonstration effects), and by supplying previously unavailable 
information that alters the other actors’ calculations regarding the costs and benefits of 
cooperative strategies. Such changes can subsequently be reinforced due to the learning 
effects and changes in the local balance of power associated with the adoption of a 
cooperative strategy by the first movers (Crouch 2005: 78-81; McDermott 2007: 120). 
However, the introduction of cooperative norms and institutions by the leading 
actors is not in itself sufficient to bring about a lasting change in the local institutional 
equilibrium. Drawing on management literature and the emphasis given in the previous 
chapter on entrepreneurial discovery – a difficult process whose importance is generally 
underappreciated in the political economy literature on cooperation – leading actors must 
also play a catalysing role in the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities and the 
dissemination of new ideas for collective entrepreneurial strategies. As was argued in the 
previous chapter, entrepreneurial innovation is typically (albeit to varying degrees) a key 
component of cooperative strategies that can pay off, and that can therefore be 
sustainable. And although technological changes generate a range of entrepreneurial 
opportunities, those are not immediately widely apparent due to information 
asymmetries: discerning an entrepreneurial opportunity requires very specific 
combinations of idiosyncratic prior knowledge, likely to be possessed by few individuals, 
if at all. As a result, “entrepreneurship cannot be explained solely by reference to factors 
external to individuals: (…) Individual differences may imprint the development of new 
organizations even before they are founded” (Shane 2000: 466). The concept of 
“gatekeepers of knowledge” from the economics of innovation is also relevant here. 
Gatekeepers of knowledge are “a small number of key people” at the “core of an 
information network”, who are “overexposed to external sources of information” and play 
a key role in identifying, translating and disseminating external knowledge inside their 
own network (Morrison 2004: 7-8). One can also use the terminology of the sociology 
literature, and point out that in relatively isolated networks, an individual or small group 
of individuals who act as “bridges” or “local bridges” to external networks play a crucial 
role in information transmission (Granovetter 1973: 1364-1365). More generally, the 
“cultural transmission of impressions and judgements” and the “free-rider problems [that] 
accompany the social learning processes that complement the development and 
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transmission of mental models” mean that “leaders tend to play disproportionate roles in 
shaping shared models”, including the shared understandings about ways of doing 
business that may need to change if the cognitive obstacles to cooperation are to be 
overcome (Ferguson 2013: 129).     
Finally, both the introduction of new cooperative institutions and the discovery 
and dissemination of new entrepreneurial ideas typically entail substantial upfront costs. 
After all, as scholars of institutional work point out, the concept of “work” implies effort 
(Lawrence et al. 2009: 15). Drawing on Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, the biggest 
or most powerful actors in a group consisting of differently sized members can 
significantly contribute to the achievement of cooperation by covering a disproportionate 
amount of the upfront costs for providing a collective good, in anticipation of reaping a 
disproportionate amount of the benefits associated with the provision of the collective 
good in the future (1965: 22-34). In areas with fragmented property structures, typically 
no single actor will be in a position to cover the entire cost of providing the collective 
good alone. Nevertheless, by taking the risk of adopting a cooperative strategy early and 
by finding ways to cover part of the upfront costs of cooperation, leading actors with a 
disproportionate stake in the economic future of their area perform a necessary type of 
work for bringing about institutional change. Interestingly, Ostrom’s detailed case study 
of the process of institutional supply in a Californian common-pool resource setting 
(1990: chapter 4), reveals that leadership played a crucial role in the emergence of the 
first system of groundwater management for precisely this reason, even though this is not 
fully reflected in her general conclusions on the subject of institutional supply. 
Specifically, in the first location where suitable institutions for the management of the 
groundwater reserves emerged, at Raymond Basin, California, it was the City of 
Pasadena, the largest user of the resource, which initiated the legal proceedings against 
the other users, undertook a disproportionate share of the litigation costs, and thereby 
precipitated the process of institutional change. According to Ostrom, Pasadena 
“approached, but did not reach, the position of a dominant actor” in Olson’s sense of the 
term, and as a result was prepared to take a leading role for finding a solution to the 
problem of water overextraction, but without being willing to bear all the associated costs 
itself  (1990: 111, 124). 
Even though, for the reasons presented so far, a compelling case can be made that 
leading actors who perform three types of institutional work can be expected to play a 
key role in the process of supplying local-level cooperative institutions, the concept of 
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leadership does not figure prominently in the political economy literature on cooperation. 
In my view, there are three reasons for this, but none of them justify the omission. Firstly, 
the “leadership” variable may appear randomly distributed. Nevertheless, a systematic 
study can reveal recurring patterns both in the type of work that leading actors must do 
to trigger the shift towards a cooperative equilibrium (the subject of this chapter), and in 
the leading actors’ characteristics (the subject of the next chapter). Studying leadership 
in this way can be useful for social scientists to not be “taken by surprise by change” 
(Crouch 2005: 16). Secondly, in the management literature where leadership does appear 
as a central concept, there is a tendency to idealise the leader and focus on “providing 
practical and moral guidance to powerholders” (Kraatz 2009: 66; see also Lawrence et 
al. 2009: 3, 11). Instead, in this study the concept refers not to the holders of specific 
positions of responsibility, but to any actor who carries out the types of institutional work 
described above, and it is used with a focus on explaining processes of institutional 
change, rather than prescriptively (for a similar approach, see Acemoglu and Jackson 
2015: 427). Thirdly, and most importantly, a long line of political economy literature is 
deeply sceptical that cooperative institutions can thrive in the presence of the power 
inequalities, resource imbalances and information asymmetries that the concept of 
leadership implies (Locke 1995: 25; Putnam 1993: 173-174; Ostrom 1990: 89). While 
fully recognising that many types of vertical networks, and particularly the clientelistic 
networks that Locke and Putnam had in mind in their studies of Italy, are deleterious for 
social trust and cooperation, I argue that in some cases leading actors can play a positive 
role. Examining the conditions under which this can be the case is crucial if we are to 
understand processes of institutional change towards a cooperative equilibrium.  
Taken together, the local-level institutional solutions and types of institutional 
work outlined so far provide a useful set of concepts for approaching the subject of 
institutional stability and change in low-cooperation areas. The remaining sections of the 
chapter show which types of solutions were used and which types of institutional work 
were carried out, or failed to be carried out, in different geographical and sectoral settings. 
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3.2 Overcoming hold-up problems and distributional conflicts: the 
supply of trust, price incentives and arenas for discussion in the wine 
sector 
3.2.1 The incremental construction of trust in the Bläuel network 
According to Fritz Bläuel, a pioneer in the production of organic olive oil in 
Greece, “trust is the main asset for changing the ‘software’ of the farmers”: it was 
primarily through the incremental construction of trust that he convinced a group of olive 
producers in the remote village of Saïdona to overcome their hesitation and switch to 
organic olive cultivation in the early 1990s (interview #1). Bläuel defines trust as “doing 
what you promise that you will do. When it comes to the farmers, trust means paying 
them on time, and paying them well” (interview #1). In other words, trust is an 
expectation that another party will refrain from behaving opportunistically, in this case 
by delivering the agreed payment under the agreed conditions. Bläuel recounts:  
“I established trust-based relations gradually over the years, before I started 
with the organic cultivation. (…) I started by buying conventional oil, and I 
acquired a reputation for paying the farmers on time. So I spent ten years 
establishing friendships and trust.” (interview #1) 
Bläuel’s description of how he earned the producers’ trust one step at a time is consistent 
with Farrell’s account of incremental changes in informal institutions, triggered by 
observed changes in the behaviour of a few “initiating actors” (2009: 143). The 
mechanism seems to work: according to a producer in Bläuel’s current Naturland fair 
trade network in Crete, whose members have to abide by several strict conditions that 
raise production costs, “we have been working with Bläuel since 1995, and there is no 
fear that he will not buy the product” (interview #3).  
Bläuel’s colleague explains that in addition to the creation of trust with the 
producers in Saïdona, who came to “consider him one of their own”, Bläuel also attached 
particular importance to information provision: 
“Bläuel offered huge support to the producers when he had the bio-
programme. He offered them agronomists and advisors, who went to the field, 
conducted analyses and told the producers what fertilisers to use and how to 
deal with the dacus fly and other diseases. This had a huge cost.” (interview 
#2) 
Bläuel did not just provide to producers information about cultivation techniques, but 
even more fundamentally, he expended considerable effort to communicate his vision 
about organic agriculture at a time when it was unheard of in Greece: “For the first five 
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years (1986-1991) I went around, almost like a missionary, and talked to farmers about 
organic agriculture” (interview #1). Later, “annual parties (glentia) with the producers of 
the bio-programme” provided regular opportunities for information dissemination 
between the firm and the producers (interview #2).  
Overall, by investing considerable time and resources to incrementally establish 
his trustworthiness, communicate a vision about organic cultivation and provide technical 
support to the producers, Bläuel played a crucial leadership role for overcoming hold-up 
and entrepreneurial problems in part of the olive oil sector in Mani.  
3.2.2 Trust and price incentives for quality improvement in Santorini’s wine sector 
When he arrived in Santorini in the late 1980s, the winemaker Yannis Boutaris 
also invested substantial effort and resources to establish trust, exchange information and 
share his vision about high-quality wine with the island’s grape producers, who, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, initially greeted him with extreme suspicion. He did this in 
three ways. Firstly, like Bläuel, he established his credibility gradually each year by 
promising better prices and sticking to his promises: “he told them that if you harvest and 
you bring me the grapes in the x week of August, I will give you this much more” 
(interview #30). As an elderly producer confirms, “at the start, when Boutaris came he 
gave really high prices compared to the Union” (interview #72).  
Secondly, making a major investment in Santorini was a way for Boutaris to tie 
his hands (see also Kraatz 2009: 77), demonstrating to the producers that his commitment 
to the development of the local wine sector was long-term. The firm went out of its way 
to communicate this in the local press: 
“The Boutaris firm believes that [the] development [of Greek areas that 
produce geographical indication wines] can only happen at the location of 
production, for the very simple reason that the continuous presence of people 
and facilities at the location where the vines are, binds the viticulturer with the 
winemaker, the two necessary forces for the production of quality wines. It 
gives to the viticulturer the certainty that his production is guaranteed with a 
brand name and on a continuous basis.” (Thiraïka Nea, Jul.-Aug. 1990, 393) 
Thirdly, like Bläuel, Boutaris followed a conscious strategy of providing 
information about his plans, explaining the reasons why he was asking for the producers’ 
cooperation, and projecting his vision about the future of Santorini’s wine sector. As he 
recounts with regard to his activity in another wine-producing area of Greece, 
“I used to call the producers to try the wine of different barrels when it was 
ready, in order for them to understand what wine is made from good and bad 
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grapes, and that if I have a good wine, I will be able to give them higher prices. 
Cultivating this mentality took many years.” (interview #13) 
In the early years of the Boutaris winery’s activities in Santorini, the firm sent 
representatives to the cooperative’s General Assembly meetings to address the producers’ 
concerns about the early harvest (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 
117, Jul. and Aug. 1989/ D5). The firm also placed several articles in the local press to 
explain the company’s strategy and vision:  
“To reach the final aim, i.e. that the wine be in high demand, it’s not enough 
to have good facilities to produce such wine. What is mainly needed is good 
raw material, i.e. quality grapes. (…) Early harvest is one of the factors that 
influence in an important way the final quality of the grapes. (…) 
Unfortunately, these days and before the harvest even begins, various 
unfounded and false rumours are circulating about collusion (!) of the firm 
with the Cooperative, at the expense of the producers. Being fully aware of 
our responsibilities, we declare to you that this couldn’t be further from the 
truth. We are working together with the Cooperative with the sole aim of 
improving the quality of the product which is called wine.” (Thiraïka Nea, 
Jul.-Aug., 379/ N4) 
It is remarkable that decades later, even though it has been years since Yannis 
Boutaris has stopped producing wine in Santorini himself, he is still considered 
trustworthy, even by a producer who showed high degrees of suspicion towards the 
cooperative and every other private winemaker named in our interview: 
“When he came, Boutaris helped the island a lot because he raised prices. He 
didn’t try to take the vineyards of the inhabitants, just their production. 
Beautiful things. He also passed on modern views, but not at the expense of 
the producer. These were positive, professional pressures, even if the 
Santorinians wouldn’t accept them.” (interview #31) 
Boutaris’s work to upgrade Santorini’s wines had ripple effects across the local 
wine sector through a series of reinforcement mechanisms. Firstly, it gave the 
management board of the wine cooperative, which, as can be seen in the General 
Assembly minutes, already had its own modernising impulses, the necessary momentum 
to overcome the forces of inertia, suspicion, and state orientation, and to construct an 
ultra-modern new winery. As explained by the current Director of the cooperative, “the 
cooperative’s management used Boutaris as a lever to tell producers – see, Boutaris is 
coming here and making such a serious investment, so there is a future for Santorini’s 
wine” (interview #36). Secondly, as Santorini’s wines started to become more 
established, some owners of the island’s old underground wine cellars (kanaves), moved 
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from producing bulk to producing bottled wine (interview #71). Thirdly, a number of 
oenologists from Boutaris’s firm, most notably Hatzidakis and Paraskevopoulos, 
eventually established new pioneering wineries in Santorini, leaving their own mark on 
the sector (interview #32, #33, #72). Fourthly, the efforts of all the aforementioned actors 
were facilitated by Boutaris’s early investments in opening new markets for Santorini’s 
wines. As mentioned by a local oenologist, “Boutaris covered the cost of finding exports 
markets entirely by himself. I don’t know to what extent this has been recognised by the 
other winemakers” (interview #30).  
The number of Santorini’s grape producers was a lot higher than the number of 
olive producers in Bläuel’s network. As a result, Boutaris, the cooperative and other 
private winemakers did not rely exclusively on trust and information provision to 
convince the producers to upgrade the way they cultivated grapes, but they also set a 
series of price incentives and rules to reward desirable improvements and punish 
production that fell below some minimum standards at each harvest (interview #32). As 
Boutaris recounts, “we were the first winery in Greece to implement a method of paying 
producers which was not based entirely on alcoholic degrees, but also on yield [i.e. 
quality7]” (interview #13). Santorini’s wine cooperative also adopted this approach long 
before other Greek cooperatives, initially by paying a higher price for certain indigenous 
varietals (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 149, Jul. 2000/ D5), and 
later by doing “quality-based classification of the grapes that we receive” (interview #36). 
Additionally, “there had to be discipline in the way the grapes were transported, only in 
creates and not in the traditional baskets from chaste tree, and of course they had to be 
transported immediately upon being cut” (interview #28). 
Although the provision of price incentives plays a crucial role for inducing 
behavioural changes when a large number of actors are involved, those incentives must 
be carefully designed so that they don’t backfire.  One of the wine cooperative’s more 
recent rules to encourage cooperative behaviour among producers entailed paying a 
higher price to producers who would deliver a higher share of their grapes to the 
cooperative. This measure is an example of a “user-alignment institutional strategy” 
(Venizelou 2015: 154/ S5), and as such it has support in economic theory. However, the 
reaction of a producer to this rule suggests that sanctions may “produce resentment and 
unwillingness to conform to the rules in the future” if “a large monetary fine [is] imposed 
 
7 When the yield of the vines is too high, the quality of the wine declines.   
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on a person facing an unusual problem” (Ostrom 1990: 98). It is interesting to consider 
the producer’s explanation at length:  
“Recently I have been taking most of my grapes to the merchants, because at 
the Union8 they made a mistake, you understand? For all these years I had 
been taking my grapes to the Union. When Boutaris came and gave much 
higher prices to the others, I still took my grapes to the Union. I always gave 
them many tons, and lost a lot of money from the Union’s lower prices. Last 
year, for family reasons, I gave some grapes to [a private merchant] because 
he bought [goods] from the shop of my children. I did it for my children, not 
for economic reasons. Wouldn’t I give him three crates of grapes when he had 
bought all those things? So I took fewer tons to the Union, and they gave me 
30 cents less for the white grapes and 50 cents less for the red grapes than they 
gave to those who took all their grapes there. To me, who all these years made 
a loss to bring grapes to the Union. So I got really angry, and this year I gave 
all my grapes to the private winemakers.” (anonymised Santorini interview)  
Ostrom would suggest that such reactions show why sanctions need to be graduated. 
However, arguably the excerpt also highlights that it is important to take into account 
social norms and the involved actors’ implicit understandings of social contract when 
designing incentives to promote cooperative behaviour. 
3.2.3 Resolving distributional conflicts through arenas for discussion in Santorini’s wine 
sector 
No matter how successful a sector is, when a serious crisis hits and a new set of 
cooperative activities are needed to overcome it, leadership may be required once again 
to trigger the necessary adaptation strategies. The Eurozone crisis posed a serious threat 
to Santorini’s wine sector, as it dealt a major blow to domestic demand for upscale wines. 
The sector was able to get through and even thrive during the crisis by shifting towards 
foreign markets. A major initiative that helped Santorini’s wineries to achieve this was 
the collaborative Wines of Santorini marketing project, which was spearheaded by the US 
wine importer Sofia Perpera and Santorini’s wine cooperative. The project involved 13 
wineries and targeted the North American market.  
As recounted by the marketing manager of Santorini’s wine cooperative, it was 
Perpera who said “it’s a pity, Santorini is very important, make sure that you become 
organised, form a team with a contract [among the wineries]. So this programme ran on 
that contract” (interview #29). While Perpera supplied the idea for the project and also 
 
8 Santorini’s wine cooperative is otherwise known as the Union.  
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provided assistance in putting together the application for EU funding, the wine 
cooperative assumed the role of project coordinator: 
“As it had the human resources, the organisation and the economic capacity – 
because some things had to be paid in full before we got the money from 
OPEKEPE [the agency that disburses EU funding] – the Union undertook the 
role of Leader of that team. So I managed all this in terms of communication, 
in terms of how the events would take place and what we would do, and 
accounting and financial support has of course also been needed many times.” 
(interview #29) 
Even if a small group of leading actors provided the idea and covered part of the 
upfront and coordination costs of the project, as discussed in the previous chapter, in 
intensely competitive environments such collaborative efforts are prone to stumbling on 
distributional conflicts. My interviewees described a process of overcoming these 
conflicts by carving out areas where they had clear common interests, while putting 
thornier issues aside for the time being: 
“When we started this collective programme, given that each winery was at a 
different level in terms of distribution in the US, we set higher recognisability 
as the aim of the programme. We didn’t go to commercial exhibitions because 
this would truly be unfair, in the sense that if we went to a commercial 
exhibition as Wines of Santorini, those who already had an importer and a 
distribution network would increase their sales, while someone who didn’t 
have an importer wouldn’t gain anything.” (interview #29) 
“[Joint marketing] is a common aim. So automatically, the other person gets 
in the mode that you’re not a competitor. It’s much easier to organise a 
promotion campaign in the US through a network, than to sit down and set a 
price for the grapes. That’s where you will fight.” (interview #33) 
Interestingly, this common ground was discovered through discussions initiated by the 
leading actors and through frequent informal contact, for instance in wine exhibitions and 
competitions (interview #71), and not through deliberations within a formal association 
of Santorini’s wineries, which still does not exist today.  Several actors agree that a formal 
association would generate even more opportunities to discover elements of common 
interest and could be beneficial for the sector as a whole (interviews #29, #30). 
Nevertheless, already today, despite intense competition among the wineries in many 
fields, “there’s a collective effort. I wouldn’t say there’s a collective spirit, but there is a 
collective effort. Always one or two people take the lead, but the others are behind and 
pay their share” (interview #30). 
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3.2.4 Leadership deficits in the Lemnos wine sector  
Despite its potential, the Lemnos wine sector has suffered from two types of 
leadership deficit that have prevented its upgrading to a level that even approximates that 
of Santorini.  
Firstly, leadership for quality improvement arrived a lot later in Lemnos than in 
Santorini. This was partly because in former times, the wine cooperative satisficed with 
a state-oriented model of development combined with bulk sales in the domestic market. 
It was also important that the cooperative’s major private collaborators used a lot of 
Lemnos’s wine in bulk, for instance as an input for the Metaxa cognac-like drink, and did 
not showcase Lemnos as a special wine-producing region in the same way that Boutaris 
did for Santorini.   
A major step towards quality improvement in Lemnos took place with the arrival 
of the private winemaker Chatzigeorgiou in the early 2000s. The oenologist at the 
Chatzigeorgiou winery describes a by now familiar set of strategies to convince the grape 
producers in the winery’s network to upgrade their production methods: “the main 
incentive for all the viticulturers, it’s no use lying, is the payment.” In addition, “once a 
year I ask the farmers to come to the winery and we talk, if there are any problems, any 
complaints, or if we want to say something. This is a relation that is built gradually, 
right?” Thirdly, the winery sets certain rules and standards, and if the producers 
repeatedly fail to comply, as a last resort the winery may exclude them from the network. 
As a result, “whereas they used to tell us I know from my uncle, my dad, my grandpa, 
gradually the producers learned to listen” (interview #79). 
After a major debt crisis which, by the early 2010s, posed a serious threat to the 
cooperative’s continued existence, in the last five years the cooperative has also been 
investing in the arduous task of re-building trust with the producers and improving quality 
to become viable in the market. The incremental strategy for constructing trust that the 
cooperative’s current Director describes is very similar to the strategies followed by 
Bläuel and Boutaris: “I set targets each time, that you will be paid this share of your 
production till then, and I managed to meet them. And as long as I was punctual in that, 
[the producers] trusted me” (interview #78). Moreover, a three-member committee now 
checks the quality of all grapes upon delivery to the cooperative, imposing sanctions in 
terms of a reduced price if the grapes fall short of certain minimum standards, and social 
rewards if the production is particularly good (interview #78). As a result, as the private 
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winemakers attest, “thankfully the Union has now changed its practices and has improved 
its quality very much” (interview #79; this point was also confirmed in interview #82). 
Nevertheless, the fact that those improvements happened so recently means that the 
reinforcement mechanisms described previously for the case of Santorini have not had 
the time to set in. 
Moreover, in a context of greater financial constraints than in the 1990s and in the 
absence of leading actors who are willing and able to spearhead horizontal collective 
efforts in the Lemnos wine sector, distributional conflicts and the difficulty of covering 
upfront costs have prevented cooperative activities for marketing and for opening new 
export markets. Indeed, in my interviews in Lemnos it seemed that most actors agreed 
that in theory, cooperation could be beneficial, but considered that someone else should 
take the lead to make it happen: 
“–[Director of the wine cooperative]: The truth is that although they are more 
flexible and they can plan better what production they will receive, in many 
areas private winemakers wait for the cooperative to pull forward. But the 
cooperative had its issues and couldn’t pull forward in previous years.” 
(interview #78) 
“–[Private winemaker A]: The locomotive, Kira, de facto is the cooperative. 
If the cooperative isn’t doing well, we have a problem. Private winemakers 
can manoeuvre more easily, but the quantities they buy can’t be compared 
with the quantities of the cooperative” (interview #80) 
“–[Private winemaker B]: Once or twice I had suggested it to the agronomists 
of the Agriculture Ministry in Lemnos, I had told them you should gather the 
winemakers etc. so that we can do something collectively as Lemnos. (…) But 
the way to reach a common understanding has not been found.” (interview 
#79) 
“–[Employee at the wine cooperative]: Once [the environmental association 
Anemoessa] had organised round tables for different sectors in the framework 
of an event. (…) They gathered us altogether to sit around the same table and 
talk about our concerns. It was a very nice initiative, and such initiatives must 
take place institutionally. (…) Essentially there must be institutions, whether 
they are state or private or anything, which will be able to bring people around 
the table to discuss.” 
In short, a wide range of stakeholders in the Lemnos wine sector agree that horizontal 
cooperation for marketing and export promotion would be beneficial and recognise that 
the supply of cooperative institutions is necessary for such cooperation to emerge. 
However, it seems that at the moment, no actor is in a position to spearhead the supply of 
those local-level cooperative institutions.  
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Overall, while the leadership recently shown by two or three private wineries and 
the cooperative for vertical quality improvement creates the conditions for an upward 
trajectory for Lemnos’s wine sector, the continued lack of leadership for horizontal 
cooperative activities dampens the sector’s progress.  
3.2.5 Alternative explanations for the success of Santorini’s wines relative to Lemnos 
Other than the leadership explanation that I have put forward, there are two major 
potential alternative explanations for the higher degree of upgrading in Santorini’s wine 
sector compared to Lemnos’s. Firstly, an argument repeated often both by Santorinian 
and Lemnian actors is that Santorini’s wine sector was able to reach today’s level due to 
the recognisability conferred to the island by tourism (interviews #34, #35, #37, #71, 
#79):  
“Santorini is not a good case to study, because it’s not representative. Its 
development was to a large extent random. It’s true that the wine is high-
quality, but a significant part of what helped was tourism, i.e. luck.” 
(background discussion with a former oenologist at a Santorinian winery) 
I do not contest that Santorini’s fame and the wineries’ ability to do “domestic exports” 
(interview #29), i.e. to sell wines directly to tourists, have substantially reinforced the 
wineries’ marketing and distribution efforts. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise 
that tourism also generates a competing land use which, given Santorini’s small surface 
area, puts a lot of pressure on the wine sector (Vlahos et al. 2016: 7/ S7; interviews #28, 
#34, #35, #36). In fact, given how much money one can quickly make by converting one’s 
vineyard to a guest house, and given the historic lack of town planning regulations to 
prevent the conversion of agricultural land to built area, in a way it is surprising and a 
testament to the success of the wine sector that it survived Santorini’s touristic 
development at all. Indeed, mass tourism in Greece has not always gone hand-in-hand 
with the development of upscale agriculture; as a result, the explanation for success or 
failure must be sought endogenously in each local agricultural sector. 
Secondly, a long-durée explanation would point to Santorini’s old wine-making 
tradition: “we’re talking about a grape that is in itself unique, it has old roots, there hasn’t 
been an interruption in its cultivation for thousands of years, it’s an exceptional 
phenomenon, a very rare microclimate” (interview #33). Indeed, before the Russian 
Revolution, Santorini’s sweet wine was exported in large quantities to Russia to be used 
in the Holy Communion (interview #33). On the other hand, the wines that Santorini 
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produced in the late 1980s were “useless” (interview #13): “nobody was interested to buy 
such a degraded wine” (Thiraika Nea, Sept. 1988, 380/ N3). Moreover, Lemnos’s 
vineyard also has thousands of years of tradition: according to the Iliad, the Achaeans 
drank Lemnos’s red wine during the siege of Troy. Modern wine-making methods were 
introduced in the island as early as in the 1920s, when the private winemaker Zavalakis 
brought in a French oenologist and started producing bottled wine. More broadly, in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Lemnos had a track record of charitable 
donations by wealthy members of the extrovert Lemnian diaspora, and of managing them 
through cooperative institutions on the island (Lagopoulos 2016: 71-72/ S10; Bakalis 
2007: 325-333/ S12). The similarities in the two cases’ long-term trajectories make it 
imperative to seek shorter-term, micro-founded explanations for the observed difference 
in sectoral outcomes. 
3.3 Overcoming entrepreneurship problems and social fragmentation: 
the “incremental proof of concept” strategy and the creation of a 
conception of shared interest in the mastiha and saffron sectors 
3.3.1 Supplying institutions for quality improvement in Chios and Kozani  
Vertical quality improvement is also a relevant concern in the Chios mastiha and 
Kozani saffron sectors, both of which are governed by obligatory cooperatives that have 
the monopsony over the raw material. An examination of the techniques used by the 
Chios cooperative to improve the quality of the raw mastiha confirms the importance of 
price differentiation for quality upgrading when the number of producers is large. While, 
being obligatory, the cooperative always buys the entire quantity of mastiha submitted 
by a producer, in recent years “we do sample-taking and classify mastiha in terms of size 
and clarity”: the price that the producer receives depends on those two factors (interview 
#62).  
Moreover, the Chios case study adds an interesting element to the picture of 
successful institutional design for boosting vertical cooperation along the supply chain, 
namely that producers seem to be readier to accept costly quality improvement measures 
if these are overseen in a way that is easy to understand and transparent. In particular, the 
mechanisation of the means of controlling the raw mastiha upon delivery to the 
cooperative appears to have increased the confidence of the producers that they are treated 
fairly. As explained by a producer, 
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“the cooperative progressed a lot. (…) They brought lots of machines, 
because, let me tell you, here we used to have people who sieved the mastiha, 
workers, but each one had his opinion about whether it is clear or not. If we 
had five people, there were five images of the mastiha. And so we ended up 
bringing machines.” (interview #61) 
A local consultant confirmed this point: if before the mechanisation of the delivery 
process, “things were much more subjective and there were fifty complaints about the 
process within a thousand deliveries, now there are five complaints.” 
Interestingly, despite some quality improvements in the saffron sector due to the 
purchase of processing equipment by the saffron cooperative and despite the emphasis of 
the cooperative’s President during the 1990s on transparency (interview #53; PDO 
application for the ‘Kozani saffron PDO’ designation, 24/2/1997/ D2), neither of the two 
techniques described above is currently used in Kozani. On the one hand, the cooperative 
buys raw saffron at a uniform price, regardless of quality and cleanliness (interview #54, 
#55). On the other hand, a solution that was discussed during my fieldwork in Kozani as 
a potential way to address the problem of foreign bodies sometimes found mixed with 
saffron, is indicative of a lack of transparency and the perpetuation of an atmosphere of 
mistrust. The solution discussed was to hire two groups of women from the village to 
control the cleanliness of the delivered saffron, but without telling the first group that the 
second group would also be hired. If a woman in the second group found foreign bodies 
mixed with the saffron in a tin that had already been controlled by a woman in the first 
group, then that woman would not be re-hired. If simplicity and transparency are indeed 
important for establishing confidence in a system of rules about quality improvement, 
then the solution discussed in Kozani was unlikely to contribute to that direction. 
3.3.2 Communicating a new entrepreneurial idea in the Chios mastiha sector: the 
“incremental proof of concept” strategy 
The supply of cooperative institutions for vertical quality improvement is relevant 
in most agricultural sub-sectors. However, the challenges associated with horizontal 
cooperation are of a different nature when the objective is radical innovation. In the wine 
industry, the main challenge of horizontal cooperation was for the actors concerned to 
overcome distributional conflicts that inhibited the adoption of cooperative strategies 
whose potential benefits were understood. On the other hand, in the mastiha and saffron 
sectors, in order to cooperate for the production of innovative, differentiated products, the 
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actors also had to overcome severe cognitive obstacles, and in particular higher hurdles 
of entrepreneurial discovery. 
The Chios mastiha case study shows that a small group of leading actors can 
perform the crucial work necessary to change the mental models used by economic actors 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of different types of strategies, if they supply an 
innovative entrepreneurial strategy in the form of a concrete plan, and prove its viability 
incrementally. These two tasks were conducted in Chios by Yannis Mandalas, who was 
hired by the mastiha cooperative in 2001 to implement a reorganisation of the institution, 
and by the cooperative’s then President Kostas Ganiaris, who supported the 
implementation of Mandalas’s plans.  
When I told one of my interviewees in Lemnos that I was also studying the Chios 
mastiha sector, he responded:  
“Did you talk with Yannis Mandalas himself? Did you understand that the 
whole story of mastiha has been constructed by a man called Yannis 
Mandalas? The entire branding was created by Yannis. It’s one man, a one-
man show.” (interview #76) 
This view is exaggerated if one considers all the types of institutional work that must be 
done to bring about sustainable change. Nevertheless, it holds an element of truth with 
regard to the origins of the entrepreneurial idea that opened the path to the transformation 
of the mastiha sector. The basic idea was for the cooperative to found a subsidiary 
company, Mediterra, which would create an innovative series of retail stores in Greece 
and abroad – the MastihaShops – selling a range of mastiha products and other upscale 
Greek agri-food goods. As Mandalas explains, “the MastihaShop is an idea I had worked 
on a couple of years earlier, before collaborating with the cooperative. But in order to win 
the battle, I proposed to implement it with the cooperative, and the management was 
easily convinced” (interview #58). The former director of the mastiha cooperative 
confirms this point: 
“Mandalas was the one who had the idea of Mediterra. And the board listened 
to him. He’s convincing, he’s good, that’s how these things happen. He 
struggled, he fought to succeed. It was hard with the producers. I preferred to 
go along with them, but he went against. You take your hat off for these 
things.” (interview #60) 
In the context of the statist orientation and suspicion of both state actors and 
private entrepreneurs described in the previous chapter, coming up with such an 
entrepreneurial idea was one thing, and implementing it through the establishment of a 
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subsidiary company in a big agricultural cooperative was another thing. As explained by 
the former director of the cooperative,  
“even if the Union had rigidities, even if it had problems, (…) it also had social 
control. (…) The subsidiary company does have representatives of the Union, 
but they are technocrats, it’s not the farmer who is a representative there.” 
(interview #60) 
As Mandalas recounts, his ability to implement his plan was firstly thanks to the 
support of the cooperative’s elected management at the time, and particularly of President 
Ganiaris, who was willing to take the risk and political cost of backing the project 
(interview #58). Secondly, Mandalas followed a strategy of incrementally demonstrating 
the benefits of his plan, building on small successes first and implementing more costly 
decisions later, which proved to be very successful: 
“Very quickly I realised that if I didn’t have any victories at the start, let’s say 
in the first six months or in the first year, everything I suggested would remain 
in the drawer of an office. When I realised this thing, I suggested the creation 
of the MastihaShops. (…) One year later the subsidiary company was 
founded, and the first shop opened. And truly, it was such a success, that it 
precipitated everything else. It precipitated the reorganisation, and the belief 
that you know, things can change, a wind of optimism. This victory also 
limited the reactions regarding the crux of the matter, which was the 
reorganisation of the cooperative.” (interview #58) 
In other words, showing results plays a crucial role for creating buy-in. Therefore, 
ensuring that a project yields a few small, low-cost successes early on, can be crucial for 
getting the relevant actors to back a new strategy (see also Ostrom 1990: 137). 
3.3.3 Creating a conception of shared interest in the Chios mastiha sector 
In addition to coming up with and projecting an innovative entrepreneurial vision, 
the Chios mastiha cooperative had to overcome the problem of social fragmentation with 
private agri-food firms, many of which viewed its new project as a threat. To do that, the 
cooperative needed to create a conception of shared interest in the sector, whereby it 
would be seen as an ally rather than a competitor of other actors. As the former President 
of the cooperative Ganiaris recounts, this was not an easy task: 
“We played our heads in a coin toss. (…) We met rabid reactions, really rabid. 
It’s enough to look at the press. Various people wrote articles, the President 
of the Chamber of Commerce came out against us, business people came out 
saying that ‘your role is to cultivate the fields, we are the ones who sell’, they 
took us to court. (…) We went through a series of lawsuits, and came out with 
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toil, financial costs, and personal costs. This is how we crossed the Rubicon.” 
(interview #63) 
Ganiaris and Mandalas employed two strategies to forge a conception of shared 
interest with other private agri-food firms. The first one was to use the Mastihashops not 
only as a means of producing and selling final mastiha goods, but also as “a marketing 
tool to communicate the different uses of mastiha”, no matter who processed it. As 
Mandalas further explains, “what is our aim? To sell mastiha at the best possible prices. 
(…) What did we do in practice? We disseminated ideas. (…) What I want to say is that 
we also protect the competition. We don’t try to monopolize the situation” (interview 
#58). The following anecdote is worth quoting at length because it typifies this strategy: 
“Do you remember that 10 years ago ION [a Greek chocolate company] had 
circulated a chocolate bar with mastiha? How did that happen? Well, we went 
to them, and we did a presentation, asking them to make chocolate with 
mastiha for our brand. The first meeting didn’t bear fruit. We said OK, we 
will try again. Two weeks later we returned, having gone first to [the well-
known chef] Stelios Parliaros, who produced a few white and dark cholates 
with mastiha for us. They tried them and they liked them very much. Three 
months later, they had developed some trial chocolates for our brand, and we 
were ready to place an order for 3 tons of chocolate, as we had previously 
agreed. However, at the meeting they asked us to increase the order to 10 tons. 
I said alright, even though this was a very large quantity for us. Then at the 
next meeting, they asked us to buy 30 tons. What had happened? They liked 
the product so much, that they wanted to produce it under their own brand 
name. I said look. We came here to buy chocolate with mastiha because we 
believe it can be commercially successful. But even if you say that you won’t 
produce it for us, of course we will still sell you mastiha to make your own 
chocolate. (…) Last year, Leonidas in Belgium produced their first mastiha 
pralines. Which means, you know what? Our proposal endured in time.” 
(interview #58) 
In short, by designing and then freely disseminating novel ideas about mastiha products, 
the cooperative’s subsidiary not only alleviated fears that it would use the cooperative’s 
dominant position in the sector to drive private firms out of the market, but it also enlisted 
the private firms as allies in its effort to dramatically increase the consumption of mastiha 
products in Greece and abroad. 
One of the cooperative’s most important allies in that process was the CEO of the 
alcoholic drinks company Concepts SA, Dimitri Steinhauer, who spearheaded the 
production of mastiha liquor: “all the work on the liquor, this boom that took place, was 
started in reality by Concepts SA. Steinhauer built the market and made mastiha liquor 
fashionable, and the others followed” (interview #59). As Steinhauer points out in a stark 
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way, the second strategy that the mastiha cooperative followed to present itself as an ally 
of private firms was to guarantee the quality and authenticity of raw mastiha:  
“– [Me:] How does the peculiar way in which the mastiha sector is governed, 
through an obligatory cooperative which has a monopsony of raw mastiha, 
affect you?   
– [Steinhauer:] It only affects us positively. It guarantees that someone gives 
us a specific quality, and at the same time it guarantees that others won’t find 
bad quality to ruin the market. So when this thing is regulated with this 
exceptional method that the Union of Mastiha Producers has, with all the 
problems which are totally theoretical and which I don’t know about, nor do 
I occupy myself with them, this gives us a major guarantee in order to invest 
on this story, because we know (…) that the raw material will continue to have 
the value and credibility that it has today.” (interview #65) 
The description of the cooperative’s monopsony over raw mastiha as “an exceptional 
method” of governance by a private firm is truly remarkable, and a testament to the 
cooperative’s success in forging a conception of shared interest in the sector.  
Overall, the mastiha cooperative under the Presidency of Ganiaris and its 
subsidiary under the leadership of Mandalas followed a series of costly and risky 
strategies which resulted in the dissemination of a new entrepreneurial vision and the 
forging of a new sense of shared interest among producers, the cooperative and private 
firms in the mastiha sector. The institutional work performed by those leading actors, 
which was reinforced by the work that was then carried out by a few pioneering private 
firms like Concepts SA, is the key for understanding the transformation of the sector in 
the 2000s.  
3.3.4 Leadership deficits in the Kozani saffron sector 
An innovative entrepreneurial strategy, expressed in a concrete, step-by-step plan 
to be implemented by a specific team, was never articulated in the Kozani saffron sector 
in the same way that it was in Chios. The view that continues to prevail in Kozani is that 
saffron is “like a stock-market product” (interview #56; similar comments were expressed 
in interviews #54, #55): it is still principally seen as a commodity whose fortunes depend 
on the global price, rather than as a potentially valuable input for differentiated local 
products.  
This view persists despite the fact that over time, a number of positive steps have 
been made towards creating differentiated products with Kozani saffron. In the late 2000s, 
the saffron cooperative embarked on a joint venture with the private company Korres to 
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produce herbal drinks with Kozani saffron. Although the cooperation had recently 
unravelled when I did my fieldwork, it was seen by most actors in the sector as “a positive 
move” (interview #52) and a “good effort” (interview #53). Moreover, in the 1990s, the 
cooperative’s management board under the presidency of Patsilias took a number of 
important initiatives, such as the adoption of the ISO standards early on and the creation 
of a recipe book where saffron was used as an ingredient, something new in Greek cuisine 
(interview #53; Voutsina 1999/ S3). Indeed, despite the continued dearth of processed 
agri-food products with Kozani saffron, the number of Greek chefs using Kozani saffron 
as an ingredient in their recipes continues to be on the ascendant.  
It is possible to hypothesise that those initiatives didn’t have an even bigger and 
longer-lasting impact on the sector partly because there wasn’t enough continuity after 
Patsilias left the cooperative, and partly because Patsilias’s ideas didn’t have the focus of 
Mandalas’s project for the mastiha sector. Indicatively, in our interview, Patsilias 
mentioned at different moments that he tried to pursue two seemingly contradictory 
strategies to tackle the problem of foreign bodies mixed with the saffron. On the one hand, 
he tried a strategy of greater centralisation of production, where the processing of the 
crocus flowers would take place in its totality in the cooperative’s premises, solving the 
problem of the variable hygienic conditions at the saffron producers’ homes. On the other 
hand, he also tried a strategy of greater decentralisation, where the producers would be 
given the tools to deliver the saffron to the cooperative in its final, packaged form, solving 
the difficulties associated with hiring women to clean the raw saffron at the cooperative 
(interview #53). Similarly, a business plan that Patsilias composed shortly before the end 
of his tenure included the aim of a “scheduled and controlled expansion of the 
cultivation”, but also exhorted producers to utilise family labour to collect the crocus 
flowers rather than hiring workers, an advice that runs counter to the aim of scaling up 
(Patsilias 1999: 66, 69/ D1). Contrast this ambivalence to the approach of the Chios 
cooperative, which clearly prioritised the centralisation of processing and the 
simplification of the tasks that the producers had to carry out, enabling them to deliver 
higher quantities. In turn, the increase in the quantity produced compensated for any 
losses in the per kilo producer price due to costs associated with the centralisation of 
processing. 
More fundamentally, no matter how many good ideas the different management 
boards of the saffron cooperative produce, a thriving saffron ecosystem will not be created 
in Kozani unless one or more leading actors take the initiative and perform the costly 
 99 
work necessary to generate a conception of shared interest in the sector. Until then, given 
the persistent sense of fragmentation between the cooperative and Kozani’s agri-food 
companies, the view will continue to prevail that the less the competition from other 
firms, the better (interview #55, #57), and that as “the others don’t care about the 
development of the sector as a whole”, each actor does best by looking after his/ her own 
interests (interview #52).  
3.3.5 An alternative explanation for the success of Chios’s mastiha relative to Kozani’s 
saffron 
A long-durée explanation of the higher degree of cooperation in the Chios mastiha 
sector compared to the Kozani saffron sector would point out that as a form of 
governance, “obligatoriness has a past [in Chios]. The obligatory cooperative is the 
continuation of a model of organisation that has been implemented since approximately 
the 13th century”, when the Genovese set up a company that assumed the exclusive sale 
of mastiha, the Maona (interview #58). Additionally, Chios is mentioned as a historically 
“dynamic community” by the historian of “the spirit of cooperation of the modern 
Greeks” Koukkidis (1948: 48). As a result, the argument could be made that it is not a 
surprise that cooperation developed in the Chios mastiha sector also in the early twenty-
first century. 
This argument suffers from two problems. Firstly, like most places, Chios has a 
mixed history with periods of high cooperation and high prosperity, and periods of low 
cooperation and crisis. It is telling that in the 1930s, a time of crisis and social unrest, one 
of the principal arguments of those opposed to the creation of the obligatory cooperative 
had to do with “the lack of cooperative mentality and consciousness among the 
producers” (Tsouhlis 2011: 128/ S2). Secondly, even if this is sometimes forgotten today, 
Kozani also experienced a period of strong community bonds and extroversion in the late 
Middle Ages, as it was one of the bases of prosperous merchants in Western Macedonia 
whose tightly-knit commercial networks reached until Austria-Hungary and Russia 
(Siampanopoulos 1993: 178-180/ S4). Indeed, it was “this class of Greek merchants, 
[from which] many big benefactors emerged”, that brought the crocus flower in Kozani 
from Austria in the 17th century (Siampanopoulos 1993: 178-180/ S4; Voutsina 1999: 26/ 
S3). This is not to suggest that history does not affect the prospects of cooperation today, 
but to argue that recent historical events, which have a direct and traceable bearing on 
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contemporary local-level institutional settings, should be given a far higher analytical 
weight than events which took place centuries ago. 
3.4 Overcoming public-good provision problems: the attraction of 
funding and the supply of negative selective incentives in the alternative 
tourism sector 
3.4.1 Ambelakia as the paradigmatic case where cooperation should emerge from a 
“history as destiny” perspective 
If cultural approaches to cooperation held explanatory power in Greece, the first 
location where one would expect cooperation for upgrading to emerge is in the village of 
Ambelakia near Larissa, where it is said that “the first cooperative in the world” emerged 
and thrived in the 18th century, selling red-painted cotton threads to trade destinations 
across Europe. Writing in the 1940s, a historian of Ambelakia explained the cooperative’s 
success citing “the spirit of cooperation that animated the residents of Ambelakia”, and 
reached the following remarkable conclusion based on the village’s experience, 
challenging the view that Greece has low social capital altogether: 
“Greece could have continued its right way of life, relying on the spirit of 
cooperation which is so fitting with the natural character of its inhabitants. 
And instead of going abroad begging for funds, only to repay them a thousand 
times higher, toiling a thousand times more, it could create them, by following 
the advice of the founders of the great cooperatives. This is even more so, 
given that the Society of Ambelakia, like the other Greek cooperatives, 
showed an exceptional ability in this field.” (Koukkidis 1948: 98) 
The locals in Ambelakia are acutely aware and very proud of this legacy: “the [historic] 
‘Cooperative’ is a topic that Ambelakiots discuss almost daily, in a narrower or broader 
way” (Stavros Mariadis, First conference of Ambelakiot Studies” proceedings 1994: 23/ 
D12). As the President of the local Museum of Folklore and History insisted during my 
visit, “in Rochdale, in England, they also formed a cooperative later on, and today they 
claim that it was there where the first cooperative in the world was formed. But this is not 
true. The first cooperative in the world was formed in Ambelakia” (interview #48). 
Nevertheless, the obstacles to cooperation analysed in the previous chapter appear 
insurmountable in Ambelakia, whereas they were overcome in Nymphaio. Like other 
Greek mountain villages, Nymphaio also has a history of a tightly-knit community in the 
early modern period, including illustrious merchants and benefactors whose economic 
activities reached “Constantinople, Xanthi, Kavala, Thessaloniki, Cairo, Alexandria, 
Lausanne, Brussels, Hamburg, Oslo and Stockholm” (“Nymphaio: Fair-tale with a 
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name”/ D7). However, Nymphaio cannot tell an equivalent “story” about a historic 
cooperative spirit as Ambelakia (Sabel: 1145-1146). Adding to the puzzle, at 1350m. 
altitude, Nymphaio is very hard to reach, whereas Ambelakia is well-located in close 
proximity to Greece’s most frequently used highway between Athens and Thessaloniki. 
Moreover, Ambelakia is home to a set of 18th-century mansions – above all the mansion 
of George Schwarz, President of the historic cooperative – which are among the rarest, 
most beautiful, and most well-taught examples of Greek late medieval architecture. While 
Nymphaio – again, like other Greek mountain villages – was also in a position to 
showcase a number of important cultural and natural resources to attract tourism, the 
cultural and natural resources that Ambelakia has at its disposal are outstanding. 
3.4.2 The leadership work performed by Mertzos and Boutaris in the Nymphaio 
alternative tourism sector 
Rather than the social bonds inherited from the longue durée or the characteristics 
of the pre-existing local resources, it is the institutional work conducted by two leading 
actors that is key for understanding why, when and how cooperation among local 
stakeholders emerged in Nymphaio. Those leading actors were Yannis Boutaris, who 
opened the first two hotels in the village in the 1980s9, and Nikos Mertzos, the President 
of the Nymphaio Commune between 1995 and 2006. 
Like in the case of radical innovation in the agri-food sector, creating an 
alternative tourism flow where there was none before firstly requires that one or more 
leading actors introduce and gradually establish the credibility of a vision centred around 
a novel entrepreneurial idea. In the case of Nymphaio, that idea was to revitalise the 
village through alternative tourism:  
“A big reversal needed to happen: we had to reject all the models of Greek 
development, and to win the Future from the Past, overcoming the derelict 
Present. Nymphaio didn’t have anymore, nor could it have, either 
silversmithing or commerce. And it never had noteworthy primary 
production. But it did have at its disposal its golden past, a bright cultural 
heritage, and virgin Nature of exceptional beauty, which, due to abandonment, 
had not been tainted. This heritage had to be rescued, showcased and utilised. 
A society had to be created, and it had to be youthful. (…) Only tourism could 
offer all this to Nymphaio.” (“Nymphaio: its revival in images”/ D8) 
 
9 Yannis Boutaris was also the pioneering winemaker who played a key role in the transformation of 
Santorini’s wine sector. When I selected my cases for this project, I was not aware of his involvement in 
either case. 
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As Mertzos recounts, this vision is primarily attributable to Boutaris: “Yannis Boutaris 
insisted a lot on mild tourism, he didn’t want any cars or anything, and he turned out to 
be right” (interview #14). And while, as was seen in the previous chapter, the locals were 
initially disbelieving that the various initiatives of Mertzos and Boutaris, such as ceding 
communal land to create a shelter for brown bears or a summer camp for children, made 
any sense, gradually, when visitors started to arrive in the village, the locals’ mental 
models and incentive structures started to change: “At the start, the locals reacted very 
strongly against giving communal land for the YMCA summer camp, but then they 
started benefiting from the camp because visitors starting coming during the weekends ” 
(interview #13). Soon enough, local residents who had previously been occupied in 
animal-herding or in small village stores, started operating their own hotels and 
restaurants (interview #16). As a result, the initiative of Boutaris and Mertzos took a life 
of its own.  
Nevertheless, unlike in the agri-food sector, in order to create a tourism flow it is 
also necessary to supply novel attractions and conduct infrastructure projects, which are 
in essence public goods. Mertzos and Boutaris invested considerable time and resources 
to find ways to fund the provision of these public goods, utilising a variety of avenues. 
Firstly, as Commune President, Mertzos spearheaded the submission of a number of 
successful applications for EU funds, soliciting volunteers to conduct the required studies 
and utilising the Nymphaio Commune’s income, which derived primarily from the 
exploitation of its forest estate for timber, to provide the required co-financing of 30 to 
40 percent (interview #14). Boutaris and Mertzos also lobbied for and acquired 
considerable funding from the Greek state, and they attracted a range of major private 
donations by both Nymphaiots and non-Nymphaiots. 
The imposition of social selective incentives by Mertzos and Boutaris also played 
an important role for overcoming coordination problems in Nymphaio. Social selective 
incentives were important for getting local property owners to renovate their homes, a 
very costly undertaking particularly due to Nymphaio’s status as a settlement with a 
protected architectural character:  
“President Mertzos exerted pressure on them; he called them and asked them 
whether they aren’t ashamed to let their house disintegrate, ruining the image 
of the entire village, when in fact they have money to restore it. This is how 
one motivated the other.” (Interview #16) 
 103 
Negative selective incentives were no less important to avoid cases of divergence 
from the architectural rules, particularly given the state’s lack of willingness and capacity 
to intervene and punish infractions. For example, Mertzos recounts that “when one guy 
tried to put shutters, I made a fuss” (interview #14). In one case, Mertzos was reported to 
have even ordered the tearing down of an illegal construction (anonymised Nymphaio 
interview). Negative social incentives were also imposed on business owners whose 
services were of a lower standard than Mertzos and Boutaris considered necessary for 
their project to succeed: 
“I was quarrelling with the taverna-owners of the village who would buy 
aubergine salad in bulk from Ptolemaida. I told them that if they want clients, 
they should make local products. And they hated me because I used to send 
my clients to other villages with award-winning tavernas. Well, others liked 
me, it depended on the mentality of each one.” (interview #13) 
As this quote shows, imposing positive and especially negative social selective incentives 
comes at a cost. In contrast to Ostrom’s cases of established cooperation (1990: 95-96), 
at least at the early stages of breaking away from a low-cooperation equilibrium, this cost 
is unlikely to be covered endogenously through the actions of multiple members of a 
community, but must be covered by a small group of leading actors. 
3.4.3 The double crisis of Nymphaio in the 2010s and the renewed need for leadership 
After a period of prosperity in the 2000s, Nymphaio entered a phase of serious 
crisis in the 2010s, from which it is still struggling to recover.  
The crisis had two causes. Firstly, the Eurozone crisis brought about a significant 
decline in upscale domestic tourism, on which Nymphaio depended (interview #13). 
Secondly, following the administrative reform known in Greece as “Kallikrates” in 2011, 
Nymphaio was stripped of its status as an autonomous Commune and was incorporated 
in the larger municipality of Amyntaio. Significantly, the communal income that was 
generated from Nymphaio’s forest estate, which had been acquired by the Nymphaiots 
during Ottoman times (interviews #14, #15), was taken away from the village and given 
to the Amyntaio municipality, making it a lot harder for the actors in Nymphaio to invest 
the resources required to access outside funding. As explained by the last President and 
current Secretary of the Nymphaio Commune, the Folk Art and Silversmithing museum 
of Nymphaio is currently closed as the municipality is unable or unwilling to devote the 
funds to pay the salary of the guard. The second phase of the artificial lake project that 
the Nymphaio Commune had initiated “was never completed, as the Municipality cannot 
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provide €500,000 and there are no development programmes anymore” (interview #16). 
The problem is that the economic structures and needs of Nymphaio and the surrounding 
villages are very different (interviews #14, #15), something that can also be seen in a 
leaflet of the Amyntaio municipality on the “Productive Activities of the Area”, which 
devotes fourteen pages on agriculture, two on energy production and none on tourism 
(“Productive Activities of the Area”/ D9).  
There are two ways for Nymphaio to recover from this crisis. The first way is to 
act through the Amyntaio municipality, which would require finding a way to overcome 
the deep-seated reciprocal sense of social fragmentation between Nymphaio and the 
surrounding villages. The second way is to devise and implement a cooperative strategy 
for expanding into new tourism markets outside the institutions of local government, for 
example through forming a business association. Given that, as a local put it, “one must 
give in order to get”, both paths are ridden with obstacles. With Mertzos having retired 
and Boutaris having sold his original hotels to locals, these obstacles will be very difficult 
to overcome in the absence of a renewed impetus by another set of leading actors.  
3.4.4 Leadership deficits in Ambelakia 
Over time, a remarkable range of good entrepreneurial ideas concerning 
Ambelakia have been expressed. In a conference organised by the Cultural Association 
of Ambelakia as early as 1994, different speakers suggested that Ambelakia could 
develop cultural tourism, athletic, hiking and horse-riding tourism, conference tourism, 
and even that, given “today’s ecological conscience” in Europe, there could be a revival 
of the traditional plant-based dyeing techniques for textiles (“First conference of 
Ambelakiot Studies” proceedings 1994: 82-83, 91-92/ D12). However, these ideas tended 
not to be expressed by the actors who were in a position to implement them, with the 
result that, as was seen in the previous chapter, a state-oriented mentality persists among 
the main stakeholders in Ambelakia today. It is remarkable that even the historically most 
active actor in Ambelakia, namely the Cultural Association under the Presidency of 
Asterios Vogias in the 1990s, focused mostly on showcasing the cultural heritage of the 
village, without implementing a rounded strategy to revitalise the economy of the village 
(see the aims and activities of the association as described in the “Centre of Cultural 
Heritage of Ambelakia” and “Ambelakia of Thessaly” leaflets/ D11).  
Moreover, the Tembi municipality, where Ambelakia belongs since the 
Kallikrates reform, has adopted a revamped promotion strategy in recent years that the 
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local actors consider positive (interview #51). However, even that tends to target tourists 
from neighbouring areas and countries that visit the municipality primarily to go to the 
beach on the other side of the mountain, rather than addressing the nature-loving and 
culture-seeking middle- and high-income tourists who could sustain an alternative 
tourism flow in Ambelakia (“Annual Programme of Tourism Promotion” documents, 
2016-2018/ D10). Additionally, like most Greek local authorities and unlike the 
Nymphaio Commune before 2011, the Tembi municipality sees its role as limited to 
promotion efforts, and does not participate in the management and enhancement of the 
touristic product. 
On the other hand, when the stakeholders in Ambelakia do attempt to implement 
promising strategies to boost tourism in the village, they tend to stumble on the obstacle 
of finding the time and resources required to implement them. The village’s only hotelier, 
Sotiris Kourias, who by all accounts participates in every collective effort to attract 
visitors to the village (interviews #50, #51), describes that in recent years he designed a 
bicycle to run on the old railway tracks traversing the “magical landscape” of the Tembi 
valley. However, the project has stagnated due to bureaucratic obstacles, which Kourias 
(unlike Mertzos in Nymphaio) feels powerless to overcome:  
“I sent a proposal to the [train company] one-and-a-half years ago, asking 
them to let me turn the abandoned tracks into a touristic enterprise (…) and I 
still don’t have an answer, either negative or positive. After one-and-a-half 
years. With such response speeds by a company or the public sector, this 
project can’t progress.” (interview #49) 
In turn, the current President of the Cultural Association mentioned that “we tried 
once to organise a Reunion of Ambelakiots in the summer, but not with full success. We 
need to search for them and send them letters, in order to incentivise them to come. It’s 
something that I need to deal with” (interview #51). Confronting the Greek bureaucracy 
and mobilising the Ambelakiot diaspora to make donations and renovate their homes are 
both activities that require considerable time, effort and resources. However, as 
mentioned by an employee at the Schwarz mansion, “the efforts that are done are small 
and piecemeal.” In short, “there isn’t let’s say a leading figure in all this” (interview #49). 
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3.5 Overcoming coordination and public-good provision problems when 
the number of actors is large: the role of imitation and the limits of local-
level leadership in the mass tourism sector 
3.5.1 The role of leadership and imitation in overcoming coordination problems  
Despite the costs associated with being a first mover in terms of adopting an 
upgrading strategy in the mass tourism sector, some mass tourism destinations in Greece 
have succeeded to upgrade. These include a number of areas in Santorini, and particularly 
the area along the caldera between Oia and Imerovigli, which has developed as a luxury 
tourism destination, and more recently also the seaside town of Kamari, which has 
succeeded to attract higher-income tourists than in the past. Moreover, the inland village 
of Pyrgos only became a popular touristic destination in the last decade, and developed 
as a high-quality destination from the start.  
Once again, these upgrading successes are at least to some extent attributable to 
the role played by a small number of leading actors, who were willing to undertake the 
cost and risk associated with upgrading first. The reason why these efforts were successful 
has to do with the role of imitation in upgrading processes. Unlike what is expected by 
many actors who are reluctant to upgrade in areas with a low-quality equilibrium, when 
an entrepreneur decides to upgrade, the other actors often don’t simply continue doing 
business as usual while enjoying the positive externalities of the pioneering 
entrepreneur’s upgrading. Instead, they tend to imitate the pioneering entrepreneur and to 
implement the exact same upgrading strategy in their own business: 
“In Kamari there are 200-300 shops in a straight line of around 1.5km along 
the seaside pedestrian road, which all offer the same thing. So some 
entrepreneurs decided, very intelligently, to upgrade their shop. Within two 
years, as soon as their neighbour saw the flow towards the [upgraded] shop, 
he understood. (…) As soon as he saw that the people now arriving next door 
were better dressed, more polished, (…), he understood that alright, I will 
upgrade my meats, I’ll upgrade my wines.” (interview #68) 
A similar story was recounted by the founder of one of the first upscale hotels in 
Pyrgos: 
“My son designed our hotel as a prototype. When the others saw the 
construction and the whole situation, they started saying alright, let’s do 
something as well. And that’s good, because they – they didn’t exactly copy, 
but they did something good in order to succeed. Many asked my son to design 
something similar. So all the little houses and complexes that are being built 
are not big, but they are of a good quality, a good category.” (interview #70) 
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The interesting thing about these quotes is that the mechanism in operation is not a pure 
competition mechanism, whereby the business that upgrades takes away the clientele of 
the other businesses, which are forced to follow. After all, in a place that receives as many 
one-off tourists as Santorini, it is always possible to make money opportunistically by 
serving goods of an inferior quality. Rather, the mechanism is one where the pioneering 
entrepreneur’s decision to upgrade generates demonstration effects and alters the nearby 
actors’ mental models about what constitutes an appropriate and successful 
entrepreneurial strategy. It is in this way that a wave of imitation is triggered, sometimes 
resulting in the overall upgrading of the destination.  
The second contribution of a few leading actors to the upgrading of Santorini’s 
tourism industry was that they supplied the ideas and covered the upfront costs associated 
with the creation of certain upscale niche markets, and particularly gastronomical 
tourism, conference tourism and wedding tourism. A key actor was Giorgos 
Chatzigiannakis, founder of one of the first upscale restaurants in the country that 
experimented with Greek traditional – rather than imported – ingredients, at a time when 
“it was unthinkable for a Greek to eat fava in a luxury restaurant” (interview #35). A 
second key actor was Kostas Konstantinidis, owner of an upscale hotel along the caldera 
who was among the first entrepreneurs on the island to organise conferences and 
destination weddings.  
3.5.2 Supplying positive and negative selective incentives for the provision of public 
goods and for addressing overtourism: the limits of local-level leadership 
As we have seen, coordination problems, where a non-negligible share of the 
benefits of upgrading can be reaped by the relevant entrepreneur, can be resolved in mass 
tourism destinations through the work conducted by a few leading actors. However, the 
provision of public goods and the resolution of common-pool resource (CPR)-like 
problems are very difficult to achieve at the local level in mass tourism destinations, even 
if leading actors are present. Instead, given the very large number and fragmentation of 
the actors involved, as will be seen in Chapter 5, the resolution of several types of 
collective action problems in the mass tourism sector requires changes in the macro-
institutional framework. 
With regard to public-good provision problems, it is interesting to observe that 
there is a large asymmetry in the willingness of local actors in my case study areas to 
impose positive and negative selective incentives. On the one hand, many actors are quite 
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willing to make a disproportionate contribution to the provision of public goods like 
destination marketing campaigns, as participating in such joint activities provides them 
with sense of membership in a professional elite. For example, the owners of a hotel in 
Chalkidiki explained in the following way why they are happy to be fee-paying members 
of the voluntary Chalkidiki Hotel Association, even though the majority of hotels in 
Chalkidiki are not members (interview #24):  
“Since we have a hotel permit, for us it is a natural choice to be members of 
the Hotel Association. We aren’t stingy, we want to be able to vote at the 
Association, so how can we not be members?” (interview #26) 
Similarly, when the Mayor of Santorini asked about fifteen tourism entrepreneurs to join 
a weekly tourism committee meeting and to undertake part of the cost of implementing 
the committee’s strategic decisions, for instance by hosting journalists for free, these 
entrepreneurs were not only willing to make this contribution, but they were also happy 
that their voices were being heard: “in Santorini we were lucky to have a Mayor who was 
willing to do something that he didn’t think of himself. That’s rare in Greece” (interview 
#75). 
On the other hand, in the context of the widespread non-implementation of the 
law analysed in the previous chapter, most actors are very unwilling to undertake the 
work that Mertzos conducted in Nymphaio and implement negative selective incentives. 
Characteristically, the same hotel owners in Chalkidiki mentioned previously, pointed out 
that the illegal (and thereby tax-free) leasing of private houses to tourists creates “unequal 
competition”. However, when asked what should be done about this, they replied: 
“The Hotel Association highlights the problem, but what exactly do you want 
them to do? Should they go and denounce that this person has a permit, 
whereas that person doesn’t have a permit? It’s impossible.” (interview #26) 
As the owner of a nearby rental rooms business asked rhetorically, “who wants to be 
mean to their neighbour?” (interview #22). As a result, in contexts where people are 
habituated to frequent rule infractions, when the number of actors involved is large, 
negative selective incentives are very difficult to provide endogenously. 
Given the strong distributional conflicts and prospects of loss involved, finding 
pure local-level solutions to the problem of overtourism is also very difficult. The 
Santorini municipality did make a positive step towards that direction when it introduced 
a berth allocation system limiting the daily number of cruise visitors on the island to 
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8,000. The way this was achieved is reminiscent of the carving out of areas of common 
interest through arenas for discussion in Santorini’s wine sector (section 2.3):  
“There were difficulties in the berth allocation system’s acceptance by 
everyone, but through meetings with the involved stakeholders, eventually 
they saw that it’s in the interest of both the island and them, if you can manage 
[for cruise visitors to come] during all the days of the week, and not just to 
have, say 15,000 in one day, and 2,000 the next.” (interview #73) 
Nevertheless, despite having commissioned a number of studies to suggest a rounded 
strategy for addressing overtourism (Spilanis 2017/ S20; Nikos Schmitt consulting firm 
2019: S19; EBRD 2019/ S21), neither the Municipality nor any other local actor has so 
far been in a position to spearhead the adoption of more comprehensive solutions 
(interview #67). 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter set out to explain the surprising emergence of local-level institutional 
solutions to cooperation problems in unfavourable settings. Building on theories that 
emphasise the role of action for institutional change, I have called for putting the 
institutional work carried out by small groups of boundary-spanning, local-level leading 
actors at the centre of the analysis of the supply of local-level cooperative institutions. By 
following particular strategies to disseminate new entrepreneurial ideas, forge shared 
conceptions of interest, and incentivise cooperative behaviour, those leading actors 
perform a necessary role for triggering processes of change towards cooperative 
equilibria, typically and at least initially at a cost to themselves in terms of time, effort 
and resources. Without taking into account this institutional work, it is difficult to explain 
why, when and how local-level institutions change towards the direction of higher 
cooperation. 
Through a detailed investigation of processes of institutional change in sectors 
facing different types of obstacles to cooperation, I have also analysed the concrete 
strategies that leading actors followed in order to successfully resolve different types of 
problems: 
1. When it comes to vertical cooperation for quality improvement along agri-food 
supply chains, the incremental construction of trust through the demonstration of 
progressively more demanding forms of cooperative behaviour is key, particularly 
when the starting point is an atmosphere of intense suspicion.  
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2. When the number of producers is large, for the quality of inputs to be guaranteed, 
trust must be complemented with price incentives to reward the delivery of high-
quality inputs, and simple rules transparently enforced to sanction the delivery of low-
quality inputs.  
3. When it comes to horizontal cooperation among firms, simple distributional conflicts 
can be resolved through the provision of arenas for discussion, which give to the 
involved actors the opportunity to carve out areas of common interest, putting thornier 
issues aside for the time being.  
4. In the case of innovative activities, disseminating a vision centred around a novel 
entrepreneurial idea can be achieved through an incremental “proof of concept” 
strategy, relying on a few small successes first, which gradually alter the expectations 
and interests of the rest of the actors in the sector. Demonstration effects and imitation 
also play an important role in the dissemination of innovative entrepreneurial 
strategies for upgrading. 
5. Finally, generating a conception of shared interest among firms requires the leading 
actors to perform costly types of institutional work in order to demonstrate in practice 
that they can be useful allies to other firms, rather than acting only as their 
competitors.  
By following these strategies and by undertaking the aforementioned three types of 
institutional work, leading actors can go far in terms of triggering cooperation when the 
benefits of cooperation are club goods or when the number of actors is not very large. 
However, if neither of those conditions is not met, the potential of local-level leadership 
alone to catalyse cooperation reaches its limits.  
If we accept that the institutional work carried out by a small group of local-level 
leading actors is key to understanding why and how local institutional configurations 
change towards the direction of higher cooperation in unfavourable settings, then it is 
natural to ask: What characteristics do those local institutional entrepreneurs have? And 
do any place-specific attributes make it likelier that potentially successful leading actors 
will be available in particular areas? It is to these questions that the next chapter turns.  
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CHAPTER 4  
CHARACTERISTICS AND AVAILABILITY OF 
SUCCESSFUL LEADING ACTORS 
4.1 Diversity, power, preferences and institutional innovation  
One of my first interviews for this dissertation was with Yannis Boutaris, at the 
time the Mayor of Thessaloniki, who had been a pioneer of the revival of Nymphaio, and 
as I only fully realised later, also of the upgrading of Santorini’s wine sector.10 Boutaris 
started narrating Nymphaio’s revival in the following way: 
“When we used to visit the village on the long weekend of the 28th of October 
and over Christmas during the decade of 1965 to 1975, there were hardly a 
hundred residents in the village. We were wondering, what should we do, what 
should we do, and I said that the only thing that can save the village is luxury 
tourism and mountain tourism. And so I made two guesthouses, La Moara 
and Linouria. At the time, a group of paragliders came to the village. I funded 
two or three of their championships as a form of advertisement. They hang-
glided from Nymphaio down to Kalambaka and broke the national record. 
Meanwhile, the village had started becoming known due to La Moara, which 
at the time was the most expensive guesthouse of Greece. People were visiting 
just to see it. This was the first golden period. And then we said, that’s not 
enough...” (interview #13) 
Despite the ease and casualness of Boutaris’s narrative, the actions that he describes are 
imaginative, complex, and highly costly in terms of time and resources: they are actions 
that most people would not wish or be in a position to undertake. What are the analytically 
relevant characteristics of leading actors like Yannis Boutaris, who manage not only to 
be successful entrepreneurs, but to also carry along an entire local sector in that success? 
In what types of places can one expect to encounter them? 
One can approach these questions in two ways. On the one hand, local-level 
leadership can be viewed as a purely exogenous, randomly distributed variable, which 
triggers a process of change along a newly emergent cooperative path in a few fortuitous 
places where a sufficient number of leading actors became available thanks to sheer luck. 
On the other hand, the availability of local leading actors can be seen as endogenously 
 
10 When selecting my case studies, I was not aware of the involvement of Yannis Boutaris either in the 
Santorini wine sector or in the Nymphaio alternative tourism sector. This is also the reason why my 
interview with him in the context of my case study in Nymphaio contains almost no references to Santorini.  
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determined by particular characteristics of place, making it possible to predict with 
reasonable accuracy where change towards a cooperative equilibrium will arise.  
I take a middle position in this debate, suggesting that the supply of potentially 
successful leading actors depends both on contextual and on individual factors (for a 
similar approach explaining differing developmental trajectories with reference to both 
“structures” and “roles”, see Evans 1995: 11-14). Building on Crouch’s (2005) argument 
that diverse institutional repertoires increase the capacity of actors to innovatively 
recombine elements of different institutional frameworks and bring about institutional 
change, and drawing attention to a factor that is not sufficiently considered or developed 
in the cooperation literature, I argue that successful leading actors tend to be in some way 
outsiders to the local area, whether they are locals with significant translocal experience 
or non-locals who have moved into the area. Moreover, drawing on the innovation and 
entrepreneurship literatures, I argue that high degrees of know-how and participation in 
networks characterised by high linking social capital are likely to confer the kind of power 
to local actors which can enable them to act as successful institutional entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, not all highly skilled, translocally embedded actors become catalysts for 
cooperation, let alone catalysts for cooperation in the agri-food and tourism sectors of 
rural Greece: in fact, few do. What is also needed for an actor to undertake the institutional 
work analysed in the previous chapter is the appropriate motivation, which is provided 
either by a subjective conception of self-interest as encapsulating the interests of the other 
actors in the local sector under discussion (Farrell 2009: 24-29), or by a particularly strong 
degree of place-based group altruism. Thus, particular types of self- and/ or other-
regarding preferences motivate leading actors to undertake the risks and upfront costs of 
catalysing institutional change. It is plausible to argue that the availability of actors with 
translocal links and a high degree of know-how and links with political and economic 
authorities at different levels may be related to place-based characteristics: the greater the 
pool of translocally embedded, highly skilled and well-connected actors, the likelier that 
some of them will assume the role of leaders for local-level institutional change. 
However, preferences are individual attributes that cannot be reduced to the 
characteristics of place, thus introducing an important stochastic element in the 
geographical distribution of potentially successful leading actors.  
The chapter is organised as follows: in the remainder of this section, I develop 
further the theoretical arguments that link translocal networks, know-how, linking social 
capital and preferences to the characteristics and availability of leadership at the local 
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level. In sections 2 and 3, I demonstrate empirically the importance of translocally 
embedded, highly skilled, well-connected and actors in catalysing cooperation in my case 
study areas. In section 4, I provide evidence regarding the stochastic element in the 
distribution of potentially successful leading actors, namely their preferences. Section 5 
concludes. As an extension of the argument, the Appendix to Chapter 4 shows that the 
main points developed in the chapter are consistent with a large-N, descriptive statistical 
analysis at the national level. 
4.1.1 Local-level leading actors: insiders or outsiders? 
It is well established in the literature that cooperation, and therefore economic 
success in fragmented economies, goes hand in hand with social capital, which can be 
defined as “the shared understandings and social mechanisms that foster mutual trust 
regarding commitments by individuals and groups to abide by cooperative agreements, 
with accompanying shared expectations of mutual coordination and enforcement” 
(Ferguson 2013: 203). The concept of “shared understandings” encompasses, among 
other elements, a widespread perception that other actors are trustworthy, which is a 
group asset, like social capital in general. The concept of “social mechanisms” includes 
“reciprocal relationships, conventions, social norms, social rules, formal rules, and social 
networks”, with the latter referring to a set of “relationship links through which 
individuals communicate and interact” (Ferguson 2013: 204-205).   
In order to understand under what circumstances social capital can be found in 
unlikely settings, it is useful to recognise that, like physical capital, social capital “comes 
in many different shapes and sizes with many different uses” (Putnam 2000: 21). As 
Putnam mentions, “of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, 
perhaps the most important is the distinction between bridging and bonding [social 
capital]” (Putnam 2000: 22). On the one hand, bonding social capital refers to “the 
cohesion that exists between small groups of similar people, such as family members, 
close friends and colleagues and perhaps the members of ethnic or religious groups”. On 
the other hand, bridging social capital consists of the “networks that link acquaintances 
who may be very dissimilar people, such as a businesswoman and her customers” 
(Meadowcroft and Pennington 2008: 120). Are bonding and bridging social capital 
equally important for the emergence of cooperation in particular places? How does each 
type of social capital arise? What are the implications of the answers to those questions 
in terms of the characteristics of successful local-level leading actors? 
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A number of studies in the political economy literature on cooperation point out 
that group homogeneity can facilitate cooperation. Ostrom claims that local-level 
cooperative institutions for the management of Common-Pool Resources (CPR) are more 
likely to emerge when “the group appropriating the CPR is relatively small and stable” 
and its members have similar interests (1990: 211). Ferguson mentions that “many self-
organized groups form around similarities in salient ascriptive characteristics of their 
members, such as age, shared cultural perspectives, race, ethnicity, ideology, or religion” 
(2013: 228-229). The absence of salient dividing lines among members can help a group 
construct shared understandings and cooperative norms, such as reciprocity, through 
“many reinforcing encounters” (Ostrom 1990: 206), and it can contribute to the 
mobilisation of solidarity (Putnam 2000: 22). In turn, communities’ “internal social 
capital resolves CAPs [Collective Action Problems] that would otherwise be difficult or 
irresolvable” (Ferguson 2013: 228). In short, a degree of bonding social capital is required 
for cooperation to emerge and be sustained, and while bonding social capital can also 
exist in heterogeneous groups, it is often considered to be more easily provided in 
homogeneous groups. 
However, in the previous chapter, I argued that cooperative informal institutions, 
and bonding social capital more generally, can be introduced in relatively short time 
periods even in unfavourable, low-trust settings, provided that a set of specific strategies 
are followed. Moreover, high amounts of bonding social capital can also have deleterious 
effects, something that is readily acknowledged in the cooperation literature. As shown 
in a long line of literature since Banfield’s (1958) anthropological study of a village in 
Southern Italy, bonding and bridging social capital are not always complementary, but 
they can also be antagonistic. Strong ties within small subgroups can generate suspicion 
and mistrust towards members of other subgroups, much like in Banfield’s case study, 
where a culture of “amoral familism” promoted “codes of good conduct within small 
circles of related persons”, but deemed selfish behaviour “acceptable outside this small 
network” (Alesina and Giuliano 2015: 14, 18; see also McDermott 2007: 106-107; 
Streeten 2002: 11-12). Ferguson also points out that self-governance efforts may breed 
insularity, which “tends to reinforce externality problems and leads to additional 
problems ranging from missed opportunities to outright conflicts”. As a result, it is 
particularly difficult to resolve complex Common-Pool Resource (CPR) problems via 
self-organisation (2013: 228). In order to distinguish between social capital that has 
negative, exclusionary effects and positive forms of social capital, Streeten calls the 
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former “antisocial capital” (2002). Uzzi also warns of the dangers of 
“overembeddedness” among local firms, which can lead a network to become “ossified 
and out of step with the demands of its environment, ultimately leading to decline” (1997: 
58-59).  According to Granovetter, while weak ties are “often denounced as generative 
of alienation”, they are in fact “indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and to their 
integration into communities”. In contrast, paradoxically, “strong ties, breeding local 
cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation” (1973: 1378). 
The exclusionary effects of bonding social capital are particularly worrisome in 
terms of the prospects of cooperation for upgrading for two reasons. Firstly, a high degree 
of homogeneity in local habits, norms, and ways of doing things can act as a hindrance 
when it comes to institutional change. As Crouch argues, institutional entrepreneurs rely 
crucially on pre-existing elements of institutional diversity in order to be able to conceive 
and enact institutional innovations (2005: chapter 4). While such elements of diversity 
may have seemed in the past as redundant capacities, when an institutional status quo 
reaches its limits and starts yielding decreasing returns, “serendipitous redundancy” 
becomes an advantage, as it “present[s] actors with alternative strategies when existing 
paths seem blocked, and [makes] it possible for them to make new combinations among 
elements of various paths” (2005: 89, 126). In the case of cooperation for upgrading, 
leading actors may draw on the mental models and diverse modes of doing business 
encountered in an adjacent field such as a different local sector, or they may recombine 
elements of the local institutional framework with cooperative practices encountered 
during the actors’ past experiences outside the area in question. 
Secondly, it is well-established in the literature on innovation and 
entrepreneurship that innovative ideas arise from embeddedness in translocal networks, 
which can provide useful information about far-away markets and ways to serve them 
using local resources (Shane 2000: 452). Indeed, Bathelt and his co-authors argue that for 
innovation to occur, what is required is a set of “global pipelines”, i.e. channels used in 
distant knowledge-exchange interactions: a local “information and communication 
ecology created by face-to-face contacts, co-presence and co-location of people and firms 
within the same industry and place” will not be sufficient. By implication, “particularly 
successful clusters” are likely to be “the ones that are able to build and maintain a variety 
of channels of low-cost exchange of knowledge with relevant hot-spots around the globe” 
(Bathelt et al. 2012: 3, 11, 13; see also Boschma and Ter Wal 2007: 180-1; Morrison 
2004: 3, 6). Such translocal links are considered to be particularly important in small and 
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peripheral regions, which depend on their more innovative counterparts and on 
international markets for information about innovative processes and products 
(Andersson and Karlsson 2004: 18). Moreover, the implementation of innovative 
strategies also requires synergies among actors from distinct social groups. As is 
established in the economic geography literature, “innovation, knowledge creation and 
learning” arise through an interactive process among actors with diverse knowledge and 
competencies, who come together and recombine their pools of knowledge in novel ways 
to design new products (Bathelt et al. 2012: 1, 5). Moreover, innovation tends to occur as 
a result of the interaction of actors across the supply chain, rather than being created and 
then diffused by a single group of actors at one part of the chain (Andersson and Karlsson 
2004: 5-6).  
In other words, institutional and economic innovation alike rely on diversity rather 
than homogeneity, making bridging social capital and the presence of actors who are in 
some sense outsiders – whether they are locals who are also involved in an adjacent field, 
locals who have lived elsewhere, or non-locals who have recently moved to the area in 
question – particularly well-placed to act as institutional entrepreneurs. Naturally, in order 
to be in a position to introduce cooperative norms that span an entire local sector, leading 
actors must also be locally embedded, which is not an easy task, particularly for outsiders. 
Nevertheless, for all the reasons mentioned above, an actor who is “located at interstices” 
(Crouch 2005: 90) is far more likely to act as an institutional entrepreneur than an insider 
who has little or no experience in other areas or adjacent fields. By implication, it can be 
hypothesised that places with high levels of population flows, in- and out-migration, 
strong diasporic networks, lasting patterns of settlement by non-local actors, or 
involvement in economic activities with dense translocal links in an adjacent sector, are 
likely to have a larger pool of potentially successful local leading actors than highly 
insular societies. There are a number of passing references to this subject in the literature: 
for instance, Burroni and his co-authors mention that one of the factors that contributed 
to the success of industrial districts in the Southern Italian region of Campania was “the 
mobility of human resources, i.e. entrepreneurs and technicians who, after a learning 
experience in northern Italy, return to set up local firms, bringing home knowledge and 
professional experience” (Burroni et al. 2008: 482). Nevertheless, the critical role of 
outsiders and hybrid actors as well as translocal links in the emergence of local-level 
cooperative efforts has not been sufficiently and systematically explored in the 
cooperation literature. 
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4.1.2 What kind of power do local-level leading actors have? 
Even though much of the literature on cooperation views power inequalities, 
resource imbalances and information asymmetries as deleterious to the prospects of 
cooperation, the concept of leadership as it was explored in the previous chapter implies 
a degree of power imbalance among the leading actors, on the one hand, and many of the 
other actors in the local sector, on the other. As was established in the introduction, the 
leading actors in my case study areas are bound with other local actors by relations of 
mutual dependence rather than by hierarchical relations. Nevertheless, leading actors still 
require a disproportionate degree of access to resources in order to be able to catalyse the 
implementation of costly collective entrepreneurial strategies and enforce material or 
social sanctions against actors who choose uncooperative strategies (Ferguson 2013: 65-
69). What could be a source of power that would enable actors to successfully perform 
the three types of institutional work analysed in the previous chapter, but without making 
it highly likely that they would abuse their position to “usurp benefits for themselves and 
deny access to others” (Ferguson 2013: 230)? 
In clientelistic settings like Greece or Italy, scholars almost automatically 
associate power with membership in clientelistic networks, which are characterised by 
exchanges of funds for votes (Piattoni 2001: 4). Some scholars have argued that under 
specific conditions, actors who are well-embedded in relationships of clientelistic 
exchange can take advantage of the resources that those relationships give them access to 
in order to foster broad-based economic development (see Piattoni’s distinction between 
“virtuous” and “vicious” clientelism in Southern Italy; 1997: 320). After all, as shown by 
Rodríguez-Pose and his co-authors, “a widespread political culture of pork-barrelling” 
does exist in the territorial allocation of public expenditure in Greece (2016: 1483). On 
the other hand, most of the literature on cooperation would regard clientelistic ties 
between local strongmen and extra-local politicians as disruptive for cooperative efforts, 
as they focus the powerful actors’ efforts towards protecting the interests of their clientele 
base rather than fostering broad-based development. As Ostrom explains with reference 
to Sri Lanka, “the spoils politics of a central regime unwilling to enforce rules 
impartially” leads to “those appropriators who want to avoid rule enforcement [having] 
considerable opportunity and means to obtain the help of central officials in obstructing 
such enforcement, thus undermining any effort to supply new local institutions” (1990: 
166). Moreover, it seems likely that actors embedded in clientelistic networks would have 
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an interest in the perpetuation of the status quo and would be central nodes in local 
networks, rather than being “located at interstices” (Crouch 2005: 90). By implication, 
they would be unlikely to have the motivation and perhaps even the innovative capacity 
to bring about local-level institutional change. 
A more likely source of power for leading actors in the context of cooperation for 
upgrading consists of a set of skills and connections that can help in acquiring access to 
a variety of resources, from EU- and national-level public sector funding to private-sector 
investment funding and donations, regardless of party-political affiliation. Knowing 
about and being able to successfully tap on such varied resources can be facilitated by 
information-gathering and analytical skills as well as by “linking social capital”, i.e. by a 
network of ties and acquaintances with “political and economic authorities” at the 
regional, national and European levels, which can provide important information and 
know-how about available funding tools (Hurrelmann et al. 2006: 223).  
Such skills and connections can be acquired in a variety of ways, one of which is 
higher education (Andersson and Karlsson 2004: 19). Indeed, in rural areas, higher 
education also serves as an opportunity to acquire translocal links, thereby contributing 
to the actors’ capacity to innovate in both institutional and economic terms. According to 
Ostrom, the combination of high educational attainment and local roots can give 
individuals the social status, credibility and local knowledge required to act as “catalysts” 
who introduce cooperative habits in “situation[s] of mutual distrust and unpredictability” 
(1990: 167-72). It is worth noting that while the importance of higher education is familiar 
in the literature on entrepreneurship and innovation (e.g. Andersson and Karlsson 2004: 
19), it does not usually figure prominently in cooperation literature. Nevertheless, given 
its association with the variables of interest here, namely know-how, linking social capital 
and translocal links, there are good theoretical reasons to include it in a framework to 
explain the emergence of cooperation for upgrading.  
4.1.3 Leading actors’ motivation 
While highly skilled, highly connected actors who are in some sense outsiders can 
be hypothesised to have the capacity to conduct the institutional work required to catalyse 
change towards a cooperative direction at the local level, this does not mean that they will 
also have the motivation to do so. Indeed, if we assume actors to be rational egoists, i.e. 
if we assume that they seek outcomes which maximize their own material payoffs without 
caring about the processes through which those outcomes were reached or about 
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outcomes for others, then it is very difficult to explain why anyone would wish to 
undertake the personal cost and risk associated with initiating cooperation for upgrading: 
“the self-interest axiom cannot even explain the resolution of relatively small-scale 
collective action problems envisioned by Olson and observed by Ostrom” (Ferguson 
2013: 93). Moreover, if, as Farrell argues, changes in informal institutions result from 
“self-centered actors’ efforts to reap distributional benefits” when the balance of power 
among different groups shifts (2009: 18, chapter 5), then it should be the weaker actors 
who would be expected to seek more cooperative institutional arrangements, not the 
disproportionately powerful ones. After all, as was seen in Chapter 2, successful 
cooperation for upgrading increases the mutual dependence among different groups of 
stakeholders and can empower actors who used to be in a weak negotiating position to 
make demands that they would never be able to see satisfied before the onset of 
cooperation. 
There are two ways to account for the motivation of the leading actors who engage 
in the types of institutional work analysed in the previous chapter. The first way is to 
recognise that actors do not always behave like rational egoists, but they also have social 
preferences: their actions may be motivated by a concern over outcomes for others, a 
concern over their position relative to others, or a concern over the processes that generate 
outcomes (Ferguson 2013: 114, Bowles 2004: 96, 109). Social preferences are consistent 
with a substantive rationality approach and can help illuminate behaviours that are hard 
to account for using a rational egoist model in a game-theoretical setting.  
One type of social preference cited in the cooperation literature is intrinsic 
reciprocity, i.e. “an intrinsic desire to reward kind, friendly, or fair behavior and to punish 
unkind, hostile, or unfair behaviour” (Ferguson 2013: 91). A wealth of experimental 
evidence shows that actors in diverse settings exhibit intrinsic reciprocity motives, 
rewarding generous behaviour and punishing unfair behaviour even at a personal cost. 
For instance, in experimental Ultimatum Games, where a first player decides how to 
divide a given sum and a second player decides whether to accept the proposed division 
or deny payment to both players, the typical final outcome tends to be a 60-40 or even a 
50-50 division among the two players, even though a rational egoist model would predict 
an outcome closer to a 90-10 division in favour of the first player. An important reason 
for this result is that a seemingly unjust division by the first player tends to provoke a 
hostile reaction by the second player, who prefers to earn nothing than to see the first 
player earn a disproportionate share of the total sum (Bowles 2004: 111-113). Intrinsic 
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reciprocity is a very useful concept for explaining how cooperative institutions can be 
gradually expanded and sustained over time, even though they constitute public goods, 
which means that their supply may stumble on similar collective action problems as those 
they are meant to resolve. However, intrinsic reciprocity is likely to be less useful for 
explaining the initial emergence of cooperation in unfavourable settings, as reciprocity 
motives tend to reinforce not only cooperative, but also non-cooperative equilibria: if 
actors are intrinsically inclined to punish non-cooperative behaviour, then what kind of 
motivation can induce a leader to begin breaking a vicious low-cooperation cycle? 
Other types of social preferences include inequality aversion, which leads to a loss 
of utility when actors are “faced with unequal outcomes between themselves and 
members of a reference group” (Ferguson 2013: 117); altruism, which is a desire to help 
others unconditionally, leading to behaviour that “confers a benefit on another while 
inflicting a cost on oneself” (Bowles 2004: 110); and spite, which motivates actors to 
unconditionally lower the utility of others (Ferguson 2013: 118). Because inequality 
aversion, altruism and spite are not dependent on the behaviour exhibited by other actors, 
they are more likely than reciprocity motives to help explain the preferences of leading 
actors in unfavourable settings. As will be discussed in section 4.4, altruism, and more 
specifically group altruism towards other actors in a particular place, constitutes a 
significant component of many leaders’ motivation for undertaking the costly 
institutional work required to catalyse cooperation at the local level.   
However, social preferences are not the only way to account for the motivation of 
leading actors in the settings of interest. As was argued in previous chapters, actors often 
face serious cognitive limitations that may inhibit them from grasping the potential 
benefits of cooperation, the full range of strategies that are available to them and to other 
actors, and the outcomes associated with each combination of strategies. Once we adopt 
a bounded rationality approach and acknowledge these cognitive limitations, it follows 
that there may be more than one way to define the actors’ self-regarding preferences in a 
given setting, depending on the mental models that the actors use to make decisions and 
the heuristics they draw upon to interpret the situation they find themselves in. While 
some actors may perceive their self-interest to be entirely or mostly oppositional to the 
interests of other local stakeholders, other actors in the exact same position may read the 
situation differently, considering their self-interest to be to a large degree aligned with 
the interests of a broader group of stakeholders. The former category of actors have a 
narrow conception of self-interest and seek to maximize their share of the pie in what 
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they perceive to be a highly competitive context. In contrast, the latter category of actors 
have a broad conception of self-interest and consider that the best available strategy for 
increasing the size of their own piece is to increase the size of the pie. Thus, once 
cognitive obstacles to cooperation are taken into consideration, it is possible to provide 
an account of the leading actors’ motivation also in terms of self-regarding preferences, 
which are no longer singularly defined. As will be argued in section 4.4, a recurring 
characteristic of leading actors in the settings of interest was that most of them had a 
subjective conception of self-interest that encapsulated the interests of a broad range of 
local-level actors (Farrell 2009: 11; Sabel 1993: 1149). In turn, many successful leading 
actors were also characterised by a particular aptitude for projecting to others their vision 
about shared prosperity and inclusive economic development via cooperation, triggering 
the process of broadening the other local stakeholders’ conception of their self-interest 
that was described in the previous chapter. Indeed, “an ability to influence shared mental 
models” can be viewed as “a key source of power” (Ferguson 2013: 129).  
While translocal links, analytical and information-gathering skills, and 
participation in networks with high degrees of linking social capital can be hypothesized 
to correlate with certain characteristics of place, the distribution of different kinds of self- 
and other-regarding preferences in a population entails a high degree of randomness, 
particularly within a specific country. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I show 
that leading actors motivated by a broad conception of self-interest and by a strong degree 
of place-based group altruism leveraged their translocal experience, skills and links to 
carry out their institutional work. I also argue that successful leading actors are more 
likely to emerge in places with many translocal links and high educational attainment, 
where the pool of potential leaders is higher, though this relation is also mediated by the 
important but stochastic element of preferences.  
4.2 Leaders as in some way outsiders  
4.2.1 Translocal links in the Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron sectors 
If we define insiders as actors who, at the onset of local cooperative activities, had 
spent most of their adult life at the locality in question; outsiders as actors who had not 
lived there for a sizeable time period and do not originate from the locality; and hybrid 
actors as those who originate from the locality but had not lived there for a sizeable time 
period, then the typical profile of an innovative actor in the Chios mastiha cooperative is 
that of a hybrid actor. Most notably, Yannis Mandalas, the CEO of the cooperative’s 
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subsidiary company, is a Chiot who studied business management in Athens and spent 
several years working at companies in the capital. He returned to Chios in 1998 at the age 
of 36 to work at the Chios Development Company, and a couple of years later he was 
approached by the President of the cooperative Ganiaris, who considered him “one of the 
brightest minds of Chios”, to undertake the reorganisation of the cooperative (interview 
#63). Mandalas thereby found himself in a position to implement “an idea that I had 
worked on a couple of years earlier”, namely the idea of the MastihaShops (interview 
#58), which likely combined insights from his experience outside the island and the 
knowledge of the local economy he gained while working at the Chios Development 
Company.  
Mandalas was not the only hybrid actor in the mastiha cooperative. Indeed, one 
of the most important legacies of the Presidency of Aristeidis Belles in the 1980s was the 
implementation of the principle of only hiring white-collar workers who had a minimum 
level of qualifications, which had the effect of attracting back to Chios a number of 
qualified locals who were living outside the island. As explained by the cooperative’s 
Director at the time, who had himself met Belles while studying at the University of 
Peiraeus and who was working at a company in Athens before being asked to join the 
cooperative,  
“we saw the need for our own renewal, and we saw that the cooperative can’t 
rely on politics along the lines – I’ll hire so many people from your village 
and so many from mine. So we started to put criteria: [the candidate] should 
have a degree, additional studies, specialisation, experience.” (interview #60) 
Thus, a number of highly educated hybrid actors with experience both in Greece and 
abroad joined the cooperative, introducing a level of professionalism and innovativeness 
that persists until today. Characteristically, the cooperative’s Director for Research and 
Development, who has overseen the conduct of major research projects that resulted in 
the registration of mastiha in the inventory of the European Medicines Agency, was 
“brought to Chios by Yannis [Mandalas]” after having studied in the UK and worked in 
the lab at the University of Thessaloniki. One of his ongoing projects at the time of my 
fieldwork aimed to isolate the mastiha’s polymer component, whose value is more than 
ten times the value of raw mastiha, in order to sell it for use in specific pharmaceutical 
products and cosmetics (interview #59). It is implausible that such innovative and 
technically demanding projects would have gone ahead in the absence of actors who had 
gained exposure to the relevant ideas while living outside the confines of the island.  
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A business plan composed by the outgoing President of the Kozani saffron 
cooperative also recognised that some interventions would be necessary in order to 
increase the cooperative’s extroversion and innovativeness: 
“The Obligatory Cooperative of Crocus Producers is characterised by a certain 
introversion, something that leads to entrepreneurial isolation, especially in 
matters regarding the potential of cooperation, information, modern 
production methods, organisation and management. (…) The management of 
the cooperative knows general things about what is required to improve and 
maintain the position of their business in the local and international markets, 
but without having a clear and substantiated picture of the whole situation and 
of the factors that influence it.” (Patsilias 1999: 90/ D1) 
However, the diagnosis of the problem was not followed by a recommendation to change 
hiring practices, but only by generally worded suggestions to “familiarise the 
management with accepting modern technical improvements related to organisation and 
administration” and to “improve the competitiveness of the cooperative through 
understanding its weaknesses and problems” (Patsilias 1999: 90/ D1). Indeed, the saffron 
cooperative appears to be still run mostly by insiders who, despite travelling frequently 
in an effort “to promote saffron everywhere” (interview #56), have typically spent most 
of their adult life locally, for instance working at the Public Electricity Company, and 
lack the translocal experience necessary to stimulate radical institutional and economic 
innovation.  
While this discrepancy is partly the result of different decisions made by the Chios 
and Kozani cooperative managers over time, it is also reflective of a broader difference 
in the degree of extroversion of the two places. On the one hand, Chios 
“certainly had an extroversion traditionally, it had people abroad, in shipping, 
it’s somewhat open to new things. It’s a commercial area, not an agricultural 
one. So it’s easier to say that we will do something to address other people.” 
(background discussion with a local resident, field notes) 
On the other hand, in Kozani, whose “lignite ‘lights up’ the whole of Greece” 
(Kiriakatikos Chronos, 13/5/2001, 3161: 1/ N1), in recent decades many locals took up 
well-paid jobs in the Public Electricity Company and tended to be less mobile. The census 
data in Table 5 suggest that the difference between the two places was small in 1991, but 
it had become very pronounced by 2001, which is right before the cooperative’s 
subsidiary company was founded and cooperation really started to deepen in Chios. 
Specifically, in 2001, the share of the population who lived elsewhere in Greece or abroad 
five years earlier was substantially higher in the mastiha-producing region of Chios 
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(Mastichochoria) than in the saffron-producing region of Kozani (Elimeia). 
Mastichochoria also had both a higher share of foreign nationals in the population, and a 
higher proportion of university graduates among foreign nationals. 
4.2.2 Translocal links in the Santorini and Lemnos wine sectors 
While Santorini’s wine sector also had a number of pioneers who were hybrid 
actors, its upgrading was inextricably linked with the arrival, from the 1980s onwards, of 
several complete outsiders. The most notable such actor was the winemaker Yannis 
Boutaris, who comes from northern Greece (as we saw, he comes from Nymphaio). 
Boutaris brought along a number of French-educated outsider oenologists, such as 
Voyatzis, Paraskevopoulos and Chatzidakis, who introduced important know-how about 
modern winemaking techniques in Santorini and later started their own highly successful 
wineries, which left their mark on the sector (interview #30). As explained by the Director 
of Santorini’s wine cooperative, who is an outsider himself, “the revolution of 
winemaking in Greece started towards the late 1970s and early 1980s when oenologists 
who had studied in France started returning and giving new wind in the sails of the wine 
sector”. In turn, the “French spirit” arrived in Santorini in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when “educated oenologists came to work with Boutaris but also at the Union” (interview 
#36; Thiraïka Nea, May-Jun. 1990, 392). Furthermore, Sofia Perpera, the US wine 
importer who, as discussed in Chapter 3, provided the idea behind the Wines of Santorini 
collective marketing project, was also an outsider: “she has studied in America, she has 
Greco-American roots, she has worked in America – and she set it as her aim, she really 
believed in Greek wine and she wanted to promote it” (interview #29). On the other hand, 
the marketing manager of Santorini’s wine cooperative is an example of a hybrid actor 
whose family originates from Santorini, but who studied business administration and 
marketing in Athens and Glasgow respectively. In her account, when she arrived in 2002 
many employees at the cooperative did not understand what marketing entailed, but now 
“marketing and public relations have become ingrained in the company’s culture” 
(interview #29).  
It would be reasonable to hypothesise that there could be a rift between outsiders 
and insiders in Santorini’s wine sector. However, as explained by a local oenologist, in 
practice the dividing lines in the sector are drawn differently: 
“There is some fear due to the demonstration of a lot of interest [towards 
Santorini wines] by big winemakers who have nothing to do with the zone, 
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e.g. from Northern Greece. But in reality, Chatzidakis was from Crete, 
Boutaris is from Northern Greece, Paraskevopoulos is from Nemea. What we 
are really afraid of is that some may come to exploit Santorini’s name without 
contributing anything to the island.” (interview #30) 
In other words, by showing through their actions that they are making a contribution to 
the advancement of the local sector as a whole rather than free riding on the success of 
others, outsider actors can be seen as allies rather than adversaries of the locals. Indeed, 
as long as they follow appropriate strategies to foster cooperative norms and a conception 
of shared interest, outsiders can become catalysts of local-level cooperation, and have 
done so on several occasions in Greek rural areas. 
On the other hand, insiders who had lived most of their adult life in Lemnos 
continued to dominate the Lemnos wine sector until much later than in Santorini. Indeed, 
probably the first truly translocally embedded stakeholder who acquired a central position 
in the sector was Chatzigeorgiou, a hybrid actor who established what is now the biggest 
private winery of the island in 1999. Chatzigeorgiou owned a drinks store in Athens, and 
his daughter, who is the oenologist at his winery, studied in Bordeaux. The 
Chatzigeorgiou family conceived the idea of making one of their most innovative 
products, namely their semi-sweet sparkling wine from the local Muscat of Alexandria 
varietal, by observing how well Moscato d’Asti sells in the drinks market (interview #79). 
By the mid-2010s, the Lemnos wine cooperative had also hired some hybrid actors. The 
current marketing manager studied in Italy and had many years of work experience in the 
trading of drinks. During my fieldwork, he was engaging in an effort to “open some new 
markets in a comprehensive way”, something that was necessary because “until recently, 
the cooperative didn’t have a complete sales network as is done in the modern market in 
terms of how it approaches clients, it went on auto-pilot” (interview #85). These 
developments, combined with the improvement in the quality of Lemnos’s wines, 
generate optimism that the sector’s performance will improve in the near future. 
Nevertheless, the late, and to this day still quantitatively limited, arrival of translocally 
embedded actors is a notable and important difference in the trajectory of Lemnos’s wine 
sector compared to Santorini’s. 
To some extent, the greater extroversion of Santorini’s wine sector reflects the 
growth of Santorini as a touristic destination, the tradition of Santorini’s shipping sector 
(interview #71; Dekavallas 2013/ S23), and the translocal links forged by Santorini’s 
residents as they sought better life chances outside the island in the postward period. 
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Indeed, a devastating earthquake in 1956, combined with the collapse of the island’s once 
thriving agricultural sector as a result of low yields and high production costs, resulted in 
poverty whose “magnitude is difficult for someone to perceive today” in the 1960s and 
1970s (Dekavallas 2013/ S23; interviews #28, #70, #72). In contrast, Lemnos is a highly 
fertile island which continuously produced large amounts of agricultural goods including 
cotton, tobacco, and, more recently, cereals and animal fodder (Dimopoulos et al. 2018/ 
S8). The difference in the extroversion of Santorini and Lemnos only shows up partially 
in Table 5. On the one hand, in 1991, about five years after Boutaris’s arrival and just 
about when cooperative activities in Santorini’s wine sector were taking off, the share of 
Santorini’s population who had lived somewhere else in Greece five years earlier was 
double than that of Lemnos. However, this changed in the 2001 and 2011 censuses. This 
change is probably at least partially attributable to the growing presence of the Greek 
military on the island, which attracts many young people to Lemnos, who are nevertheless 
not embedded in local productive activities (Mimi 2013: 59/ S11). As argued by Bakalis, 
in the postwar period Lemnos was treated either as a purely agricultural area or as a 
militarised zone, and didn’t develop other forms of entrepreneurship (2007: 202/ S12). 
Still, above and beyond those place-based differences between Santorini and Lemnos, the 
arrival of Boutaris in Santorini was a highly influential event in itself for the evolution of 
Santorini’s wines, and it undeniably also entails an important random element. 
4.2.3 Translocal links in the Nymphaio and Ambelakia alternative tourism sectors 
The two most important catalysts for the growth of Nymphaio’s alternative 
tourism sector were hybrid actors, and specifically prominent members of Nymphaio’s 
diaspora who grew up, were educated and built their careers outside Nymphaio, but spent 
their summers in the village since childhood. Yannis Boutaris, who opened the first two 
hotels in the village, is a winemaker, and Nikos Mertzos, who became the President of 
the Nymphaio Commune, a journalist; both were based in Thessaloniki. Boutaris’s 
account of how he conceived the idea of setting up the sanctuary for brown bears in 
Nymphaio demonstrates the importance of his translocal links for coming up with what 
was, as was seen in Chapter 2, a radically novel suggestion for the Nymphaio context: 
“At the time [in the 1980s], I had met a group of crazy English people in 
Thessaloniki called Libearty. There was a law in Greece banning the practice 
of bear-dancers, but it wasn’t being implemented. When I asked the General 
Secretariat for Forestry why this was so, they told me that if they confiscated 
the bears, they wouldn’t have where to put them. And this is how I clicked 
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and said that I will create a bear sanctuary in Nymphaio. This is how 
Arktouros was born. (…) We hired bear-specialists, and we also maintained 
contact with the London Zoo, which had specialists on the psychology of 
captive animals.” (interview #13)  
As the tourism sector grew in Nymphaio, the village’s translocal links were reinforced, 
with other members of the diaspora making substantial donations and investments, and 
many outsiders investing in Nymphaio as well: “in the past, at the church you could tell 
immediately who was foreign. Now it’s hard to find the Nymphaiots” (interview #15). 
For example, the owner of two of Nymphaio’s most upscale hotels today is a Cretan who 
had been going to the village on holiday since 2005, and moved there permanently in 
2013. 
In contrast, most stakeholders in Ambelakia do not have substantial translocal 
experience that extends beyond the wider area around Ambelakia up to the nearby city of 
Larissa. Indeed, the difference in the translocal embeddedness of Nymphaio and 
Ambelakia is visible in a stark way in Table 5, where the share of Nymphaio’s population 
who had lived somewhere else in Greece five years before the census was triple in 1991, 
quadruple in 2001, and double in 2011 than the equivalent share of Ambelakia’s 
population. This is partly reflective of the existence of sufficient economic opportunities 
in the area around Ambelakia, for example in service areas and shops along the highway 
linking Greece’s two biggest cities, which passed from very near the village, or in Larissa 
(Stroulias 1998: 102-105/ S17). Moreover, Ambelakia’s wider diaspora appears to be 
mostly disconnected from the village (interviews #47, #48, #49, #51). As a result, even 
though a great deal of creative ideas have been expressed over time about the potential 
direction of Ambelakia’s development (see “First conference of Ambelakiot Studies” 
proceedings 1994/ D12), there seems to be a mismatch between the actors who express 
those ideas (e.g. outsider academics participating in the conference cited above), and the 
actors who are in a position to actually implement them (people living in Ambelakia). 
4.2.4 Translocal links in the Santorini and Chalkidiki mass tourism sectors 
Like in the wine sector, several of the pioneers of upscale and thematic tourism in 
Santorini were outsiders. Chatzigiannakis, who founded on the island one of the first 
high-end restaurants in the country to offer Greek rather than international cuisine, had 
no relation to Santorini other than having been on holiday there for about ten years before 
moving permanently to the island from Athens and opening his restaurant. He describes 
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in the following way the mental process of recombining elements from his knowledge 
about Santorini’s resources and the demands of upscale customers in urban centres: 
“I have been coming to Santorini from 1975 – it’s not my homeland. In 1986, 
my wife and I decided to open a restaurant here because we had something 
similar in Athens. (…) We saw from the first year that Santorini is not just 
about August and the Greeks, you must be able to survive during the rest of 
the months. And that’s when the idea came up, to add to the equation the local 
cuisine. (…) The traditional cuisine of Santorini was made for the 16-degree, 
high-alcohol wines that they used to have. When the wine went down to 11-
12 degrees and became more elegant, we had to utilise the primary materials 
in a wholly different way. We did a lot of work, it was a motivation for my 
colleagues.” (interview #35) 
Paris Sigalas, one of the first winemakers to establish a private winery in Santorini after 
Boutaris in the early 1990s and a pioneer of local oenotourism, explains that 
Chatzigiannakis was part of a group of friends in the village of Oia who used to spend 
their holidays there together: “we had very close relations, and it was on the basis of that 
contact with Santorini that he said, I’ll open a restaurant here, as he already had something 
similar in Athens” (interview #71). Indeed, a number of persons from that group of friends 
ended up opening upscale restaurants that left their mark on the gastronomy sector of the 
island. Sigalas himself is a hybrid actor whose father was from Santorini but migrated at 
the age of seventeen due to the island’s poverty in the postwar period. Having grown up 
outside Santorini and become a maths teacher, Sigalas eventually moved permanently to 
the island to work professionally as a winemaker (interview #71). 
On his side, Konstantinidis, the pioneer of conference and wedding tourism in 
Santorini and owner of one of the early small luxury hotels along the caldera, explains 
that he “had no relation to Santorini”, but combined ideas that he brought from outside 
with his reading of Santorini’s potential: 
“In the consortium of companies that we own, we also had a travel agency. In 
Greece, according the law, to organise a conference you need to be a travel 
agency. I thought that at the time, in the 1990s, it would be interesting for this 
place to develop conference tourism, and for us it would be an interesting 
entrepreneurial activity. And that’s how we started.” 
“Destination weddings were unknown in Greece in the 1990s, but they were 
very widespread abroad. Doing a wedding of foreigners in Santorini was a 
simple thought.” (interview #75) 
While the degree of recent mobility in Chalkidiki was consistently lower than in 
Santorini in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses (see Table 5), there are also many outsider 
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investors in Chalkidiki. Nevertheless, no critical mass of leading actors has emerged who 
are willing and able to spearhead cooperation for upgrading and the creation of niche, 
upscale markets. Without denying that there is an element of randomness in this 
discrepancy, perhaps in a paradoxical way Chalkidiki’s proximity to Thessaloniki inhibits 
the sustained contact between the outsiders and the locals, since the outsiders tend to live 
permanently in the city – as do many skilled locals of Chalkidiki (OAOM consulting firm 
1977/ D14). On the other hand, a number of foreign investors whom I interviewed during 
my fieldwork arrived to Chalkidiki after it had become a successful mass tourism 
destination, serve very specific market segments often from particular countries, and are 
disembedded from the rest of the local economy (for example, this is the case of 
interviewees #19 and #25). In the few instances where alternative tourism flows have 
developed in Chalkidiki, as in the villages of Ano Nikiti and Parthenonas, the local actors’ 
translocal links played a key role in that development. In the case of Ano Nikiti, these 
links were with Germany, where many locals had migrated as guest workers (Deltsou 
2015: 187/ S28). In the case of Parthenonas, the pioneer of the village’s revival was a 
hybrid actor from a nearby town who was a return migrant from the US.  
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Table 5: Measures of translocal links in the case study areas/ Source: Greek census data 1991, 2001, 2011 (ELSTAT) 
 
NB: The basic administrative unit in the table is the municipality level using Greece’s 2010 administrative system. Where this administrative unit is 
too large to provide accurate information about my case study areas, I also present data for the most relevant geographical unit based on the 1997 
administrative system, which included more administrative units. This more fine-grained data is presented in parentheses.
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4.3 Leaders as highly skilled and highly connected actors 
4.3.1 Accessing resources in the tourism sector 
As was seen in the previous chapter, a key part of the institutional work required 
to generate alternative tourism flows in remote areas concerns accessing resources to 
provide a range of public goods, particularly infrastructural projects and novel attractions. 
Being able to tap on voluntary work by highly skilled “economists, urban planners and 
engineers” was, unsurprisingly, a major advantage for the Nymphaio Commune when it 
came to applying for EU funding, which it did often and with much success (interview 
#14).  
What is more interesting is that even accessing national funds to support 
cooperative efforts for upgrading appeared to be correlated with linking social capital and 
know-how, rather than membership in clientelistic networks. Indeed, the following 
account by the President of the Nymphaio Commune between 1995 and 2006 Nikos 
Mertzos, who is a well-known right-wing public figure in Greece, is indicative of how 
leading actors in high-cooperation case studies typically gained access to national funds 
“through acquaintances at the start and through persuasion when we had shown results” 
(interview #14), but without a plausible prospect of providing a substantial number of 
votes in return. After all, nearly throughout Mertzos’s term as Commune President, 
Greece had a centre-left PASOK government. 
“The second source of money was Laliotis, when he was Minister for Public 
Works. I asked him for 78 million [drachmas] to make a cobbled path. He 
gave me the money [as a personal favour] even though usually he would call 
me a fascist and I would call him the ‘black widow’ – we were major enemies 
because he was the spokesperson of PASOK. (…) When he came to see the 
completed works, he said that if he had to implement the works that I did for 
78 million, he would have needed double the amount. From that day on, they 
started giving me money much more easily.” (interview #14) 
Moreover, initially Boutaris, who is also well-connected with several Greek political 
actors, and at a second stage also the Nymphaio Commune, hosted a number of prominent 
members of Greece’s political class in the village, some of whom learned about 
Nymphaio’s revival and later became its advocates on the national stage (interviews #13, 
#14, #15; “Nymphaio: Fair-tale with a name”/ D7). In contrast, despite Ambelakia’s 
symbolic significance, which always made it an attractive place for politicians to visit 
(interviews #48, #51), the local stakeholders have felt powerless to either convince the 
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state to invest in the village – even for completing the renovation of the renown Schwarz 
mansion – or to attract funds from elsewhere. 
Links with the authorities at different levels and know-how about potential 
funding sources can also be leveraged to obtain a favourable regulatory framework, which 
can facilitate cooperative efforts in a different way than by subsidising the upfront costs. 
Boutaris’s recollection of how he advocated for adjustments in the construction of 
Greece’s major west-to-east highway in order to avoid severely damaging the fauna of 
the wider area around Nymphaio is a case in point: 
“With Arktouros [the NGO that ran the sanctuary for brown bears], we also 
intervened in the construction of the Egnatia Road. We opposed the passage 
of the road between Grevena and Metsovo, because it would cut the habitat of 
the bears in half, and the bear specialists said that it would be the end of the 
world if the road passed from there. The Council of the State vindicated our 
objection. The cost for making the tunnels in the alternative design was 60 
million. At the time, Laliotis had gotten me in a room and was telling me to 
sign for the original design to be implemented. I told him I’m not going to 
sign, and instead of irritating me he should go to Brussels and talk to them 
about the bears which are a protected species, and ask for the funds. In the end 
the design was implemented with our suggestions, and animal passages and 
electric fencing were also built. It was my biggest achievement.” (interview 
#13) 
As will be further discussed in the next chapter, favourable regulatory frameworks, 
adopted following pressure by local stakeholders who knew whom and how to ask, can 
also greatly facilitate cooperation in the mass tourism sector by providing a set of locally 
applicable rules and preventing anarchic development. Both Oia, Santorini’s most 
luxurious destination, and Pyrgos, a village in Santorini that developed more recently 
directly as an upscale destination,  are governed by special architectural protective 
legislation, obtained following the intervention of local stakeholders who either activated 
their contacts in the state or simply lobbied the relevant authorities (interview #35). On 
the other hand, stakeholders in Chalkidiki who expected that they would obtain national 
public resources for infrastructural investment in return for voting for PASOK saw their 
hopes disappointed, despite the fact that a local politician was allocated important 
ministries in the PASOK government (interviews #6, #26). 
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4.3.2 Accessing resources in the agricultural sector 
Unlike remote villages, agricultural cooperatives were traditionally very well 
placed to attract funding from the national government due to their political importance 
(interview #77). Characteristically, 
“The Union [of Chios mastiha producers] was supported by the state since it 
was created. By the political authorities, the local authorities etcetera. Because 
it brought many people together. (…) The Chiots are proud of their mastiha. 
The fact that their product is funded, it’s a big deal. So it [i.e. funding mastiha] 
has appeal both politically and technocratically.” (interview #60) 
As a result of such considerations, at least until the Eurozone crisis, the cooperatives that 
I studied were generally able to access national funds, regardless of which party was in 
government.  
At the same time, know-how and participation in networks with a high degree of 
linking social capital helped leading actors to access specific resources that were 
particularly useful for upgrading. For example, the long-time President of the Chios 
mastiha cooperative Kostas Ganiaris replied in the following way when I asked him how 
the mastiha sector was able to persuade Piraeus Bank to fund a mastiha museum in Chios 
as part of its series of thematic museums around Greece: 
“Through personal contacts, I don’t want to say more. Why did [the person 
responsible at the bank] choose us? It was also that she considered us reliable. 
The Cultural Foundation of Peiraeus Bank had traumatic experiences with 
municipalities which agreed one thing and did another. They wanted to know 
that they will enter somewhere, they will be able to do their work and get out, 
and that the others will keep their commitments.” (interview #63) 
Moreover, a story recounted by the former Director of the mastiha cooperative shows that 
having links to a variety of highly skilled stakeholders can assist even in simple daily 
tasks, which were nevertheless crucial for achieving the small early successes that are the 
key to building trust in the sector: 
“An important step in the production process is the placement of the white soil 
underneath the trees. In the past, people went and dug into the mountains to 
get this white soil. In the mines. Some people died in the process. (…) At some 
point I said, one moment, what is this white soil? So I called our friend [Χ, a 
chemical engineer], and I asked him ‘what can I do about this white soil?’ and 
he said ‘send me a sample’. He does the analysis and he tells me, ‘it’s 98% 
calcium carbonate. You can find 98% calcium carbonate in the companies that 
process marble, it’s a by-product of marble’. (…) By now, we are able to give 
out the white soil to the producers for free.” (interview #21) 
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Once again, the kind of contacts that are referred to in the two previous examples 
did not have a party political nature, but spanned a broad spectrum of political and 
economic elites. As explained by the former President of the mastiha cooperative,  
“I always kept excellent relations with all political parties, all political 
formations. We visited the EU, we travelled with Simitis [PASOK, Prime 
Minister], we travelled with Konstantopoulos [leader of the left-wing 
Synaspismos party], we travelled with Stefanopoulos [right-wing President of 
the Republic], we travelled with Chatzidakis [New Democracy MEP and later 
Minister], we travelled with Terence Quick [journalist, later Minister for the 
right-wing Independent Greeks]. We are proud of this. (…) Politically, it was 
difficult. During half of my tenure there was a PASOK government, and 
during the other half there was a New Democracy government. I never fought 
with or denounced anyone, even though I was asked to do so.” (interview #63) 
Along similar lines, one finds multiple references in Santorini’s local press of events 
organised by the wine cooperative in collaboration with other local stakeholders, which 
attracted a number of representatives of Greece’s political elite across the political 
spectrum. Some of those actors can be hypothesised to have later considered the interests 
of Santorini’s wine sector when making policy. 
Overall, the typical profile of leading actors that emerges from this account is that 
of highly skilled, well-connected and mobile entrepreneurs or other stakeholders. In 
contrast, clientelistic ties were almost never used in my case study areas to provide the 
resources required for cooperation for upgrading. It is interesting to note that in Chios, 
this description also applied to the leading actors who spearheaded the effort to establish 
the Union of Mastiha Producers as an obligatory cooperative in the 1930s: “Studying the 
class composition of the first Governing Board of the Union, we find that it was 
constituted in its entirety by educated bourgeois who came from Southern Chios and had 
played an important role in supporting the demand for creating an obligatory cooperative” 
(Tsouhlis 2011: 129/ S2).  
The know-how and linking social capital that leading actors use to access 
resources and other tools that can facilitate their institutional work can be acquired in a 
variety of ways, including through higher education, professional experience and even 
through inherited family connections. Nevertheless, higher education is one of the sources 
of know-how and linking social capital that is most generally available and easiest to 
identify, and for rural areas especially, it also offers an important opportunity to acquire 
translocal experience. Moreover, according to some interviewees, higher education has 
the potential to instil a type of confidence that can help actors overcome what a former 
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President of the mastiha cooperative called “the syndrome of the countryside”, namely 
the mentality that “this is not for us, it’s impossible; if your idea was good, a big 
industrialist would have thought about it already” (interview #66). Therefore, it is 
plausible to expect that the pool of potential leading actors will be higher in places whose 
population has a higher educational attainment. Looking at Table 6, it transpires that the 
share of the tertiary-educated population in the mastiha-producing area of Chios was 
substantially higher than that of the saffron-producing area of Kozani in the 1991, 2001 
and 2011 censuses. The same holds true for the tertiary-educated population of Nymphaio 
relative to that of Ambelakia: indeed, in the 2011 census, the tertiary-educated population 
of Nymphaio, a remote village at 1400km altitude, was 2.5 times higher than the national 
average! On the other hand, the education level of the population in Santorini, Lemnos 
and Chalkidiki was comparable in the three censuses. 
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Table 5: Level of education in the case study areas/ Source: Greek census data 1991, 2001, 2011 (ELSTAT) 
 
NB: The basic administrative unit in the table is the municipality level using Greece’s 2010 administrative system. Where this administrative unit is 
too large to provide accurate information about my case study areas, I also present data for the most relevant geographical unit based on the 1997 
administrative system, which included more administrative units. This more fine-grained data is presented in parentheses. 































2011, permanent population 51,390 (3,672) 71,388 (5,910) 15,550 16,992 (2,535) 16,973 (132) 13,712 (451) 29,066 
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2001, permanent population 51,773 (4,322) 70,220 (6,320) 13,725 17,852 (2,727) 18,357 (211) 15,439 (415) 26,769 
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1991, permanent population 51,627 (4,707) 66,285 (6,457) 9,608 17,712 (3,027) 18,320 (112) 16,215 (508) 21,871 
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4.4 A broad conception of self-interest and place-based group altruism 
as the leading actors’ motivation 
While highly skilled, highly connected actors who are in some sense outsiders are 
able to conduct the institutional work required to catalyse change towards a cooperative 
direction at the local level, it is clear that only few of them actually do so. In addition to 
the aforementioned resources, what is also required to set a leading actor apart from other 
actors is motivation. Many leading actors in my case study areas were boundary-spanning 
entrepreneurs who had a broad conception of self-interest, i.e. who considered that they 
could only succeed in their economic ventures if the whole local sector succeeded. On 
the other hand, some leading actors, particularly in the alternative tourism sector of 
remote villages, were mainly motivated by an other-regarding desire to see a place 
develop. Indeed, what distinguished the leading actors in my case study areas from other, 
similarly endowed actors, was a combination of a particular kind of self-regarding 
preference, where, in a context of uncertainty about the final outcomes of different 
strategies, the leaders subjectively interpreted their own interest as being largely aligned 
with the interests of other local stakeholders, as well as a motivation to act based on a 
particularly strong degree of altruism towards a group defined by place. Those two types 
of preferences featured in the motivation of the leading actors under scrutiny to different 
degrees. Unlike the previously discussed characteristics of mobility and skills, 
preferences cannot plausibly be attributed to any particular features of place: after all, 
many outsiders and hybrid actors had developed their conception of self-interest 
somewhere else than in the locality in question. Instead, having a broad conception of 
self-interest as well as altruistic preferences emerges as a systematic but randomly 
distributed characteristic of successful leading actors in the settings under scrutiny.      
4.4.1 A broad conception of self-interest as a motivation for boundary-spanning 
entrepreneurs 
Winemaker Yannis Boutaris’s conception of his entrepreneurial self-interest as 
encapsulating the interests of the producers and other winemakers in the wine-producing 
areas where he is involved, is one of the most salient features that distinguishes him from 
many other large Greek winemakers. As he explains, “I passed in the sector the view that 
the aim is not for the one to eat the pie of the other, but for the pie to grow” (interview 
#13). Characteristically, upon his arrival in Santorini Boutaris founded an 
interprofessional wine association which, among other activities, conducted experimental 
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vinifications with local varietals and also hired an agronomist to cover the gaps at the 
local office of the Ministry of Agriculture. As the interprofessional association explained 
in the local press,  
“Given the lack of an Agronomist at the Department of Agricultural 
Development of Thera and the unpleasant consequences that this gap creates 
in the agriculture of our island, all producers, whether they are members of 
the Interprofessional Association or not, can receive information regarding 
any cultivation problem (fertilization, pest control, subsidies etc.) by the 
agronomist of the Interprofessional Association. (…) Among so many 
problems that the country faces, we didn’t want to create one more, by merely 
denouncing the indifference of the responsible institutions.” (Thiraïka Nea, 
Oct. 1994, 429) 
Thus, in order to achieve quality improvement in a way that they considered would 
ultimately benefit them, Boutaris and the other actors who were involved in the 
interprofessional association where happy to entirely cover the cost of a service that the 
state was not able or willing to provide, thereby generating a public good to the local 
sector.  
Boutaris’s broad conception of self-interest contrasts in a stark way with the view 
expressed by a Lemnian winemaker, who considers that only the cooperative would have 
an interest in making investments that would benefit the local sector as a whole:  
“There must be a big institution, which not just has the economic capacity, but 
which also acts collectively and socially, right? It has as an aim to help the 
local economy and its producers-members. Whereas the private winemakers, 
right? And I include myself as a private winemaker, it doesn’t matter. The 
private winemakers are only interested in profit and in their pocket, they’re 
not interested in anything else. Right?” (interview #83) 
This narrower conception of self-interest, whereby it is considered impossible that an 
investment with high externalities can ever yield high enough private returns to justify 
the cost, is typical of many agri-food actors in low-cooperation areas.  
Boutaris’s success despite the hostility with which some Santorinian producers 
received him at the start (see chapter 2), would have been more difficult to achieve had 
the management team of Santorini’s obligatory wine cooperative not also had a broad 
conception of self-interest, seeing the arrival of Boutaris as an opportunity to help the 
sector solve chronic problems and modernise, rather than considering him a threat 
competing for a limited market share. As explained by an oenologist who used to work 
with Boutaris, “even letting him do the [first experimental] vinifications in their own 
premises for two years was a big help, because otherwise he would have been set back 
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for some years” (interview #30). Even more importantly, the cooperative never enforced 
in a strict way the legal requirement for all producers to deliver to it at least a quarter of 
their production, but allowed producers to freely sell grapes to Boutaris and the other 
private winemakers. It thereby voluntarily gave up on its obligatory character in practice, 
though not in paper (Iliopoulos and Theodorakopoulou 2014: 671/ S6). When challenged 
by a researcher whether this situation does not generate conflicts between producers who 
are “dedicated members” and supply all their production to the cooperative, and members 
who are “free-riders” and sell to the private wineries, the President of the wine 
cooperative seemed to resist this binary categorisation: “the Union may have some 
problems regarding the rights and obligations of the members, but it also has all the people 
with it. Even the producer who doesn’t deliver grapes to the Union is a child of the union” 
(Venizelou 2015: 151, 156/ S5). In other words, since the 1980s, the management of 
Santorini’s wine cooperative has typically taken the view that despite the tensions that 
inevitably arise due to raw material shortages, private winemakers, and by extension the 
producers that supply their grapes, don’t generally constitute a problem for the local wine 
sector, but they are allies in the effort to increase the size of the sector’s pie. 
As was seen in the previous chapter, the management team of the Chios mastiha 
cooperative has also embraced a similarly broad conception of self-interest, and has 
indeed gone to great lengths to render this a shared conception across the sector. The 
cooperative’s Alternate Director explained that even though they make similar products 
as the cooperative’s subsidiary, private firms are seen as allies rather than competitors in 
the effort to promote mastiha: “when you need to sell the entire mastiha production, you 
want to create your own competition, you don’t just sell your own products through your 
subsidiary” (interview #59). In the words of the former President Ganiaris, “We care 
about the development of mastiha, not to sell our own products. (…) If [another firm’s] 
product is better, let it survive, or let us become better” (interview #63). Consistently with 
this narrative, when a private entrepreneur approached the mastiha cooperative with the 
proposition to make a mastiha liqueur, in his own account they “welcomed” the 
proposition “as a nice, new, creative, fresh effort” which “fit very well with the 
philosophy of the Union and the MastihaShops”; “they helped me a lot in the whole 
process” (interview #65).  
In contrast, as was discussed in the previous two chapters, in the absence of a 
leading actor with a broad conception of self-interest, a sense of fragmentation among 
different groups of actors will persist. Characteristically, neither the cooperative nor the 
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private entrepreneurs interviewed in Kozani considered that an increase in the number of 
firms producing goods with Kozani saffron would be a positive development. As 
mentioned by a local agri-food entrepreneur in one of the few local firms that process 
saffron, 
“The cooperative didn’t keep its promises. They said they wouldn’t close 
many similar deals, but they have given saffron even to the last person who 
asked to make saffron products. (…) One shouldn’t give the saffron 
everywhere, because everyone can copy the other person.” (interview #57) 
In turn, seeing multiple firms produce Kozani saffron products also does not seem to be 
what the cooperative currently wants: 
“– [Me:] Is there a local ecosystem of businesses that produce saffron 
products? 
– [Interviewee:] Not really. The cooperative doesn’t want it, after all. It prefers 
to sell its own products.” (interview #53, former President of the saffron 
cooperative) 
Despite the similarity in the institutional environment in terms of the presence in both 
Chios and Kozani of an obligatory cooperative with a monopsony over a rare agricultural 
good, the difference in the interviewed actors’ conception of self-interest between the two 
areas is indeed remarkable. 
A conception of entrepreneurial self-interest as encompassing the interests of others 
was also a salient characteristic of leading actors in the tourism sector. Characteristically, 
Konstantinidis, the pioneer of conference tourism in Santorini, explains in the following 
way his decision to organise thematic conferences about Santorini’s agricultural products: 
“Especially for Santorini, the challenge was that nobody had studied 
scientifically a number of issues that concerned the island. For instance, the 
agricultural production. So we saw an opportunity. (…) When, for instance, 
we said that we’ll do a conference for the little tomato, we went to the Union 
and we said, will you play with us? And the Union said, I will play. Then we 
went to the winemakers, and we said who of you wants to get involved? 
There’s always someone who wants. (…) On the basis of the three conferences 
that we did in four years about the waterless Santorini tomato, the application 
that was submitted to the European Union to make the tomato a Protected 
Designation of Origin product was prepared.” (interview #75) 
Thus, not only did Konstantinidis set up a team of diverse stakeholders in order to realise 
what he considered to be his entrepreneurial self-interest, but his entrepreneurial idea 
even resulted in the compilation of the material required to apply for a Protected 
Designation of Origin for one of Santorini’s agricultural products. When I asked 
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Konstantinidis why he and another handful of entrepreneurs “undertook a personal cost 
in order to develop some ideas and create a market”, he replied: “I don’t believe that it’s 
like that. We did it, and whoever was involved, because we wanted a better destination 
for our client. It was us that it would benefit” (interview #75).  
Similarly, Chatzigiannakis, who spearheaded the rise of gastronomical tourism in 
Santorini, undertook a large part of the cost to attract media attention to Santorini’s 
gastronomy, including by hosting journalists on several occasions and organising events 
both in Santorini and elsewhere. As he explains, if journalists learned about the “myth of 
Santorini”, “that’s an advertisement for me”; after all, “you don’t become a gastronomical 
destination if you’re shut in your own store” (interview #35). This broad conception of 
self-interest helps to resolve the apparent contradiction mentioned by one interviewee: 
“Why should Chatzigiannakis carry others along with him? He has a business, he’s not 
acting out of altruism” (interview #67).  
4.4.2 Place-based group altruism as a principal motivation of leading actors in remote 
areas  
While a market orientation is necessary in order to catalyse the development of an 
alternative tourism sector in remote areas, entrepreneurial self-interest alone is unlikely 
to be sufficient as a motivation for potential leading actors in such areas, no matter how 
broad it is. After all, there are usually few entrepreneurs in places that face strong 
pressures of depopulation. Instead, the evidence that I collected in the alternative tourism 
sector in Nymphaio suggests that an at least partly other-regarding, strong altruistic desire 
to see a place experience inclusive economic development and flourish is a key 
motivation for leading actors in such contexts. This point comes across in a clear way 
from the narratives of both the key leading actors in Nymphaio:  
“At some point it hit me that I liked my village Nymphaio very much, and I 
was sorry to see it slowly die. And I said that we must do something, with – 
even if it this sounds a bit ridiculous –  respect for the ancestors. I couldn’t let 
it collapse. But in order to do something for the village, you must first of all 
put an emphasis on the economy of the place. Without this, nothing can be 
done. By this logic, I decided to make two hotels, one luxury one, La Moara, 
and a shelter-style one, Linouria. I didn’t decide to become a hotelier, I just 
wanted to create a certain situation. And I saw my dream being realised! 
Because I saw Nymphaio reviving, acquiring more life.” (Yannis Boutaris, 
quoted in Netsika 2006) 
“Between 1980 and 1995 only 35 people had remained in the village. At that 
point, we decided not to let the village die. The roads and buildings had been 
totally destroyed. I decided to abandon journalism and Thessaloniki, and I 
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came to live here, where I stayed for twelve years as President of the 
Commune.” (Nikos Mertzos, interview #14) 
Unlike the main motivation of most leading actors in the agri-food and mass tourism 
sectors, Boutaris and Mertzos’s motivation comes across as being primarily linked to their 
attachment to their place of origin, rather having to do with the realisation of an 
entrepreneurial idea that requires all boats to be lifted at the same time. In turn, the 
aptitude of both actors for projecting their vision about inclusive economic development 
via alternative tourism to local stakeholders was key for the ultimate success of their 
efforts.   
Overall, actors in high-cooperation areas generally have broader conceptions of 
self-interest than actors in low-cooperation areas. Although, as was seen in the previous 
chapter, such conceptions of shared interest can be spread by leaders who are able to 
project their vision, the initial availability of leading actors with a broad conception of 
self-interest or a place-based altruistic motivation is in itself crucially important for 
triggering change from low to high cooperation. The presence of leading actors with such 
motivation appears to be a systematically key element for cooperative change, but the 
availability of such actors in particular places is subject to an element of randomness.  
4.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I set out to provide an account of the analytically relevant 
characteristics of actors who undertake the institutional work required to catalyse 
cooperation at the local level, despite the costliness and complexity of the task. I argued 
that successful leaders are typically translocally embedded, highly skilled and highly 
connected actors who are motivated by a broad conception of self-interest or by a 
particularly strong degree of place-based group altruism. This depiction builds on 
Crouch’s (2005) argument that having access to diverse institutional repertoires improves 
the ability of leading actors to innovatively recombine elements of different institutional 
frameworks, as well as on the insight that economic innovation depends on the 
“movement of people with ideas” (Crescenzi and Gagliardi 2015). Having examined in a 
detailed way how the leading actors in my case study areas drew on a range of assets and 
resources to successfully conduct the three types of institutional work analysed in the 
previous chapter, I suggest that translocal links, a high level of skills, and participation in 
networks with a high degree of linking social capital (as distinct from membership in 
clientelistic networks where funds are exchanged for votes) should be considered as 
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centrally important variables for the emergence of cooperation. As regards the leading 
actors’ motivation, I argued that while strong place-based altruistic preferences are 
important, in order to fully account for what sets the leading actors apart from others, it 
is necessary to acknowledge that self-regarding preferences also play a significant 
motivating role: what is key is that, in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality, 
the leaders interpret a given situation in a way that is consistent with a broad conception 
of self-interest. 
In addition, I argued that despite an important element of randomness in the 
distribution of preferences, leadership of the aforementioned type is more likely to 
become available in places with many translocal links and a high degree of educational 
attainment in the population: in such places, the pool of potential leading actors is bigger. 
This depiction runs counter to the view often found in the cooperation literature of 
cooperative norms as a feature of stable, tightly-knit and insular communities. I discussed 
the degree to which my different case study areas differ in terms of those place-based 
characteristics, and I also suggested some reasons for those variations. In particular, 
having a population which sought better life chances outside the area in the recent past 
generated strong translocal networks in some case study areas, while in others, close 
proximity to a city with ample employment opportunities in insular sectors reduced the 
local actors’ translocal embeddedness. As an extension of this chapter’s argument, the 
Appendix to Chapter 4 employs an observational statistical analysis which examines 
whether there is an association between translocal links, educational attainment and 





APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
A STATISTICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE 
PLAUSIBILITY OF THE ARGUMENT  
The argument put forward in Chapter 4 regarding a possible association between 
the translocal links and know-how of an area’s population and the degree of cooperation 
in that area, can in principle be tested quantitatively. The difficulty with such an exercise 
is that these factors are difficult to measure quantitatively. Nevertheless, in order to 
further investigate the plausibility of Chapter 4’s argument, I constructed a nationwide 
cross-sectional database including proxy variables for the principal underlying factors of 
interest. This analysis constitutes a preliminary effort to examine whether an 
observational analysis of large-N data is consistent with the argument put forward in the 
Chapter, which can act as a starting point for a more comprehensive future study.  
In attempting to examine quantitatively the characteristics of places with high 
degrees of cooperation among economic actors, the biggest challenge is to measure the 
degree of cooperation in each area. I constructed two cooperation variables, one for the 
agri-food and one for the tourism sector. For the agri-food sector, I used as an estimate of 
cooperation the proportion of producers in each municipality who are members of an 
agricultural cooperative. In order to construct this variable, I requested and collected data 
from the Ministry of Agriculture about the number of members of cooperatives listed in 
the National Registry of Agricultural Cooperatives. Before the Eurozone crisis, 
membership in one of Greece’s approximately 6000-7000 agricultural cooperatives was 
not a meaningful measure of cooperation because most cooperatives were inactive, highly 
indebted and mainly existed to distribute state funding (Doxiadis 2014: 130). However, 
following a number of reforms and the creation of the National Registry of Agricultural 
Cooperatives during the last decade, the approximately 600 currently registered 
cooperatives are solvent and fulfil a set of criteria, which render membership in those 
cooperatives a meaningful measure of cooperation (Efthymiou 2017: 9-10; telephone 
conversation with Petros Efthymiou, 13 April 2020). In order to capture the denominator, 
i.e. the total number of producers, I used the number of agricultural properties in each 
municipality, as 99.92% of agricultural properties in Greece are individually owned 
(telephone conversation with an employee at the Agriculture, Livestock, Fishery and 
Environment Statistics Division of the Hellenic Statistical Authority, 6 August 2020).  
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In order to measure the degree of cooperation in the tourism sector, I constructed 
a variable that captures the proportion of hotels in each municipality who are members of 
a voluntary hotel association. I collected data regarding the members of voluntary hotel 
associations in each municipality from the website of the Hellenic Hoteliers’ Federation, 
which is the umbrella organisation for voluntary hotel associations in Greece. I collected 
data regarding all businesses with a hotel permit in each municipality from the website of 
the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels, where all hotels are registered obligatorily.11 I then 
checked whether each hotel registered in the Chamber of Hotels was also a member of a 
voluntary hotel association. As for the agri-food sector, the cooperation variable for the 
tourism sector is of course imperfect: different voluntary hotel associations engage in 
different degrees of cooperation, with some undertaking more demanding forms of 
cooperative activities than others. Nevertheless, the variable that I constructed is a 
meaningful measure of cooperation, because the existence of a voluntary hotel 
association that includes a large share of local hotels indicates that local economic actors 
have, at the very least, created a broad-based local arena for discussion, which is itself a 
cooperative institution, and they are likely to be engaging in some additional forms of 
cooperation as well.  
Moving on to the independent variables, in order to measure a place’s translocal 
links, I relied on a census question which asks respondents to declare where they lived 
five years prior to the census, capturing the population’s recent mobility. Specifically, the 
variable that I used was the percentage of the population of a municipality who lived in 
the same municipality five years prior to the 2011 census: the higher that percentage, the 
lower the population’s recent mobility. In order to capture the population’s know-how 
and linking social capital, I used as a proxy variable educational attainment, and 
specifically the percentage of each municipality’s population with a tertiary education 
degree or above during the 2011 census. Finally, the third independent variable in my 
models is an estimation of the percentage of the population with a higher education degree 
from a foreign university, based on data provided to me by the Greek authority 
responsible for the recognition of foreign university degrees (DOATAP). This variable 
captures both mobility and educational attainment, thereby reflecting the place-related 
characteristics that are of interest in the analysis in a relatively precise way.  
 
11 The idea to use the information provided by the Hellenic Hoteliers’ Federation and the Hellenic Chamber 
of Hotels was originally given to me by interviewee #24. 
 146 
Tables 6 and 7 show the descriptive statistics for all variables. For the analysis in 
the agri-food sector (Table 7), I included all municipalities which had a cultivated area of 
at least 10,000 stremmata,12 thereby excluding areas with practically no agricultural 
production. For the analysis in the tourism sector, I included all municipalities which had 
at least one registered hotel in the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels. It is worth noting that the 
proportion of farmers participating in a cooperative displays a skewed distribution, with 
few municipalities having a high participation rate. This is even more pronounced when 
it comes to the participation of a hotels in voluntary associations. The skewed distribution 
of the cooperation variables makes sense, as cooperation is a rare event in Greece.  
In order to examine the association between the dependent and independent 
variables, I had to take into account that my dependent variables are bounded between 0 
and 1 (as they are proportions), and they are heavily skewed towards 0. This makes it 
inappropriate to use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression model. Moreover, 
running an OLS model on the given data yields residuals that are far from being normally 
distributed, indicating that the model is not suited for statistical inference and therefore 
for examining the association that is of interest here. Instead, I made use of a logistic 
regression model for grouped data.13 Logistic regression models are typically used to 
study associations with binary dependent variables, and they estimate how various factors 
affect the probability that the particular outcome in question will occur. Because they 
assume that the dependent variable follows a binomial distribution (reflecting the 
probability of a number of “successes” over the total number of observations), logistic 
regression models are also very well-suited to the study of proportions such as my 
dependent variables, which can be thought of as denoting the number of successes 
(number of members in a cooperative or association) out of n trials (total number of 
producers or hotels in each municipality). Using the logistic regression model for grouped 
data, I can input the dependent variable data as a proportion. The model assumes that the 
proportion denotes the number of instances where the outcome of interest occurred over 
the total number of trials in each municipality, and calculates how the independent 
variables influence the probability of success (i.e. membership in a cooperative or 
association), in the same way that an ordinary logistic regression model for ungrouped 
data does (Agresti 2007: 106).  
 
12 1 stremma is equal to 1000 square metres of land. 
13 I would like to thank Nikos Pantazis for this suggestion. 
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The results of the model indicate that the nationwide observational data that I 
collected is consistent with the depiction of high-cooperation areas in Greece as places 
whose population has many translocal links and a high degree of know-how. All three 
independent variables have statistically significant effects on the observed degree of 
cooperation in the expected direction. Specifically, controlling for the other variables, a 
1% increase in the share of the population with tertiary education is associated with an 
8.4% increase in the odds that a particular producer will be a member of an agricultural 
cooperative; a 1% increase in the share of the population which was resident in the same 
municipality five years earlier is associated with a 1.1% decrease in the odds that a 
particular producer will be a member of an agricultural cooperative; and a 1% increase in 
the share of the population with a tertiary degree from a foreign university recognised by 
the Greek authorities is associated with a 23.6% increase in the odds that a particular 
producer will be a member of an agricultural cooperative (Table 9). In the tourism model, 
controlling for the other variables, a 1% increase in the share of the population with 
tertiary education is associated with  3.5% increase in the odds that a particular producer 
will be a member of an agricultural cooperative; a 1% increase in the share of the 
population which was resident in the same municipality five years earlier is associated 
with a 1.5% decrease in the odds that a particular producer will be a member of an 
agricultural cooperative (although the statistical significance of the association is less 
pronounced than for the other variables); and a 1% increase in the share of the population 
with a tertiary degree from a foreign university recognised by the Greek authorities is 
associated with an increase by 4.304 times in the odds that a particular producer will be 
a member of an agricultural cooperative (Table 10). 
This preliminary attempt to explore the characteristics of high-cooperation areas 
in Greece through a large-N observational analysis can be strengthened by adding further 
controls to the analysis, such as variables capturing the occupational composition of 
different areas, and particularly the share of employment in the public sector, which, as 
has been argued in the dissertation, can generate satisficing and an insular mentality that 
act as a hindrances to the emergence of cooperation for upgrading. Moreover, one could 
only begin to contemplate a causal analysis if it was possible to collect time-series data 
and identify place-based attributes prior to the emergence of cooperation, but this is very 
difficult to achieve for the cooperation variables. Nevertheless, even this first attempt to 
provide a quantitative measure of cooperation and cross-sectionally analyse its correlates 
offers a rare depiction of the characteristics of high-cooperation places in Greece. 
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Consistently with the argument put forward in Chapter 4, this depiction runs counter to 
the view often found in the cooperation literature of cooperative norms as a feature of 
stable, insular and tightly-knit communities. 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the variables for the agri-food model (n=238) 
Notes: (1) In order to exclude from the analysis areas with no agricultural sector, only 
municipalities which had a cultivated agricultural area over 10,000 stremmata were 
included in the analysis (1 stremma is equal to 1000 square metres of land). The total 
number of observations was therefore 238, out of a total of 316 municipalities.  
(2) In the agri-food dependent variable (percentage of owners of agricultural properties 
who are members of registered cooperatives), 8 municipalities had a larger number of 
members of registered cooperatives than owners of agricultural properties. This could 
be due to a variety of reasons, e.g. time lag between the “number of agricultural 
properties” and the “members of registered cooperatives” variable and inclusion in the 
“members of registered cooperatives” variable of producers such as beekeepers who do 
not own the land that they use. In order to be able to run the analysis, these 8 observations 
were assigned the value 100% for the dependent variable. In a future analysis, one could 
attempt to find data on the number of producers directly, rather than relying on 
agricultural holdings. 
(3) I only had data for the third independent variable, namely the percentage of the 
population with a foreign university degree recognised by the relevant Greek authority 
DOATAP, at the prefecture level, and not at the municipality level. In order to conduct 













2,988.45 2,350.02 83 1,481.25 2,479.50 4,111.00 15,949 




564.54 953.76 0 19.75 205 703 7,603 
Percentage of owners 
of agricultural 
properties who are 
members of registered 
cooperatives  
18.51 24.36 0 0.87 9.73 25.68 100 




7.66 3.34 1.83 5.45 7.00 9.37 23.80 
Percentage of the 
population who were 
living in the same 
municipality 5 years 
previously, 2011 
88.28 4.06 74.46 86.68 89.07 90.69 97.61 
Percentage of the 
population with a 
foreign university 
degree recognised by 
the Greek authorities, 
2008-2019 
0.4268 0.22441 0.19 0.2500 0.4100 0.5125 1.52 
Permanent 
population, 2011 
29885.18  50680.64 1334 10922 17888 32905 664046 
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the analysis, I assigned to each municipality as a value for this variable the percentage 
of owners of degrees from foreign universities that was observed at the prefecture where 
the municipality belongs.  
Data sources: Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT),  2011 census (for the tertiary 
education, recent mobility and population variables); ELSTAT, 2009 Census of 
Agricultural and Livestock Holdings (for the number of agricultural properties); Greek 
Ministry of Agriculture (for the cooperatives registered in the National Registry of 
Agricultural Cooperatives and the number of members of all active cooperatives). 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the variables for the tourism model (n=268) 
Notes: (1) In order to exclude from the analysis areas with no tourism sector, only 
municipalities which had at least one registered hotel in the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels 
were included in the analysis. The total number of observations was therefore 268, out 
of a total of 316 municipalities. 
(2) In order to ensure consistency in the measure of the dependent variable (percentage 
of registered hotels that are members of voluntary associations), the members of the 
voluntary associations were checked individually to ensure that they are registered 
hotels. Thus, businesses without a hotel permit who were members of voluntary hotel 
associations were excluded from the analysis. 
(3) Comment 3 of Table 7 applies here as well.  
Data sources: Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT),  2011 census (for the tertiary 
education, recent mobility and population variables); Hellenic Chamber of Hotels (for 
the number of hotels registered in the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels); Hellenic Hoteliers’ 
Federation for the names of the voluntary associations of hotels in Greece which are 










Number of hotels 
registered in the 
Hellenic Chamber of 
Hotels 
28.65 50.81 1 4 11.5 26 408 
Number of hotels that 
are members of 
voluntary associations  
6.68 17.17 0 0 0 5 179 
 
Percentage of 
registered hotels that 
are members of 
voluntary associations 
19.23 28.59 0 0 0 29.81 100 




8.97 4.98 1.65 5.78 7.90 10.78 27.92 
Percentage of the 
population who were 
living in the same 
municipality 5 years 
previously, 2011 
87.60 4.27 65.71 88.57 88.51 90.22 97.48 
Percentage of the 
population with a 
foreign university 
degree recognised by 
the Greek authorities, 
2008-2019 
0.4396 0.21882 0.19 0.2500 0.4300 0.5900 1.52 
Permanent 
population, 2011 
33708.06 53307.85 1008 10154.50 19826.50 38161.50 664046 
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members of the Hellenic Hoteliers’ Federation; websites of the individual voluntary 
hotel associations for their member-hotels. 
Table 8: Logistic regression for grouped data results: Dependent variable = proportion of 
producers in each municipality who are members of a registered agricultural cooperative 
(n=238) 
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* Model Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): 207822, 214833 and 216223 respectively 
** AIC: 207398 
 
Table 9: Logistic regression for grouped data results: Dependent variable = proportion of 
hotels in each municipality that are members of voluntary hotel associations (n=268) 
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* Model Akaike Information Criterion (AIC): 3167.9, 3225.2 and 3073.1 respectively 





SECTORAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION: EU 
TO THE RESCUE? 
5.1 Facilitative political regimes in the EU context 
As soon as I arrived in Santorini on a Sunday evening for my first fieldwork trip 
there, I met the Vice-Mayor at the reception area of the wine cooperative. Our discussion 
spanned a range of issues about both the agri-food and the tourism sectors, and the Vice-
Mayor described Santorini as “an island of contrasts” (interview #28). I have thought 
about this characterisation many times since that evening. Indeed, Santorini, a small 
island of 73 square kilometres and 15,000 inhabitants (Table 6), is a mass tourism 
destination with 1.5 million arrivals per year (Spilanis 2017: 21/ S20), and yet, alongside 
thousands of tourism businesses, it also has a substantial agricultural sector with three 
Protected Designation of Origin products. Santorini features some of the highest-quality 
wines, restaurants and small luxury hotels in the country, and yet as soon as visitors 
venture out on the island’s public space, they are likely to face “urban-style problems” 
(interview #28), including traffic, pollution, overcrowding, and uncleanliness (Spilanis 
2017: 35/ S20). Santorini’s winemakers and grape producers have engaged in remarkable 
forms of coordination and cooperation to produce Greece’s most expensive wines, and 
yet, in a substantial part of the island,  the anarchic manner in which the tourism industry 
has developed, without a plan and without any rules, creates an image of an 
undifferentiated, low-quality, degraded mass tourism destination: “the traffic is 
exasperating, the anarchy is unthinkable, illegal parking is the rule, whoever is honest 
gets tormented, whoever breaks the rules is king” (intervention of K. Zekkos in 
Vatopoulos et al. 2018). 
In this chapter, I take a step back from the micro level of analysis that I have 
adopted so far, and I argue that part of the explanation for the contrasts observed in 
Santorini has to do with the differences in the overarching institutional frameworks that 
apply in the agri-food and tourism sectors. Other factors, and particularly the different 
number of actors involved in agri-food and tourism and the different degree of dispersion 
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of the benefits of cooperation in the two sectors, undeniably also play a role. Nevertheless, 
the variation in macro-level institutions matters. While local-level leadership of a 
particular kind is a necessary condition for the supply of local-level cooperative 
institutions, in some contexts the applicable sectoral governance frameworks aggravate 
the obstacles to cooperation to such an extent that leadership alone does not suffice to 
overcome them. Thus, having in place a macro-institutional framework that, at least to 
some degree, facilitates cooperation emerges as a second necessary condition for the 
supply of local-level cooperative institutions. But what does a facilitative overarching 
institutional framework look like? And how can it be provided in a country where, as was 
seen in the introduction, the national institutional framework is considered to be weak? 
In chapter 3, I pointed out that the precise way in which local conditions influence 
the likelihood of local-level cooperative institutions being supplied or not is not well 
understood in the literature. In contrast, the characteristics of overarching institutional 
frameworks that facilitate cooperation are well accounted for in existing studies. 
Although Ostrom’s Governing the Commons is best-known for the ten design principles 
of successful local-level institutions for the management of common-pool resources 
(1990: 88-102), it is less commonly appreciated that the book also offers a useful and 
comprehensive account of the overarching institutional frameworks that abate the 
obstacles to cooperation, which Ostrom calls “facilitative political regimes” (1990: 
chapter 4 and 200-201, 211-214). In this chapter, I make use of Ostrom’s concept of 
facilitative political regimes in an analysis of the national and supranational policies that 
are relevant to cooperation for upgrading in the agri-food and tourism sectors, thereby 
putting forward a framework for policy analysis that can be of broader relevance for the 
study of economic development in fragmented economies. 
Importantly, in EU member-states, the sectoral policies that constitute the relevant 
overarching institutional frameworks when it comes to cooperation for upgrading are 
provided at both the national and the EU levels, to different degrees depending on the 
sector in question. The central argument of this chapter is that in sectors that fall under 
the scope of EU competence, such as the agri-food sector, EU policies can supplement 
national policies and to some extent compensate for deficiencies in national institutional 
frameworks. As a result, economic actors in those sectors can acquire access to a 
facilitative overarching institutional framework even if they are located in a country with 
weak national institutions. By examining how in some sectors, EU policies have the 
potential to help reshape domestic governance arrangements in a way that reduces the 
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barriers to local-level cooperation, I follow calls to move beyond the study of 
conditionality-based policies for the encouragement of domestic reform in favour of 
economic development (Bruszt and McDermott 2012: 747), and I propose a novel angle 
through which to study the EU’s agricultural and regional policies. 
The chapter is structured in the following way: in the remainder of this section, I 
outline the characteristics of facilitative political regimes, and I analyse how the concept 
can help bring to the forefront important but hitherto underappreciated implications of 
EU and national sectoral governance frameworks. In the following four sections, I exploit 
the variation in the sectoral governance frameworks that are applicable in my case study 
areas to show empirically the effect that different sectoral policy provisions had on the 
prospects for local-level cooperation. I argue that particularly in highly regulated sub-
sectors like wine, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) acts as a facilitative 
political regime which, in the presence of local-level leadership, enables local actors to 
establish local-level cooperative institutions and reap the benefits of cooperation. Viewed 
from that angle, it is no accident that many of the most notable instances of cooperation 
for upgrading in Greece have occurred in the agri-food sector and especially in the wine 
sub-sector. To some extent, the EU’s regional policies have aspired to provide similar 
tools in the alternative tourism sector, but have only succeeded in doing so in a more 
limited way. On the other hand, the overarching institutional framework that is applicable 
in the Greek mass tourism sector, which mostly falls outside the sphere of the EU’s 
competence, impedes rather than facilitating the emergence of cooperation for upgrading, 
and this is one of the reasons why it is difficult to pinpoint even a single case in which a 
high degree of cooperation among economic actors can be observed in the sector. 
5.1.1 Characteristics of facilitative political regimes 
Ostrom outlines the characteristics of facilitative political regimes based on her 
and her colleague’s fieldwork on groundwater resource management in California. In her 
view, a facilitative political regime “allows substantial local autonomy, invests in 
enforcement agencies, and provides generalized institutional-choice and conflict-
resolution arenas”. It thereby enables local actors to supply local-level cooperative 
institutions when they may not have succeeded in doing so in a different setting (1990: 
212).  
Firstly, Ostrom strongly emphasises that facilitative political regimes do not 
impose substantive cooperation rules on local actors from above, but encourage the 
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concerned actors to define their own rules through deliberation in inclusive arenas for 
discussion. This is because even “honest officials” in a centralised state do not have the 
necessary information to design cooperation rules that are congruent with local 
conditions: “if, instead of honest officials, one posits corrupt centralized regimes”, then 
local actors are incentivised to devote their efforts in gaining special favours from 
national-level politicians, rather than working with other local actors to increase the size 
of the local pie (Ostrom 1990: 200, 214; see also McDermott 2007: 106-107; Bruszt and 
McDermott 2012: 748). The importance of “incorporating a variety of socioeconomic 
groups into the policy-making process and empowering them to experiment with new 
policies and institutional forms” is also one of the principal conclusions of the literature 
on participatory governance (McDermott 2007: 107), for the additional reason that 
through the act of “studying their industries jointly”, economic actors come to see the 
costs and benefits of cooperative strategies under a new light, leading them to redefine 
their interests (Sabel 1993:1158-1159). 
Beyond encouraging local actors to negotiate the rules that will govern their 
cooperative efforts, facilitative political regimes also provide mechanisms to ease the 
monitoring and enforcement of those locally determined rules and to expedite dispute 
resolution. Ostrom argues that the supply of cooperative institutions for groundwater 
resource management in California was greatly helped by California’s court system, 
which gave to individual appropriators standing to initiate litigation in order to settle their 
disputes; indeed, the state even subsidised the costs of such litigation by one-third (1990: 
138-139).  
Moreover, facilitative political regimes reduce the obstacles to cooperation by 
providing information and technical assistance to the local actors about the properties of 
their common resources, a role played in Ostrom’s case study by the Californian 
Department of Water Resources and the US Geological Survey (1990: 138-139). If we 
see the provision of such technical assistance as a type of subsidisation of the upfront 
costs of cooperative efforts, then more generally, “besides a permissive legal environment 
of the kind just described, the obvious national complement to [participatory] projects 
would be a system of grants-in-aid to distressed localities”, which would be “spent at the 
discretion of the local economic actors” (Sabel 1993: 1167).   
Finally, Ostrom’s first of the ten design principles for successful local-level 
common-pool resource (CPR) management institutions is also relevant here, even though 
she does not discuss it in the context of her analysis about facilitative political regimes. 
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This principle has to do with “clearly defined boundaries”: “individuals or households 
who have rights to withdraw resource units form the CPR must be clearly defined, as 
must the boundaries of the CPR itself” (1990: 91). Ostrom presents the clear delineation 
of the boundaries of the group as a feature of local-level institutions, but more often than 
not, the extent to which group boundaries are malleable depends on the applicable macro-
institutional rules. The importance of clearly defined boundaries does not so much stem 
from protectionist considerations, i.e., from the fact that barriers to entry reduce 
competition and thus increase the potential rents that economic actors can collectively 
gain from the product or service that they produce jointly. After all, as was discussed at 
length in the previous chapter, barriers to entry can also have a deleterious effect on 
cooperation, as they reduce diversity and thus also the likelihood of institutional and 
economic innovation. Instead, clearly defined boundaries are important for two reasons. 
Firstly, knowing and being able to easily communicate with the full set of potential 
contributors to a collective good is necessary for brokering broad-based agreements about 
local cooperative rules, as well as for monitoring compliance with those rules. Secondly, 
if the actors concerned are to use a low enough discount rate when calculating the present 
value of the future benefits of cooperation so as to decide to cooperate, it is necessary to 
have in place an institutional framework that prevents the unconstrained entry of new, 
opportunistic actors who can benefit from the collective good created by the first movers 
but without contributing to, or even while undermining, its provision. In other words, 
while it is clear that in a free market economy, it is neither possible nor desirable for the 
number and identity of participants in a local sector to be fixed, different sectoral rules 
imply different degrees of barriers to entry for opportunistic actors and different 
obligations of local actors to participate in joint institutions. Macro-level institutional 
frameworks that encourage or require the inclusion of new entrants in previously created 
local cooperative rules and institutions increase the bargaining power of the first movers 
to prevent opportunistic behaviour by new entrants, thereby facilitating the emergence 
and perpetuation of cooperation. 
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Overall, rather than either ignoring cooperation problems altogether or regulating 
local cooperative activities in substantive detail from the top, a facilitative political 
regime creates the conditions where a broad range of local actors are encouraged to take 
decisions about the rules governing their cooperation, and can monitor and enforce the 
implementation of those rules (see Box 4 for an overview). Given the enabling and 
procedural character of the rules associated with facilitative political regimes, having in 
place a macro-institutional framework that is at least to some degree facilitative is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the supply of local-level cooperative 
institutions: for that, local-level leadership is also required. 
5.1.2 National and European sectoral institutional frameworks as potentially facilitative 
political regimes 
Facilitative political regimes play a key enabling role in the provision of local-
level cooperative institutions not only when it comes to common-pool resource 
management, but also in the case of cooperation for upgrading. But can economic actors 
have access to facilitative sectoral regimes in countries whose national institutional 
frameworks are characterised by important weaknesses?  
Indeed, as was mentioned in the introduction, Greek formal institutions have well-
documented shortfalls with regard to the uniform implementation of the law (Doxiadis 
2014: chapter 6). This discourages cooperation, as it is easier for micro-firms than for 
larger entities such as cooperatives to evade state controls. As studies of the role of the 
shadow economy in local economic development have shown, while illegal activities 
such as tax evasion and the irregular employment of workers have at times helped bolster 
Box 4: Characteristics of facilitative political regimes 
1. They incentivise or require the adoption of a locally applicable set of 
cooperation rules  
2. They allow local communities to define their own cooperation plans and rules, 
and to that end they create inclusive arenas for discussion and dispute 
resolution 
3. They provide institutional structures for, and/ or decrease the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing the local rules 
4. They provide information and technical assistance to the local actors, or 
otherwise subsidise the upfront costs of cooperative efforts 
5. They enable a relatively clear delineation of the boundaries of the group of 
relevant local actors 
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local SMEs and boost economic growth in backward regions in the aftermath of a major 
crisis, in the long term, reliance on the shadow economy inhibits “the production of local 
collective competition goods for the upgrading of the firms’ competitive strategies”, 
leading to a “‘fast development’ trap, where swift economic growth based on the mix of 
low quality/ low prices and a high level of shadow economy [promotes] an institutional 
environment that [hinders] the possibility of pursuing the so-called high road of 
development, based on innovation and high-quality products” (Burroni et al. 2008: 487).  
Moreover, the Greek justice system works slowly and ineffectively, which to an 
extent deprives local actors of an important recourse mechanism for the enforcement of 
locally applicable rules. The Greek state is one of the most centralised in Europe, leaving 
little leeway to local actors to use local governments as platforms for reshaping the rules 
governing their relations (Loughlin 2001: 271). Historically, the national government has 
even substantively determined many of the internal rules of the statutes of agricultural 
cooperatives (Skylakaki et al. 2019:120-122,135). The pervasive influence of clientelism 
in Greek politics exacerbates the situation, with local governments frequently being 
“dominated by local magnates and operated in a clientelistic manner” (Loughlin 2001: 
274). Similarly, agricultural cooperatives have functioned as “mechanisms for the 
consolidation of the state-oriented party system and the clientelistic state” (Efthymiou 
2017: 16), and state institutions have been regarded by some as “apples of discord” whose 
capture gives to victors the opportunity to protect and materially reward their followers, 
rather than catering for local development more broadly (Diamandouros 1983: 46). The 
Greek public administration is also notoriously deficient when it comes to the production 
and dissemination of data and information (Doxiadis 2014: chapter 11), putting an 
additional onus on local actors who wish to embark on innovative collective 
entrepreneurial projects. The high frequency of major changes in national regulations 
about cooperatives undermines legal certainty, further impeding local long-term planning 
in the agri-food sector (Efthymiou 2017: 8; Skylakaki et al. 2019: 112). 
In such settings, local economic actors can theoretically gain access to facilitative 
overarching institutions in three ways: through national-level reforms in sectoral 
governance frameworks, through the rules mandated by the EU or other “transnational 
integration regimes” that govern trade arrangements among countries (Bruszt and 
McDermott 2012), or through participation in private certification schemes. In this 
chapter, I focus primarily on the role of the EU’s sectoral governance arrangements in 
encouraging the supply of local-level cooperative institutions in a country whose 
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domestic institutional framework is generally not facilitative, but I also refer to a few 
specific features of the Greek national institutional framework that play an enabling role 
in the sectors of interest.  
Studying how the daily operation of the EU’s sectoral governance frameworks 
affects the prospects of cooperation among economic actors at the local level can improve 
our understanding of how EU policies affect economic development in fragmented 
economies. While the literatures on multi-level governance and Europeanization provide 
invaluable insights about the ways in which the EU has altered governance arrangements 
in current and candidate EU member-states, the outcome of interest in these literatures is 
typically the nature of the divergence from previous models of governance in itself and 
the empowerment of new subnational actors, rather than economic development and the 
facilitation of cooperation among economic actors to that end (e.g. see Featherstone 2003; 
Hooghe and Marks 2001; Goldsmith 2003; Loughlin 2001: 276; Piattoni 2010).  
On the other hand, much of the literature on the EU’s role in fostering reforms to 
improve domestic economic performance tends to focus on the impact of conditionality 
and of tying the domestic elites’ hands either during the accession process or in the 
context of externally imposed reform during crisis, and not on the way the day-to-day 
policies of the EU reshape domestic governance arrangements (Bruszt and McDermott 
2012: 747; for example, see Pagoulatos 2013; Featherstone 2003: 9). Bruszt and 
McDermott (2012) and Bruszt and Langbein’s (2014) studies on how, under certain 
conditions, the EU’s accession policies helped foster broad-based economic development 
in Central and Eastern Europe, constitute exceptions to this trend. Bruszt and McDermott 
(2012) argue that by emphasising domestic administrative capacity-building, designing 
assistance programmes in a way that promoted the forging of multiplex ties, and using 
monitoring as an occasion to engage in joint problem-solving, the EU’s accession policies 
led to regulatory improvement and broad-based upgrading in Central and Eastern 
European countries. This result was not achieved in Mexico in the context of NAFTA, 
which “offers few if any provisions to aid weaker groups and firms to either organize 
more effectively or develop new capabilities and practices” (2012: 759). Bruszt and 
Langbein point out that EU accession policies generated stronger and more inclusive 
positive developmental effects in the dairy sector in Poland rather than in Romania, as 
the Polish dairy sector was better organized and utilised EU tools, and especially pre-
accession funding, proactively. Instead, in Romania, the EU expended its energies 
creating “the basic elements of sectoral state organization”, resulting in positive but 
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weaker developmental effects that benefited a narrower constituency (2014: 59-60). The 
present chapter seeks to make a contribution to this literature by analysing how the EU’s 
day-to-day sectoral governance institutions in some cases empower local economic actors 
to reshape their relations and upgrade. 
In particular, I use the concept of the facilitative political regime to analyse two 
sets of EU policies that are relevant to my case studies, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and regional policy. Starting with the former, the CAP is often seen in political 
science – and even more so in public discourse – as little more than “a monument to 
economic irrationality” (Roederer-Rynning 2015: 197). Students of EU politics learn that 
the CAP is a protectionist and rent-allocating policy that is only perpetuated because it is 
designed “by an ‘iron triangle’ of agriculture ministers, agriculture officials in the 
Commission, and European-level farming interests”, all of whom have “a vested interest 
in defending the interests of the others”. In contrast, consumers and taxpayers have few 
incentives “to mobilize to attempt to break the iron triangle”, as each pays a small share 
of the CAP’s cost (Hix and B. Høyland 2011: 227-228; see also Roederer-Rynning 2015: 
202-205). Moreover, the CAP is widely considered to benefit principally large farmers, 
and not small farmers (Hix and B. Høyland 2011: 226; Knudsen 2009: 273; Gebrekidan 
et al. 2019). 
While these views partially reflect the reality of the CAP, particularly before the 
adoption of a series of major reforms starting with the 1992 McSharry reform, the CAP 
also constitutes an interesting and understudied example of capitalist regulation that has 
profound effects for local development in rural areas. It does so not only through the 
transfer of resources, but also by reshaping local governance through its regulatory 
framework and methods of disbursing funds. As will be seen in the remaining sections of 
the chapter, when the CAP consisted mainly of a system of price support for agricultural 
products guaranteed through subsidies (Roederer-Rynning 2015: 199-201), the policy’s 
effects for local-level cooperation among farmers were indeed deleterious. With a 
relatively high price being set and guaranteed by the public sector, there was little 
incentive for farmers to cooperate in order to upgrade their products. However, the 
reformed CAP seeks to promote its welfarist aim of ensuring “a fair standard of living for 
the agricultural community” to a large extent by promoting agricultural modernization 
and rural development rather than purely through income redistribution (Roederer-
Rynning 2015: 206; Knudsen 2009: chapter 6). Given the importance of cooperation for 
upgrading in fragmented economies, several initiatives in the context of the reformed 
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CAP seek to foster productive synergies among actors in the agri-food sector. Moreover, 
many of the elements of the CAP that have survived successive reforms, such as the 
systems of Protected Designations of Origin and planting rights, also facilitate 
cooperation in competitive agricultural areas. Indeed, as observed by Xavier Itçaina and 
his co-authors in their fascinating study of the EU’s 2008 wine reform, it was much easier 
to delegitimize and abolish the EU’s system of distillation subsidies, given out to support 
producers who could not sell all their wine, than to move away from the system of 
planting rights, which requires growers to apply for the right to plant new vines and limits 
the kinds of vines that can be planted. This was precisely because planting rights 
constitute “a way of facilitating contracts and thus reducing transaction costs in the 
industry” (2016: 160). As a result, in contrast to distillation subsidies, planting rights were 
widely supported in upscale wine-producing regions. 
Although regional policies are sometimes seen as mere side-payments for the 
acceptance of other policies by member-states at the EU’s periphery (Moravcsik 1998: 
367), political scientists are generally readier to recognise that the EU’s regional policies 
also have a “classic normative redistributive goal”, namely to reduce the economic 
disparities among European regions (Hix and B. Høyland 2011: 230). Even though there 
is a rich literature in economic geography and regional science assessing – primarily 
through quantitative methods – the extent to which the EU’s regional policies achieve 
their developmental goal (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 2017; Crescenzi et al. 2015), there is still 
considerable scope to study the extent and detailed mechanisms through which they 
achieve this aim by fostering synergies among diverse actors in fragmented rural 
economies. 
Overall, in sectors that fall under the EU’s competence, EU policies to some 
extent have the potential to compensate for the lack of a favourable institutional 
framework for cooperation at the national level. Using the concept of the facilitative 
political regime, in the remainder of the chapter I examine whether and how they played 
such a role in my case study areas. 
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5.2 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)’s regulatory framework 
and cooperation for upgrading in established agri-food sub-sectors 
5.2.1 Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) as a facilitative institutional framework 
for the establishment and enforcement of local rules about quality  
During one of my first interviews for this project, winemaker Yannis Boutaris 
mentioned: “It is worth looking into is the role of the legislation on the designations of 
origin. There are areas like Goumenissa whose character changed when they became 
PDO. (…) The areas that are PDO change appearance” (interview #13). Indeed, the EU’s 
system of Protected Designations of Origin (PDO), which are labels that guarantee the 
authenticity of specific products linked to their geographical origin, to some extent has 
all the five characteristics of a facilitative political regime (see Box 4), and it is helpful 
for cooperation in fragmented economies particularly in terms of requiring local actors to 
define their own rules and set up monitoring and enforcement systems. Nevertheless, as 
an enabling institution, a PDO designation is not a guarantee of market success and 
upgrading; rather, it is a tool at the disposal of local actors to facilitate and maximize the 
impact of their own cooperative efforts. In other words, not all “areas that are PDO 
change appearance”, but only those where the PDO framework is used as an opportunity 
to credibly commit to following strict production rules that can catalyse upgrading, and 
where the local actors engage in collective marketing efforts to promote the local PDO 
products. 
According to the EU’s PDO Regulation (2081/92), “only a group” is entitled to 
apply for a registration of a designation of origin (Council of the European Union 1992: 
208/3). In order to do so, the group must agree on a “specification” with which the 
agricultural product will comply, which for the case of wine must minimally include, 
among other elements, the wine’s “principal analytical and organoleptic characteristics”; 
“the specific oenological practices used to make the wine or wines, as well as the relevant 
restrictions on making them”; “the demarcation of the geographical area concerned”; “the 
maximum yields per hectare”; and the type of grape varietals used to make the wine 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013: 347/720-721). This 
specification “can be considered as a minimum agreement between all the actors living 
from the product” (Chappuis and Sans 1999: 10). Moreover, the PDO regulation obliges 
member-states to ensure that “inspection structures are in place, the function of which 
shall be to ensure that agricultural products and foodstuffs bearing a protected name meet 
the requirements laid down in the specifications”. These inspection authorities must meet 
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EU standards and be accredited (Council of the European Union 1992: 208/5; Barjolle 
and Sylvander 2000: 30). In the case of wine, the inspection authorities must conduct 
annual verifications of compliance with the requirements of the PDO legislation, 
including “organoleptic and analytical testing” and “checking compliance with the other 
conditions set out in the product specification” (European Commission 2018: L9/56).  
The President of Santorini’s wine cooperative summarised aptly the effects of this 
system on the organisation of the local wine sector: “The PDO is important for us because 
it guarantees authenticity and quality, but also because it requires that you are organised, 
that you have all those elements that we were lacking until then: the creation of 
institutions, services, rules” (interview #28). A PDO also “puts an area in order, because 
it has strict standards” (interview #13).  
Crucially for the Greek context, those standards are not merely nominal, but they 
are also enforced:  
“The PDO is important for quality, because there are better controls for PDO 
wines. At every stage, wineries have to be able to prove that they acquired 
grapes from specific vineyards employing specific cultivation methods. At the 
end of the year, when the wines are ready, an independent team conducts 
checks, chemical and organoleptic analyses, and blind tastings to see if the 
PDO specifications were followed.” (interview #30) 
Indeed, while some Santorinian winemakers suspect that there is at least some degree of 
adulteration in Santorini’s table wines, which takes the form of mixing local grapes with 
cheaper, non-local ones, most are convinced that this type of cheating does not occur 
among PDO wines. This is not only due to aforementioned controls, but also because 
fraud would be easy to detect in a wine that must follow clear minimum standards: “I 
don’t think that anyone tampers with the PDO wines. The profile of Santorini is so 
special, that if someone cheats, it’s obvious on the product” (interview #33); “it would be 
as if you go to a triple jump race and do four steps” (interview #34). In contrast, when it 
comes to table wine, “we don’t play on equal terms. A hotelier who is taxed in Malta and 
one who is taxed in Greece don’t play on equal terms – it’s something similar” (interview 
#33).  
The stakeholders whom I interviewed in Lemnos provided similar perspectives 
regarding the impact of the PDO regulation on the quality of Lemnian wines (interviews 
#80, #82). The locally based agronomist of the Agriculture Ministry described in detail 
the procedures that must be followed for a wine to be awarded the PDO certification. His 
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description is worth quoting at length because it shows how comprehensive the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms associated with the PDO system are: 
“In order to give the PDO certification, a certain process is followed. When 
he delivers the grapes, the producer says from which vineyards they 
originated, so that traceability is retained. This is fundamental for quality, but 
also to ensure that non-vinifiable varietals are not vinified, and to prevent 
adulteration. The wineries check the quality of the grapes that are delivered, 
but sometimes we [i.e. the agronomists of the local branch of the Agriculture 
Ministry] also do checks through visits. 
(…) When the wine is ready, each winemaker comes and tells us what quantity 
he would like to have recognised as PDO. At the first stage, we take samples, 
and we send them to the Centre for the Protection of Plants and Quality 
Control in Patra for the chemical analysis to be done. We check particular 
aspects of the wine, e.g. the acidity, which must be at specific levels for the 
wine to be PDO. (…) Secondly, another control is done by a committee of the 
Interprofessional Organisation of Vine and Wine, which is an organoleptic 
control.” (interview #84) 
Thus, not only does the PDO system require multiple controls to ensure that the different 
kinds of rules in the PDO specification for Lemnos wines are adhered to, but it has also 
been accompanied by the creation of a whole administrative structure at the domestic 
level to implement those controls. 
Importantly, the PDO system contributes to ensuring a level playing field among 
winemakers not only with regard to quality, but also with regard to tax compliance, as all 
grapes and wine that are given a PDO certification must also be accounted for in tax 
terms. As explained by the regional Director of the General Chemical Laboratory of the 
State, who was visiting the island for work during my fieldwork, 
“The main reason why I am here at the moment is to check the tax warehouses 
of the Union and the Savvoglou winery for their production of vin de liqueur, 
which consists of grapes mixed with alcohol. When the mixing happens, we 
measure the quantity of the product, we check that the raw material is 
appropriate and hasn’t rotten, that the sugars are as many as they should be. 
We then complete the mixing protocol, confirming that this many grapes were 
mixed with this much alcohol, so that we can certify the production of this 
much vin de liqueur PDO Lemnos sweet Muscat, according to the law.” 
(interview #82) 
Given the deleterious effects of the non-implementation of the law and concomitant 
perception of cheating on mutual trust and conceptions of shared interest among 
economic actors (interview #71; see chapter 2), these implications of the PDO legislation 
for tax compliance are important for the prospects of the emergence of local-level 
cooperation. 
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As I discovered during my fieldwork in both Santorini and Lemnos, the inspection 
systems set up in the framework of EU legislation also perform another function of 
facilitative political regimes, namely information provision. In both cases, and 
particularly in Lemnos where the wine cooperative had a lower capacity to perform that 
role itself relative to Santorini, the agronomists of the Agriculture Ministry served as 
important contact points of grape producers who sought advice about cultivation 
techniques and other issues. Indeed, my interviews with the Ministry’s agronomists in 
both Santorini and Lemnos were interrupted several times by producers coming in to ask 
questions. Indicatively, a worried Santorini producer entered the office asking: “It’s not 
raining and I don’t know if I should water my grapes. I am a young farmer and I feel 
totally directionless. I asked the elders of Santorini and they told me to leave my vines 
unwatered. Should I do that?” (interview #37). In turn, in Lemnos, a couple of local 
producers entered the agronomist’s office asking whether they should trust a craftswoman 
who wanted to source inputs from them: “Why does she want to make us sign a contract? 
If she fails in her shop, or if her final products are not good, are we going to go to prison?” 
(interview #84). By looking over the proposed contract and providing reassurance that 
everything was in order, the agronomist encouraged cooperation in the agri-food sector 
in a way that went far beyond the implementation of EU legislation itself. Therefore, 
despite significant cuts in the capacity of these local offices of the Agriculture Ministry 
during the crisis (interviews #28, #37, #84), the presence of at least the personnel 
minimally required for conducting the controls stipulated by the Common Agricultural 
Policy has multiple types of positive implications for the local sector. 
Finally, by providing a type of common label to local producers, PDO certifications 
to some extent also facilitate collective marketing activities. In the words of the Director 
of the Lemnos wine cooperative, “all certifications are forms of differentiation, and they 
help in today’s competitive environment” (interview #78). Nevertheless, as many 
producers and cooperatives have learned through experience, a PDO certification alone 
can at best make a limited contribution in terms of marketing a product in upscale 
markets: brand recognition only comes about as a result of active and costly cooperative 
promotion efforts by the producers and wineries themselves. As argued in the previous 
chapters, such cooperative activities can only be supplied in places where they were 
previously absent through leadership. As mentioned by my interviewees in Santorini, “the 
PDO label helps because it says Santorini, not because it says PDO” (interview #37). 
Indeed, the lack of a widely recognised brand name for Lemnos’s wines is one of the 
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crucial reasons why the Lemnos PDO wines are not as successful in the market, despite 
their high quality (interview #83). In that sense, evaluating the success of the PDO 
regulation in terms of whether having a PDO certification makes a difference for 
consumers’ willingness to pay for a particular product (e.g. Fotopoulos and Krystallis 
2002), misses the point that the PDO system can facilitate collective reputation-building 
efforts, but it cannot substitute them. 
In fact, a PDO certification also does not guarantee that a specific protected agri-
food product is upscale: whether the entry into the PDO system will catalyse upgrading 
in quality mostly depends on the content and strictness of the local rules that the involved 
actors decide to include in the PDO specification (Chappuis and Sans 1999: 10). 
According to my interviewees, acquiring PDO status in 2012 made little difference in the 
production methods of Chalkidiki’s green olives: 
“Nothing changed in the way we cultivate olives. The PDO designation just 
means that the olives are produced and processed in Chalkidiki. It was an 
initiative that the regional authorities took. Either way, few olives from here 
are exported as Chalkidiki PDO olives. Most are sent in bulk to Italy.” 
(interview #6) 
Even though some consider that the European Commission ought to be more demanding 
in terms of requiring the adoption of strict, optimal production rules by applicant groups 
(Barjolle and Sylvander 2000: 28-30), in my view this would be hard for the 
Commission’s small and distant bureaucracy to assess. Instead, the current enabling 
system has the benefit of being a widely and readily accessible tool at the disposal of local 
economic actors, who can decide how to best use it given their aspirations and the 
prevailing local conditions.  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the origins of the PDO system, 
and whether it was put in place consciously in order to facilitate cooperation among 
producers and agri-food firms in fragmented rural economies, or whether its facilitative 
character was a “by-product” of institutional decisions that followed a different logic 
(Schelkle 2017: 10). Nevertheless, in the context of this discussion, it is interesting to 
note that a system close to the current PDO model was first adopted in the French 
Champagne region in the early twentieth century, and was “uploaded” to the EU (Dyson 
2017: 66) upon French insistence (Carter 2018: 487-490). It is doubtful whether without 
the export of this successful regulatory system from France via the EU, a facilitative 
regime of equivalent scope would be available in the Greek agri-food sector. 
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5.2.2 CAP subsidies as incentives for cooperation 
The CAP’s successive reforms have had important implications for the way in 
which the policy influences the prospects of cooperation among economic actors at the 
local level. Studying the minutes of the General Assembly meetings of Santorini’s wine 
cooperative reveals that the CAP’s old system of price support and subsidies to enable 
low-value uses of excess production that could not be sold otherwise, reinforced the grape 
producers’ statist orientation and undermined the prospects of cooperation for upgrading. 
Characteristically, in the 1980s, Santorini’s wine cooperative was highly reliant on the 
European Economic Community (EEC)’s distillation subsidies, and the producers sought 
to resolve their financial problems by asking the Commission to increase those subsidies: 
“The Governing Board member X [anonymised], says that a telegram of 
complaint should be sent to the EEC because it put quantitative restrictions to 
preventive distillation and so it obstructs the sale of the wines even at a low 
price.” (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 98, Jul. and 
Aug. 1984/ D5) 
An interesting first indication of change occurred in the early 1990s, when the 
CAP’s system of price guarantees started to be replaced with direct income support for 
farmers, proportionately to the size of their cultivation. Although this new “per stremma 
subsidy”14 did not explicitly aim to promote cooperation in the agri-food sector, in 
Santorini it had the consequence of doing so as a result of the fact that it was disbursed 
to individual producers through the obligatory wine cooperative. By generating such a 
financial dependence among all local producers and the cooperative, the new subsidy 
gave the cooperative a tool that enabled it, for the first time, to enforce the General 
Assembly’s decision to deduct a small contribution per kilo of Santorini grapes in order 
to finance the construction of the cooperative’s new modern winery. Whereas in previous 
years, the cooperative had been unable to enforce that decision on producers who 
delivered grapes to private winemakers, from 1993 on it became possible to deduct the 
levy directly from the per stremma subsidy (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting 
minutes, Act 131, Apr. 1994/ D5). 
More generally, many of the CAP’s current subsidy schemes are addressed to 
groups rather than individual actors. They thereby provide a major incentive to economic 
actors to form producers’ groups, producers’ associations and interprofessional 
organisations and come up with their own sets of rules and entrepreneurial plans 
 
14 1 stremma is equal to 1000 square metres of land. 
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(Skylakaki et al. 2019: 89-95), fostering the formation of “multiplex ties” (Bruszt and 
McDermott 2012: 750) and performing the first two functions of a facilitative political 
regime listed in Box 4. This is widely recognised by actors on the ground. As explained 
by a Lemnian winemaker with regard to producers’ groups, 
“The institution is being promoted – and has been promoted for many years – 
by the European Union, because it believes – and it’s correct – that producers 
must unite in teams, and that each shouldn’t operate separately. The 
producers’ group is governed by a particular legal framework, it has a statute, 
and each group has its own aims. (…) For the producers to be able to obtain 
some benefits that they are entitled to because they are in Lemnos, because 
it’s a PDO zone, because they cultivate certain varietals – they must be 
registered in a group, they must be organised.” (interview #80) 
A similar logic applies with regard to the incentives provided by the CAP to foster 
cooperation among wineries: 
“When the funding from [the CAP] came for promotion activities to third 
countries15, [US importer] Sofia Perpera said it’s a pity, Santorini is very 
important, make sure that you get organised, create a team with a contract – 
because there was no association [of Santorini wineries], there still isn’t. And 
that programme ran with that contract (…) We are still discussing that a formal 
association must be created. It’s important, because there will also be other 
funding programmes that will be easier to manage if such an association 
exists, both from the financial and the organizational point of view. The EU 
always, and especially as time goes by, prioritises and chooses team projects. 
The more collaborative they are, the better.” (interview #29) 
Making the same point but more cynically, a Santorinian winemaker said,  
“if you have to agree [with other winemakers] for someone to subsidise you, 
you will agree. Will we get 500,000 from the Greek state or a European 
programme to go [collectively] to America to present our wines? This is not 
bad, let’s agree. But if the 500,000 had been allocated separately to each 
winery, we’d say, what are you talking about? (…) We love each other when 
someone else pays.” (interview #33) 
Nevertheless, even if the actors initially only join forces in order to benefit from a subsidy, 
their interaction through a collective project and the organisational capacities that they 
acquire in the process can dynamically open up new possibilities for cooperation in the 
future.  
The type of subsidy discussed in the last quote not only encourages the formation 
of teams horizontally within the wine sector, but it also covers part of the upfront cost of 
 
15 For more details about this programme in the context of the EU’s 2008 wine reform, see Itçaina et al. 
2016: chapter 8. 
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cooperative activities such as joint marketing projects. Such subsidies thereby reduce in 
a direct way the extent of the obstacles to cooperation, performing the fourth function of 
facilitative political regimes as described in Box 4 (Vlahos et al. 2016: 6/ S7; 
Theodorakopoulou and Iliopoulos 2012: 34). The same can be said of subsidies to invest 
in physical infrastructure for upgrading, such as the Santorini wine cooperative’s new 
modern winery in the early 1990s, which was subsidised by the EEC – “and we have 
participated in at least another three programmes since” (interview #36). The CAP also 
provides subsidies to producers to reduce the upfront costs of quality upgrading, 
particularly through its vineyard restructuring programme and its subsidies for transition 
to organic agriculture (Santo Wines General Assembly meeting minutes, Act 149, Jul. 
2000/ D5; Venizelou 2015: 133-134/ S5; interview #84). Some collective activities – 
particularly joint marketing projects – are also supported through national-level initiatives 
spearheaded by one of Greece’s most active interprofessional organisations, the National 
Interprofessional Organization of Vine and Wine (EDOAO) (interviews #29, #71). 
Nevertheless, similarly to the PDO system, the CAP’s subsidies facilitate 
cooperation for upgrading, but cannot guarantee that it will take place. This is firstly 
because all the subsidies for joint investment projects require co-financing, which is 
typically hard to provide collectively in the absence of leadership. In Lemnos, this 
constitutes a major obstacle for utilising EU funding programmes:  
“There are such programmes. Programmes that are subsidised by the state, 
right? To modernise the factory, to promote your products, in Greece as well 
as abroad. But in all this, there is the own contribution. The subsidy is not 
100%, you understand? So this own contribution is missing.” (interview #83; 
similar comments made in interview #78) 
Secondly, like all systems of incentives, CAP subsidies are subject to being used for 
extracting a short-term financial benefit, while only paying lip-service to the requirements 
to form teams, specify rules and draw up long-term entrepreneurial plans. In such cases, 
the cooperative activities that are subsidised do not become self-sustaining, but dwindle 
when the subsidy programme runs out. For example, if a local group of producers decided 
to transition to organic agriculture mainly in order to receive, “apart from the normal 
subsidy, also the organic one” (interview #83), rather than to facilitate the execution of a 
novel collective entrepreneurial idea, then it’s not a surprise if the effort collapses when 
the subsidies run out. For sustainable cooperation for upgrading to be observed, CAP 
subsidies (and similar national-level initiatives) need to co-exist with conscious and 
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costly local-level efforts to that end. As was argued in the previous two chapters, the 
emergence of such local-level collective efforts in places where they were previously 
lacking requires leadership by a small group of boundary-spanning actors. 
5.2.3 Planting rights, land use plans and the delineation of the boundaries of the local 
group 
Both the PDO system and the CAP’s subsidy system facilitate in their own way the 
delineation of the boundaries of the group of relevant local actors, which is the fifth 
function of facilitative political regimes as listed in Box 4. The former does so by 
requiring “the demarcation of the geographical area concerned” as part of the local PDO 
specification document (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013: 
347/720-721), and the latter by incentivising actors to join one or more formal 
associations.  
In the wine sector, the CAP’s system of planting rights contributes further to the 
delimitation of boundaries by slowing down the rate of new entrants, who are required to 
apply for the right to plant new vines, and more crucially, by limiting what varietals new 
entrants can plant, thereby stopping them from undermining existing actors’ cooperative 
efforts for quality upgrading by planting different, higher-yield varietals. As an oenologist 
in Santorini explains, 
“Only a couple of aspects of agricultural legislation make a difference today. 
The first and most important one is that you cannot bring other varietals of 
grapes to plant in Santorini. (…) This decreases the cases of adulteration, 
where the assyrtiko varietal is mixed with another varietal that is cheaper.” 
(interview #34) 
On the other hand, the limitations associated with the planting rights system also inhibit 
the scaling of Santorini’s highly successful vineyard, exacerbating the distributional 
conflict for inputs that complicates cooperative efforts among winemakers: “the planting 
rights system makes it very difficult for us to get permits for new cultivations. (…) If the 
system was more open, this would be very good for Santorini” (interview #30). This 
shows that the main benefit of the planting rights system for cooperation is not so much 
that it reduces the size of the sector, which does help deter the entry of all actors including 
opportunistic ones, but it also prevents the scaling of successful cooperative efforts. 
Instead, planting rights facilitate the emergence of cooperation principally because they 
compel new entrants to abide by a set of rules previously determined by the locals in order 
to enable upgrading, thus preventing opportunists from entering the sector and benefiting 
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from the collective reputation that previous actors had invested in creating, while planting 
lower-quality, higher-yield varietals and eventually damaging the reputation of local 
wine. 
Even though the regulatory framework of the CAP constrains new entrants within 
the agri-food sector from undermining ongoing cooperative efforts by existing 
stakeholders, those efforts can also be threatened by new entrants from different 
industries, which are regulated at the domestic level. This is the case in Santorini, where 
actors in the wine sector have struggled to prevent the conversion of the island’s vineyards 
into touristic accommodation facilities (see chapter 3, section 2.5). Many local 
stakeholders agree that the most appropriate institutional solution to the problem would 
be to adopt a land use plan for the island, something that falls under the competence of 
the national government. However, successive Greek governments have so far been 
reluctant to implement such a policy, for fear of the political cost (interviews #28, #34, 
#35). Given the absence of a land use plan in Santorini, the principal way in which the 
problem has been addressed over time is by giving to producers very high prices for the 
grapes (“Burgundy prices”; interview #35). Two policy measures have also contributed 
to slowing down the conversion of vineyards into built areas. The first was a CAP agri-
environmental subsidy that was given out in the 2000s to incentivise farmers to maintain 
the agricultural landscape (interviews #28), and the second was a 2012 national law (the 
so-called “Sifounakis law”), which prohibited building on fields that were formally 
declared as active vineyards (interviews #28, #33, #34). While these measures did provide 
a “minimal protection” to Santorini’s vineyard (interviews #34, #35), only a land use plan 
with a delimitation of agricultural and residential zones can provide comprehensive 
solution to the problem (interview #36, #71). However, the adoption of a land use plan 
requires that the national authorities take decisive action based on consultation with a 
range of stakeholders and a well-thought-out plan, something that successive Greek 
governments have been unwilling or unable to do, satisficing instead with the 
perpetuation of a suboptimal status quo. 
5.2.4 Contract farming as a national-level enabling institution for vertical cooperation in 
agri-food supply chains 
During the last decade, a national-level institutional framework – namely contract 
farming – did in some cases facilitate the resolution of hold-up problems among 
producers and processors in agri-food supply chains. Contract farming is a system that 
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originates from the French poultry market (Skylakaki et al. 2019:143), and was launched 
in Greece in the first half of the 2010s by Peiraeus Bank, a private-sector bank which 
acquired the bankrupt Greek Agricultural Bank (ATE) during the early stages of the 
Eurozone crisis. Whereas, as seen in the previous chapter, ATE’s traditional practice of 
overlending to agricultural cooperatives proved to be deleterious to cooperation for 
upgrading as it fuelled clientelistic relations and offered an easy alternative path to 
prosperity, through its contract farming programme, Peiraeus Bank makes it easier for 
processors and producers to agree on upgrading cultivation standards. It does so firstly 
by enabling the payment of the producers at the agreed price upon delivery rather than 
after the sale of the final product months later, which can reinforce the producers’ 
confidence that their efforts to upgrade quality will be rewarded. Secondly, the bank acts 
as a third-party enforcer of the producers and processors’ written agreement about the 
quality standards to be followed and the obligations of each party, providing reassurance 
outside the framework of the ineffective Greek court system that the terms of the contract 
will be adhered to. As explained by an employee at the Bläuel olive oil firm, which has 
entered the programme,  
“The aim of Contract Farming is to buy inputs in a way that improves quality. 
After a private contract is signed between the firm, the producer and the bank, 
which describes the quantity and approximate price of the transaction, the 
bank pays the producer directly. The contract is binding, though we retain the 
right to turn down the olive oil if in the end it doesn’t meet the specifications 
– but we can’t replace the producer with someone else.” (interview #2). 
As a result, while the merchants ensure that they will have the quantity and quality of 
inputs that they require, the producers ensure that they will be paid the agreed price, on 
time (interviews #5, #86). 
Similarly to the other institutional frameworks examined so far, contract farming 
cannot be considered as a panacea, but is a tool that can be useful only in conjunction 
with (rather than as a replacement of) local-level cooperative efforts and therefore local-
level leadership. In Chalkidiki’s table olive sector, which is characterised by tight-throat 
competition based on price and a low degree of cooperation, contract farming may not 
appear as  
“the best solution for the merchant. For instance, [company X] will be charged 
for the working capital from which the producer will be paid from September 
on [when the olives are delivered]. Whereas if the producer is paid at Easter, 
the merchant won’t pay interest on the delay.” (interview #6) 
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Entering the contract farming programme minimally requires that processors have an 
interest to upgrade quality, while using the programme successfully in order to improve 
cultivation techniques can also be greatly facilitated if the producers engage in some form 
of cooperation and thereby have a degree of bargaining power (Skylakaki et al. 2019:143-
149). This helps avoid practices such as “leaving the box about the minimum price empty 
in the contract” (interview #5), which undermine the reciprocal character of the parties’ 
contractual commitments. As was seen in Chapter 2, such bargaining power is typically 
itself the result of previous cooperation, which, to an extent paradoxically, is often 
initiated by final firms that assume the role of leading actors. 
On the other hand, in the presence of the type of leadership analysed in the previous 
two chapters, contract farming can help actors achieve productive synergies. Unlike the 
rest of the facilitative institutions analysed so far, contract farming is a national-level 
institutional framework, whose design and implementation is spearheaded by a private-
sector bank. Its relation with the EU is only indirect, and has to do with the restructuring 
of the Agricultural Bank in the context of Greece’s memorandum obligations during the 
Eurozone crisis. 
5.3 EU policies, obligatory cooperatives and the emergence of 
cooperation for the creation of innovative agri-food products 
5.3.1 The impact of PDO regulations and EU subsidies in the mastiha and saffron sectors 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Common Agricultural Policy’s regulatory framework 
is a lot more detailed in terms of the tools for upgrading that it puts at the disposal of 
economic actors operating in established agri-food sub-sectors, than when it comes to 
unique products like mastiha and saffron, where the challenge is to create new markets. 
The CAP still plays a facilitative role in the latter case, but its impact is more limited than 
it is in more established sub-sectors, and particularly in the wine sector, which “in Greece 
is governed by as much legislation as all other agricultural products together” (interview 
#37). 
Both mastiha and saffron have Protected Designations of Origin. The PDO label is 
potentially useful for two reasons in Chios and Kozani. The first one is that it clearly 
delimits the geographical boundaries of the groups of Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron 
producers, helping the local actors safeguard potentially successful innovative products 
from imitation by outsiders. Indeed, given the recent success of Chios mastiha, this 
function of protecting the local brand has become quite important for the island:   
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“When you make mastiha products, the mastiha must come from us. Provided 
that you use mastiha, we have the right and are mandated by the PDO regime 
to trace it in the good that you produce. In other words, if you make loukoumia 
[a traditional sweet] and you buy a kilo of mastiha from us, the loukoumia that 
you produce must correspond quantitatively to the 1kg of mastiha. (…) The 
guarantor of the PDO designation is the cooperative, not the EU.” (interview 
#63; a similar comment was made in interview #59) 
The clear definition of Chios mastiha PDO as a product from the island of Chios has 
protectionist implications, but in terms of its effects on cooperation, it is particularly 
important because it helps local actors safeguard their reputation against lower-quality 
imitations from outside actors, which could tarnish the reputation of “Chios mastiha” 
altogether.  
Secondly, as explained in an information leaflet produced by Kozani’s saffron 
cooperative for its producer-members, the PDO designation can also assist in collective 
marketing efforts:   
“In the past, all our product got exported anonymously, in bulk, and the final 
consumer knew nothing about its origin. Now, following the acquisition of the 
PDO certification, it is established in the international markets as ‘Kozani 
saffron’, something that gives it prestige and generates benefits for our entire 
area.” (“Annual report 2000”/ D3). 
On the other hand, given the obligatory nature of the mastiha and saffron 
cooperatives and their monopsony over raw mastiha and saffron, the PDO designation 
does not play as important a role in terms of fostering upgrading horizontally across the 
sector as it did in the case of wine: as the sole buyers of primary inputs, it is the two 
cooperatives who have the potential to play the role of quality regulators and enforcers in 
the Chios mastiha and Kozani saffron cases. Moreover, operating in sectors where 
territorial origin is not as important as in the wine sector, both cooperatives have sought 
to complement the PDO label with additional quality certifications in order to be 
competitive in global markets. As explained by the former President of the saffron 
cooperative, “we were one of only 30 companies in Greece to have ISO [the International 
Standards Organisation standard “ISO-9002”] in 1994, if I remember well. In Western 
Macedonia we were the only ones, nobody else had it. People didn’t know what it was” 
(interview #53). The Chios cooperative has continued along this track a lot more actively 
during the last two decades, acquiring a number of ISO, Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) and British Retail Consortium (BRC) certifications, and 
succeeding to register mastiha in the inventory of the European Medicines Agency 
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(interview #59). Even though such standards impose a set of uniform quality rules and 
are thereby not characterised by the element of local agency that is an attribute of the 
PDO system, “strategically, those standards are important, because they give you prestige 
and power” (interview #62). 
The CAP’s system of subsidies is also not as well-targeted when it comes to rare 
and innovative agri-food products than it is in the case of wine. As mentioned by the CEO 
of the Concepts SA company, which spearheaded the production of mastiha liquor, EU 
funding is generally aimed at manufacturers rather than brand owners, while the funding 
programmes for marketing subsidise participation in exhibitions – but “we live in an era 
where exhibitions don’t help, business is not done through exhibitions” (interview #65). 
Indeed, according to the CEO of the mastiha cooperative’s subsidiary company, “at the 
start we received no support whatsoever from national or EU policies: we were entirely 
self-funded. Especially if we talk about the MastihaShop, this was made with the money 
of the cooperative, then some shareholders came in, then some more, and we progressed” 
(interview #58). On the other hand,  
“to be fair, I would say the following: whenever the cooperative needed 
money for scientific research or marketing, and whenever it made [funding] 
proposals [to the EU], I would say that as a rule it has gotten the money. (…) 
[Also,] when the cooperative makes productive investments in things like 
factories, it receives funding from the EU, like every other Greek 
manufacturing company.” (interview #58) 
Kozani’s saffron cooperative also received EU funding for investments in physical 
infrastructure, promotion and training (interviews #53, #55; “LEADER II examples”/ 
D4). Furthermore, in Chios, the mastiha cooperative successfully applied to obtain from 
the EU a form of income support for mastiha producers, something that was in part 
possible due to mastiha’s PDO status, in line with the CAP’s favourable attitude towards 
collective efforts (interview #63). This subsidy facilitates cooperation in the sector, as it 
decreases the incentives of producers to sell mastiha through the black market (interviews 
#59, #63).    
Finally, even if far from all EU funds are spent in a productive way, let alone in a 
way that promotes cooperation for upgrading, the local discussion in Kozani about the 
mismanagement surrounding the so-called “Local Fund” demonstrates the importance in 
the Greek context of having in place the EU’s system of controls for the spending of 
agricultural and regional funds. The “Local Fund” was given to the Kozani region by the 
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Greek national government to promote local development as compensation for the 
pollution generated by the lignite mines. According to a local newspaper, 
“the 1997 local development fund has become a tool for petty politics and 
patronage at the hands of the regional and, secondarily, the local authorities. 
(…) Most recently, a long series of over 100 [sports and cultural] associations 
and organisations received various funds, following the intermediation of 
mayors and local officials and patrons, usually with unknown funding criteria. 
(…) In no place does the relevant Ministerial Decision 22-7-97 foresee 
subsidising associations, and doing so is therefore illegal.” (Kiriakatikos 
Chronos, 21/5/2000, 2919: 7/ N1).  
Almost twenty years later, a local agri-food entrepreneur has the exact same complaint: 
“this money should support the local economy, but every year they find something else 
to do with it – last year they funded all the local associations, they said” (interview #57). 
The following remarkable response of a Regional Governor of Kozani to allegations of 
corruption in the disbursement of the local fund is telling of the mentality of clientelism 
that permeated many Greek state institutions: 
“You are asking whether the Regional Governor played a game of 200-300 
million drachmas with those funds, which in total came up to 2-2.5 billion 
drachmas. Well, these things are details, and it is naïve to bring them up in 
evaluating the programme.” (Kiriakatikos Chronos, 21/5/2000, 2919: 7/ N1) 
In such a context, having in place even the imperfect mechanisms of control designed by 
the EU and implemented by a range of local stakeholders in the context of disbursing EU 
subsidies, appears like a significant asset that substantially increases the chance that 
policies for local economic development will have a positive impact.  
5.3.2 Obligatory cooperatives: assets or liabilities? 
Beyond the CAP’s policy framework, an institution that is permitted by the Greek 
legal system and that is in fact being challenged by the European Commission, namely 
the institution of obligatory cooperatives, also has obvious relevance for this discussion. 
While cooperatives are typically understood as “association[s] of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs” (Vakoufaris et al. 
2007: 777), in obligatory cooperatives the entry and participation of producers of a 
particular agricultural good in a particular area is compulsory. Obligatory cooperatives 
were first permitted in Greece in the 1930s (Theodorakopoulou and Iliopoulos 2012: 31) 
and were created usually upon the initiative of local actors in order to more effectively 
counterbalance the bargaining power of merchants (e.g. regarding the case of Chios, see 
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Tsouhlis 2011: 120/ S2). At the moment there are four obligatory cooperatives in Greece: 
the Chios mastiha cooperative, the Kozani saffron cooperative, and the wine cooperatives 
of Samos and Santorini. Following a lawsuit initiated in 2007 by a private winery in 
Samos and a request by the European Commission to the Greek authorities in 2013 to 
allow private wineries to produce and market their own Samos PDO wine, the future of 
the principle of obligatoriness in these four areas is in question (Venizelou 2015: 10-19/ 
S5; Iliopoulos and Theodorakopoulou 2014: 664/ S6). 
On the one hand, obligatory cooperatives satisfy some of the criteria associated with 
facilitative political regimes, as they create an arena for discussion among producers and 
they are well-placed to provide information, technical assistance and other club goods 
horizontally across the sector, as well as to enforce local rules about production standards. 
In the words of the CEO of the mastiha cooperative’s subsidiary,  
“The restructuring of the cooperative [in the early 2000s] included a pledge of 
funds for research and development, and for promotion and communication. 
Large amounts of funds. If the cooperative wasn’t obligatory, why would it 
decide to invest money to research and develop the attributes of mastiha? (…) 
The fact that it was an institution that concentrated all the [concerned] 
economic interests, meant that it could say, since I, as a legal entity, and my 
members, are the sole beneficiaries, then yes, I will do a campaign for mastiha, 
using my own funds.” (interview #58) 
Indeed, as was seen in chapter 3, in Chios even private agri-food firms believe that “the 
obligatoriness of the cooperative is created with a certain wisdom”, as they consider that 
it provides a guarantee that raw mastiha will continue to be of high quality, encouraging 
private firms to invest in mastiha products (interview #65). 
On the other hand, as monopsonists, obligatory cooperatives may also suffer from 
inertia, stifle competition, and hold back the development of the local sector. From the 
perspective of the concept of facilitative political regimes, a problem of the institution is 
that though it creates an inclusive arena for discussion among local producers (who are 
all compelled to be members of the obligatory cooperatives), it also creates the risk of 
antagonising and excluding private firms from efforts to develop the sector (as long as 
they do not produce raw inputs but only process and sell final products to the market, 
local private firms are not members of the obligatory cooperatives). As was seen in the 
previous chapters, to some extent this seems to be happening in Kozani, where 
obligatoriness is defended by the saffron cooperative’s management based on the 
argument that “we can achieve better prices and avoid exploitation” (interview #55), but 
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is resented by private firms, which wish that “someone will be found who will break up 
the obligatory cooperative through a lawsuit” (interview #52). Once again, we observe 
that the same overarching institution, in this case a legal framework that permits the 
operation of obligatory cooperatives, generates very different outcomes depending on 
local conditions.  
Overall, it seems difficult to sustain that an institutionalisation of local monopsonies 
is generally positive for local economic development. On the other hand, it is also difficult 
to ignore that “some of the most successful cooperatives in Greece belong to the group 
of obligatory cooperatives” (Theodorakopoulou and Iliopoulos 2012: 34). Reflecting on 
the cases of Chios and Santorini, which are the two most successful areas with obligatory 
cooperatives, a key ingredient for success seems to be the enlistment of private firms as 
allies rather than competitors. This happened in Chios by providing a range of club goods 
to private firms, including ideas for innovative products, marketing for mastiha products, 
and strict controls to maintain the quality and credibility of raw mastiha. In Santorini, the 
obligatory wine cooperative made its peace with the private wineries by voluntarily 
giving up in practice its right to collect a particular share of the grape production of all 
local winemakers, as it simply did not enforce this rule (Venizelou 2015: 112/ S5). Based 
on these observations, a rule that could suit the Greek context would be to permit the 
creation of obligatory associations of local producers, which would be able to levy a 
compulsory membership fee on local actors, but not impose a local monopsony. Such a 
framework would permit the adoption of similar legislation as that obtained by the 
Chianti wine consortium in 2012 in Italy, which required “the entire sector marketing 
Chianti wine, including those who were not members of the Chianti consortium, (…) to 
pay a share of the cost of the marketing undertaken by the consortium” (Itçaina et al. 
2016:174). Though it would be neither possible nor appropriate (given the diversity of 
the member-states’ economies) for the EU to enable the creation of obligatory 
associations within the framework of the CAP, this seems like a proposal that would be 
worth considering at the national level by countries with fragmented rural economies, 
interested in fostering cooperation for upgrading. 
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5.4 Rural development policies and the emergence of cooperation in the 
alternative tourism sector 
5.4.1 EU rural development programmes  
In some ways, the EU’s rural development programmes, which date back to the 
adoption of the first Integrated Mediterranean Programme in 1983, also foster local-level 
cooperation and networking among a range of stakeholders. Indeed,   
“rather than simply giving national governments what were effectively blank 
cheques to support nationally determined initiatives, the post‐1989 use of [EU 
structural] funds required proposals to come forward on the basis of an agreed 
strategy between national governments and the eligible regions, and at the 
regional level the funds also required partnerships between the public and 
private sectors along with the voluntary sector where appropriate.” 
(Goldsmith 2003: 122) 
The participatory, bottom-up approach became the hallmark of the EU’s LEADER 
programme, which started to be implemented in 1991 in the framework of the EU’s 
renewed commitment to structural policies for rural development (Knudsen 2009: 285-
286), and emphasised the agency of local actors in the design and implementation of rural 
development policies (Mimi 2013: 21-22/ S11).  
There is some evidence from my fieldwork that EU structural and LEADER 
funding schemes did empower local communities to define their own plans for economic 
development, both through the conduct of the studies that were necessary to submit EU 
funding applications, and through the role played by the regional development companies 
that often undertook the task of managing the EU funds. Indeed, a number of important 
leading actors in my case study areas, including the CEO of the Chios mastiha 
cooperative’s subsidiary company and the former President of Kozani’s saffron 
cooperative Emmanouil Patsilias, had worked at the local development companies before 
taking on a leadership role in their local sectors. As Patsilias explains, having worked at 
the Kozani Development Company “helped me a lot, because I knew that some things 
can be done, and some things cannot be done. And for those that can be done, I knew 
what the steps were” (interview #53). 
On the other hand, the extent to which the EU’s rural development programmes 
encouraged local communities to define their own path towards economic development 
was limited by the fact that the participatory element of the policies was not always 
implemented rigorously (Mimi 2013: 26-28/ S11). Moreover, these policies never 
included a requirement to adopt a set of local rules to underpin the synergies among local 
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actors, as the concept of facilitative political regimes would stipulate. The Kozani press 
provided a good assessment of the impact of the LEADER programme in the area when 
it mentioned that the programme “gave a lease of life to mountainous, isolated areas” and 
“opportunities to some businessmen”, but  
“there is still a lot to be done. Above all, a comprehensive set of actions needs 
to be developed, so that whichever works [are done] don’t function in an 
isolated way. For instance, it’s not enough to do mountainous hotels, if there 
isn't a comprehensive plan for touristic development, education and 
information of the labour force, systematic promotion of the natural beauty 
etcetera.” (Kiriakatikos Chronos, 29/7/2001, 3215: 1/ N1) 
Indeed, during my fieldwork I encountered several examples of LEADER-funded 
projects that were oriented at best towards individual rather than community upgrading, 
and at worst had no developmental value at all. In the region of Florina, where Nymphaio 
belongs administratively, the LEADER+ programme (2000-2006) funded mostly 
individual businesses, such as hotels, bakeries, restaurants and a spa centre, and to a lesser 
extent team projects or projects with a public-good character such as tourism information 
centres (Tsalkou 2007: 33-36/ S14). In the neighbouring village of Nymphaio, 
Limnochori, one of the first things a visitor sees is a LEADER-funded abandoned 
building right in front of the village’s lake, which was supposed to function as a market, 
but was abandoned and has become an eye-sore that blocks the view from the village’s 
(also LEADER-funded) coffeeshop.  
To take an even more extreme case, in one of my case study areas, a long-standing 
member of an agricultural cooperative’s management board told me the story of how the 
cooperative had received 20 million drachmas from a LEADER programme to purchase 
packaging equipment that was not even used once: 
“-[Me:] So how did you get the money for the machines? 
-[Interviewee:] They told us, buy them and put them in storage. Use this 
supplier. LEADER itself searched for us and found us through the 
cooperative. They saw that this cooperative existed, they came in contact, and 
they told us, take the money before the programme closes, because in the 
future it may not exist. (…) In twenty years, we didn’t package a single kilo 
of [X] with those machines.” (anonymised interview) 
In other words, in the absence of rigorous monitoring mechanisms to ensure that 
LEADER funds were spent in a productive and team-oriented way to serve genuine 
locally defined needs, in many occasions the LEADER programme did not reach its 
developmental potential.  
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While LEADER performed the second function of facilitative political regimes 
(namely to encourage local communities to define their own vision and rules) only to a 
limited extent, in the presence of local leadership for upgrading, the funding programme 
was very effective in terms of subsidising the upfront costs of cooperative efforts (fourth 
function of facilitative political regimes). Indeed, “the [Nymphaio] commune utilised in 
a creative way the rich development programs of the European Union” (“Nymphaio: Fair-
tale with a name”/ D7). LEADER and structural funds were used to co-finance a series 
of major projects in the village, including the expansion of the facilities of the Arktouros 
brown bear sanctuary, the creation of the silversmithing museum, the construction of the 
communal hotel and communal horse stable, the creation of a nature park and an artificial 
lake, the signposting of hiking paths, and the restoration of the traditional cobbled paths 
(Kalfas 2007: 124-130/ S15; interviews #14, #16).  
Some EU-funded projects were also implemented in Ambelakia (e.g. see “Centre 
of Cultural Heritage of Ambelakia” leaflet/ D11), but according to local stakeholders,  
“surely there was a potential to do absorb much bigger funds, because there 
are important structures that could be restored, mansions which are registered 
as historic buildings, in other words theoretically it should have been an easy 
case given the importance of the work, to absorb these funds.” (interview #49) 
In the absence of local leadership to give impetus to the compilation of the required 
funding applications and to identify co-financing sources, the stakeholders of Ambelakia 
were not able to utilise EU rural development programmes to subsidise the upfront costs 
of collective efforts in the same way that their counterparts in Nymphaio did 
(Papadimitriou 2012: 83).  
5.4.2 The failure of a national-level, top-down rural development approach in Ambelakia 
Even though the EU’s rural development policies could be designed better as 
facilitative political regimes for local-level cooperation, the comparison of the 
development of the alternative tourism sector in Nymphaio and Ambelakia shows that by 
providing tools to local public- and private-sector actors to implement their vision, EU 
rural development programmes still had a higher chance of success than an alternative, 
purely top-down approach that was tried by the Greek national government in Ambelakia. 
In Ambelakia, the first attempt to promote touristic development “was led by the 
then General Secretariat for Equality, in 1980-1985” (interview #47). The idea was for 
the state to create a women’s agritourism cooperative in the village, subsidise the 
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conversion of some rooms in the members’ homes into guest rooms, improve the 
“technical infrastructure of the village (telephone, water, road etc.)”, and thereby not only 
develop “mild tourism” in Ambelakia, but also create a paradigm for “economic and 
social development” that could apply in “other agricultural areas” (Chrissanthi Laiou-
Antoniou, “First conference of Ambelakiot Studies” proceedings 1994: 80-82/ D12).  
Despite the undeniably positive intentions of the programme, the policymakers and 
local actors involved soon discovered that merely introducing a vision about development 
from above and providing funding were not sufficient for mobilising the local capacities 
and resources that were necessary to make the plan take off, as top-down policy cannot 
substitute the institutional work conducted by leading actors in areas that shift from a 
low- to a high-cooperation equilibrium. Indeed, the women’s cooperative “didn’t renew 
itself, as its members either died or became too old to engage in such activities” (interview 
#47). An observer of the project reflected: 
“Is the resident of Ambelakia appropriately prepared to accept to abandon his 
work as a farmer, animal-herder or small professional, and become a hotelier 
or a restaurant owner or to be employed in reception, accommodation and 
restaurant facilities of any category or kind, without a basic pre-existing 
professional education or training? The example of the Women’s Agritourist 
Cooperative which operates from 1985 to today, provides an answer that it not 
completely certain. (…) There is an issue of how to encourage and urge the 
local residents, and how to attract back those who have moved elsewhere, to 
undertake substantial initiatives for entrepreneurial touristic activities.” 
(Chrissanthi Laiou-Antoniou, “First conference of Ambelakiot Studies” 
proceedings 1994: 85/ D12) 
In contrast, in Nymphaio, where the vision of “mild tourism” was instead introduced by 
two local leading actors, an entrepreneur and the President of the local commune, the 
incentive structure and professional composition of the village residents was gradually 
transformed (see chapter 3, section 4.2). This comparison suggests that a policy which 
facilitates actors who have a stake in the local economy and society to catalyse 
development has higher chances of success than a purely top-down policy that doesn’t 
involve any local actor in policy design and any local entrepreneur in policy 
implementation.   
5.4.3 Architectural protection legislation as a mechanism of adopting a locally applicable 
set of rules 
While the EU’s rural development programmes did provide some incentives for 
local stakeholders to collectively define their own vision about local development, they 
 182 
didn’t include any scheme to encourage those stakeholders to collectively determine the 
rules of their cooperation in order to avoid opportunistic behaviour. Here, the national-
level institutional framework for the protection of traditional architectural settlements to 
an extent complemented the EU’s subsidy schemes by introducing a set of locally 
applicable architectural rules (see also Healy 1994: 604). In Nymphaio, those rules played 
an important role in terms of facilitating cooperation to showcase the village’s traditional 
character: “the settlement is protected, so one can’t build whatever one wants. The houses 
are protected by the state” (interview #15; similar remarks were made in interviews #13, 
#14, #16). While the content of the architectural rules determined by the protection 
legislation is not determined by locals as the second characteristic of facilitative political 
regimes requires, in the case of Nymphaio it was local actors who lobbied the state to 
implement the legislation in the village in 1978  (interviews #13, #16). 
On the other hand, in the same way that architectural protection regulations may 
usefully complement rural development programmes, the availability of rural 
development programmes, as well as of local-level leadership to utilise them, are 
themselves necessary complements of architectural protection regulations. As mentioned 
by Valaoras in connection to environmental rules, costly protective legislation is unlikely 
to be implemented effectively if it is not linked with a way for local actors to generate an 
income, something that in the case that Valaoras studied was accomplished with the 
attraction of a range of EU funds for the development of ecotourism (2000: 79-81). 
Indeed, Ambelakia is also an architecturally protected settlement, but in the absence of 
local-level leadership to attract resources for costly renovations in line with the 
architectural rules, the protective legislation is mainly considered a burden imposed on 
the locals by distant and uncaring state (interview #47).  
 
5.5 The Greek sectoral institutional framework as a further obstacle to 
cooperation in the mass tourism sector 
5.5.1 Low barriers to entry and the difficulty of defining local rules 
In the agri-food sector and to a lesser extent in the alternative tourism sector, an 
overarching sectoral institutional framework that is mostly provided by the EU provides 
tools and incentives for local actors to define their own plans and rules for cooperation, 
and to monitor their implementation. This is not the case in the mass tourism sector, which 
mostly falls outside the scope of the EU’s competence. Indeed, the sectoral governance 
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framework in the mass tourism sector is unsuited to facilitate cooperation for upgrading 
among small firms.  
Reaching a local-level agreement about upgrading quality, providing public goods 
to lengthen the season, and limiting overtourism are difficult to achieve firstly because 
the boundaries of the relevant group of economic actors are constantly shifting. This is so 
particularly in the context of the “liberalization of short-term rentals, which means that 
whoever owns a flat can rent it out to tourists” (interview #21). Indeed, according to the 
President of the Chalkidiki Hotel Association, in 2017 when our interview was 
conducted, the Greek state had not even put in place a functioning system through which 
home owners could declare income obtained from short-term rentals to the tax authorities, 
meaning that the short-term rental sector was not only exceptionally unregulated for 
European standards, but it was also mostly untaxed and thereby indirectly subsidised by 
the state (interview #24). Given the number of actors involved in the short-term rental 
sector and the complexity of identifying them in the absence of a sufficiently developed 
regulatory framework, it was nearly impossible to conduct deliberations including the full 
range of actors involved in the local-level accommodation sector. 
These difficulties are aggravated by the lack of a generalised spatial plan in Greece, 
which would determine land uses across the country, limiting residential and tourism 
zones to certain areas and thereby imposing some basic rules about how new entrants are 
allowed to build and operate in each area. In particular, throughout Greece and 
particularly in mass tourism destinations like Chalkidiki and Santorini, unregulated 
construction outside areas covered by the urban plan (ektos shediou) has been occurring 
since the onset of mass tourism in the 1960s and 1970s. In Chalkidiki, “arbitrary 
construction had become endemic” in the 1980s, “a situation that worsened after 1995, 
when credit facilities made possible the acquisition of a second house and multiple cars 
for every single family with an average income” (Gounaris 2015: 30/ S16). Around the 
same time, the local press in Santorini attributed “the degradation of the built area in some 
places, such as Perissa, mainly [to] the inexistence of regulatory and spatial planning” 
(Thiraïka Nea, May 1993, 419/ N4). Nearly three decades later, the local stakeholders 
who are concerned with the upgrading of the tourism sector and the limitation of 
overtourism in Santorini, are still asking the state to impose a temporary freeze on permits 
for construction outside the urban plan and to adopt a comprehensive spatial plan for the 
island (interview #78; intervention of Santorini’s Mayor Nikos Zorzos in Vatopoulos et 
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al. 2018). As an anonymous interviewee mentioned, “I didn’t want to say it so starkly 
earlier, but the situation here is a total mess – we don’t even have defined land uses”. 
In turn, the fact that the adoption of any decision to place limitations on new 
constructions in Santorini requires a ministerial initiative from the central government is 
indicative of a hyper-centralised overarching institutional framework, which doesn’t 
allow local actors to take important decisions about their area (Tsoulidou makes a similar 
point about the hyper-centralisation of responsibility about coastal management in 
Greece; 2013: 42/ S27). This lack of authority to create rules which suit local conditions 
and needs concerns not only local governments, but also local collective associations of 
economic actors. Konstantinidis, one of the pioneering entrepreneurs in Santorini’s 
tourism sector, explained this point very well: 
“– [Me:] In order to increase the representativeness of local collective 
associations, is the solution to make participation obligatory? 
– [Interviewee:] I don’t think that obligatory participation is the solution. But 
what is a solution is to create an institutional framework where participation 
becomes obligatory indirectly. 
“– [Me:] How?  
– [Interviewee:] For example, if we have an evaluation system [for local 
businesses], the evaluator should be the collective institution. In other words, 
if we transfer a series of responsibilities to the institution, we will oblige 
people to be part of the institution. But we don’t do this, because we want to 
maintain the clientelistic relation to the central government, to the MP, the 
system of favours.” (interview #75) 
As shown by the following quote from my interview with the President of a local and a 
regional rental rooms association in Chalkidiki, the lack of participation in decision-
making by local stakeholders generates a profound sense of powerlessness: 
“– [Me:] Are you concerned by problems related to the environment and 
spatial planning?  
– [Interviewee:] Everything concerns us, both the environmental and the 
spatial planning issues. But as regards spatial planning, the rental rooms don’t 
participate in the planning. The planning is done by the state and the 
municipality. (…) In all these issues, also in terms of garbage and waste 
thrown in the sea, the rental rooms are the last receiver.” (interview #21) 
In fact, the only type of locally applicable rules that stakeholders in Santorini and 
Chalkidiki have on some occasions been able to use in order to facilitate upgrading, stem 
from the architectural protection legislation referred to in section 4.3. Indeed, one of the 
reasons why the village of Pyrgos in Santorini developed as a comparatively upscale 
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destination was that construction in the old part of the village inside the Venetian castle 
was strictly regulated (interview #35): 
“[When] I was the Commune President of Pyrgos, (…) I asked the Ephorate 
of Byzantine Antiquities to characterise half of Pyrgos as a protected 
monument. The then curator (…) said that it was the first time a Local 
Governance Organisation requests the characterisation of a settlement as a 
protected monument, and that I will face reactions. The reactions were truly 
strong and widespread, but to a large extent Pyrgos retained its morphological 
characteristics, and has a more balanced development today.” (speech of 
Santorini’s Mayor Nikos Zorzos, Vatopoulos et al. 2018) 
Similarly, the development of Oia as the most luxurious and expensive destination in 
Santorini is linked to its protection as a traditional settlement since 1978, and the strict 
regulation through Presidential Decrees in 1993 and 1997 of what could be built within 
the limits of the settlement and how many licenses could be issued to different businesses. 
Indeed, the 1997 Decree was so detailed, that it specified that within the catering sector, 
only “16 restaurants, 2 snack bars, 6 traditional cafés, 6 cafés, 2 cafés that serve pizza, 1 
café-patisserie, 1 snack-bar/ ouzeri, 1 café-bar, and 3 refreshment stands” were allowed 
to operate within Oia (Polyvou and Ritzouli 2014: 120/ S24).  
Nevertheless, such protective regulations are too limited in geographical scope to 
suffice for facilitating generalised upgrading in mass tourism destinations. Moreover, the 
way in which local actors can gain access to such legislation is not governed by a 
transparent framework that could operate as a generally available facilitative institution 
for local actors across the country. As explained by an interviewee regarding the case of 
Oia, “at the time there was Papazoi [a PASOK minister] who had an interest in Oia 
herself, and together with some shipowners who constituted the Oia lobby, they managed 
to pass the legislation” (interview #35). 
Given the lack of institutionally available mechanisms to encourage the adoption 
of local rules in the mass tourism sector, it is sometimes suggested that local actors could 
overcome the obstacles to cooperation by implementing a “system of local quality and 
responsibility labelling” themselves (Spilanis 2017: 70/ S20). Nevertheless, according to 
an upscale hotel owner in Santorini who was closely involved in the Mayor’s efforts for 
upgrading during the 2010s, 
“I consider that a local quality label is not among the first priorities. Because 
someone can say I don’t want it, I don’t need it. Communicating a local quality 
label requires very much money to imprint it in the consumers’ 
consciousness.” (interview #75) 
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In other words, without a policy framework and support by the state, putting in place an 
effective local quality label system is quite a difficult task. 
5.5.2 Deficiencies in the implementation of the law  
Apart from the lack of a permissive framework that encourages local actors to 
define their own collective rules and plans, the severe deficiencies in the available 
institutional mechanisms for the implementation of the applicable legal framework in 
mass tourism destinations generates a perception of an uneven playing field and of 
inescapable anarchy: “You can’t put order in this place, everyone does whatever he likes. 
Solar boilers for example are disallowed in Santorini. But if someone goes and puts a 
solar boiler, who will take it off?” (interview #35) 
As many interviewees explained, this situation is partly a matter of the deficiencies 
in the structure and administrative capacity of the state. Regarding the rental rooms 
businesses, 
“The National Tourism Organisation was abolished as an institution that 
inspected the rental rooms businesses and said who is right and who is wrong 
when there was a disagreement. And the tourism police doesn’t work either, 
so there are no controls whatsoever in the sector, neither regarding the number 
of rental room businesses, nor for quality, nor for meeting the standards and 
prices that are associated with the ‘key’ system.” (interview #21) 
The gap left in the mass tourism sector by the lack of a tourism police and the insufficient 
capacity of the regular police force was mentioned as a problem by several actors: “the 
entire Municipality of Sithonia [in Chalkidiki] – 140km of coastline – is served by three 
police cars, of which two operate during the day and one during the night” (interview 
#18)  
Apart from administrative capacity, the hyper-centralisation of the Greek state and 
the failure to involve local stakeholders in processes of legal and policy implementation 
also contribute to the atmosphere of lawlessness. This is powerfully illustrated by the rise 
and decline of an innovative approach developed by Santorini’s municipal company 
Geothira towards monitoring the use of the island’s beaches. In recent years, Santorini’s 
municipality had delegated the task of managing the island’s beaches to the municipal 
company. The municipal company was thereby responsible for implementing the process 
of leasing out permits to individual businesses to put up umbrellas and sunbeds at a 
portion of some of the island’s beaches, and to monitor the correct implementation of the 
relevant contracts. Soon, the employees of the municipal company discovered that they 
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had to “find an objective and quick way to operate a control system, because we faced 
big issues regarding the observance of legality at the beaches” (interview #73). The 
municipal company didn’t have the authority to impose sanctions if they found that a 
lessee violated the terms of their contract: that was the responsibility of the state’s Real 
Estate Service. Nevertheless, the employees of the municipal company found an 
innovative solution for monitoring which seemed to work: 
“– [Interviewee:] We used remote sensing technology, i.e. satellite images, 
which let’s say constitute a fair, indisputable piece of evidence as to what is 
the situation of the beach on a particular date. (…) Essentially you don’t need 
to be there every day to see if some lessee is using 500 square metres or 200 
square metres at any moment in time. You don’t have to go there and take out 
the measuring tape. Which is anyway something painful because it generates 
reactions. So we implemented a framework for monitoring, with which people 
felt that nobody specifically is targeted, they felt that there are no double 
standards. And with some on-site inspections, we confirmed let’s say the 
situation. And then we informed the relevant authorities, we did what the law 
foresaw, we informed the Real Estate Service. (…) 
– [Me:] Did the fact that you were monitoring change something, even though 
you couldn’t impose fines?  
– [Interviewee:] I would say that gradually it became understood that there is 
supervision. It surely facilitated the work of the Real Estate Service, because 
people knew they couldn’t overdo it let’s say.” (interview #73) 
However, in 2017, without any consultation or explanation, the national government 
legislated that municipal companies were no longer allowed to manage beaches in 
Greece: this had to be done by the municipality itself. “When the responsibility left from 
here, from a small and purposeful organisation, and it went to the Municipality, all this 
finished. It doesn’t happen anymore. The Municipality, with its staffing shortages, does 
not have the capacity to do it” (interview #73). Thus, a distant, erratic and overly 
interventionist state pulled the rug from under the feet of a local effort to harness modern 
technology in order to generate compliance with the law.  
5.6 Concluding remarks 
I opened this chapter with a reflection about Santorini as “an island of contrasts”. 
Taking a step back from the micro-level analysis of leadership and local institutional 
change, I argued that one of the reasons for the different extent of cooperation observed 
in Santorini’s wine and tourism sectors has to do with the macro-level institutional 
frameworks that shape the relations among local actors in the two sectors. As explained 
by Vlahos and his co-authors,  
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“In the case of wine quality, the existence of a quality convention (PDO wine), 
initiated by the EU but embedded in the local society, implicates local actors 
towards an active protection of a collective good, i.e. fame. Unfortunately, no 
such convention for the landscape was perceived and much less adopted by 
local stakeholders.” (2016: 8) 
Utilising Ostrom’s concept of facilitative political regimes, I suggested that although 
overarching sectoral institutions cannot guarantee and substantively impose cooperation 
on local actors, they can play a crucial role in enabling cooperation by encouraging local 
stakeholders to define their own plans and rules, by facilitating the implementation of 
those rules, and by subsidising the upfront costs of cooperation. Taken together, the type 
of facilitative sectoral institutional framework outlined in this chapter and the local-level 
leadership analysed in the previous two chapters, are jointly sufficient for the emergence 
of cooperation of upgrading. 
Crucially, in sectors that fall under the scope of the EU’s competence, the EU’s 
sectoral governance frameworks can supplement and to some extent compensate for 
deficiencies in national overarching institutional frameworks. In putting forward this 
argument, I drew attention to an important but underappreciated characteristic of the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), namely that particularly in established and highly 
regulated agri-food sectors like wine, it acts as a facilitative political regime that makes 
it easier for local-level actors in fragmented economies to overcome the obstacles to 
cooperation. It does so by incentivising local stakeholders to define their own rules about 
production standards and cooperative procedures, by requiring member-states to set up 
functional, multi-level enforcement systems, and by making it difficult for new entrants 
to undermine the achievements of first movers. The EU’s regional policies and 
particularly the LEADER programme also have participatory aspirations and elements, 
but given their smaller emphasis on the development of local rules and administrative 
capacity, they have incentivised local economic actors to act synergistically to a lesser 
extent than the CAP. More broadly, studying how the EU’s day-to-day expenditure and 
regulatory policies reshape the governance of the relations among local economic actors 
is key for understanding the impact of European integration on the prospects for economic 
development of fragmented economies. 
On the other hand, I showed that the Greek national-level overarching institutional 
framework generally conforms to the expectation of an overly centralised, 
administratively weak state that hinders rather than facilitating local-level cooperative 
efforts. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to pinpoint cases of sustained, 
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broad-based cooperation among economic actors in the mass tourism sector, where the 
rules of the game are mostly determined at the national level. Nevertheless, some private 
or public-private actors like Piraeus Bank with its Contract Farming programme and the 
National Interprofessional Organization of Vine and Wine did facilitate local cooperation 
through national-level initiatives. Moreover, local-level actors in my high-cooperation 
case study areas were also able to use two national-level institutions to facilitate their 
collective efforts. The first is the institution of the obligatory cooperative, which, given 
the limitations and legal challenges associated with local monopsonies, could be 
transformed to an option to form local obligatory associations with a membership fee, as 
they exist in other European countries. The second institution is architectural protection 
legislation, which has enabled the adoption of locally applicable building laws in several 
areas with a traditional built environment, facilitating cooperation in the tourism sector. 
Such legislation could become more effective in terms of fostering economic 
development if local actors could gain access to it in a more transparent way, and in any 
case would have to be accompanied by a more general spatial planning policy framework 
if it were to enable successful cooperation in the mass tourism sector. The challenge is 
that even though facilitative national-level institutional frameworks are crucial for 
economic development in fragmented economies, they are difficult to provide 
endogenously in contexts where the actors who stand to benefit are too weakly organised 




HOW FAR DOES THE ARGUMENT TRAVEL? 
EVIDENCE FROM DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL 
SETTINGS 
6.1 Boundary-spanning entrepreneurs as catalysts for change: a 
generalisable path to cooperation in unfavourable settings? 
Based on empirical material from Greece, I have argued that a path to the 
emergence of cooperation among economic actors exists even in institutionally thin, low-
trust settings. This path relies on the institutional work conducted by a small group of 
boundary-spanning leading actors, typically entrepreneurs but sometimes also 
representatives of the local government, who operate in the framework of a facilitative 
political regime which may, at least in part, be externally provided.  
To what extent can this argument travel to different geographical settings? By using 
as analytical building blocks obstacles to cooperation and institutional features that are 
widely employed in the political economy literature, I have sought to put forward an 
argument that should, in principle, also be relevant in other similar settings. Delving 
deeper into the question of generalisability, in this chapter I draw on some of the few 
previously published case studies that also address the puzzle of the emergence of 
cooperation in unexpected places, in order to examine how and why cooperation among 
economic actors has emerged in unfavourable settings beyond Greece. In analysing the 
empirical material related to those cases, I expected to be able to identify the three 
elements that were key for the emergence of cooperation in Greece as crucial ingredients 
for the path to cooperation followed in each non-Greek case. Firstly, I expected that the 
process of local-level change towards a cooperative equilibrium would be linked in a 
clear and obvious way to the costly institutional work performed by a small group of 
easily identifiable actors. Secondly, I expected that those easily identifiable leading actors 
would be in some way outsiders to the area under discussion, whether they were 
translocally embedded locals or locally embedded non-locals. Thirdly, I expected that the 
institutional work of those leaders would exploit and rely in a substantively important 
way on facilitative overarching institutions, some of which would have been made 
available by actors other than the national government. Through an analysis of primary 
 191 
and secondary sources, I show that these conditions indeed held in the case studies 
examined in this chapter.   
More specifically, sections 2 and 3 of the chapter analyse in detail two case studies 
where cooperation emerged in recent decades in the alternative tourism and agri-food 
sectors of two areas in Southern Italy. On the one hand, the case study of Castel del 
Giudice, which draws on original empirical material collected through fieldwork and the 
published work of Belliggiano et al. (2017), highlights the central role played by a small 
number of hybrid or outsider local commune leaders and entrepreneurs in introducing 
cooperative institutions and innovative ideas about collective entrepreneurial strategies 
in a remote village in Alto Molise. On the other hand, the case study of the buffalo 
mozzarella sector in the region of Campania, which draws on the published work of 
Bianchi (2001) and Locke (2002), showcases the importance for catalysing upgrading of 
the institutional work conducted by a small group of highly skilled and well-connected 
leading actors operating in a favourable sectoral institutional framework. Moving beyond 
Southern Italy, based on the work of Hurrelman et al. (2006) and Hancké (2011), section 
4 considers certain instances of emergence of cooperation in the agri-food, tourism and 
manufacturing sectors in particular areas of Central and Eastern European countries. 
Albeit somewhat more tentatively, the section concludes that similar processes as those 
identified in Greece and Southern Italy can on some occasions also be observed in 
postsocialist settings.  
If the path to cooperation presented in this dissertation can shed light on relatively 
rare but substantively important cases where cooperation emerged in recent decades in 
Greece, Southern Italy and Central and Eastern Europe, then it is plausible to expect that 
its relevance also extends to other institutionally thin, low-trust settings with fragmented 
ownership structures. Nevertheless, ultimately, precisely how far the argument travels 
remains an open empirical question. 
6.2 Explaining the emergence of cooperation for the supply of innovative 
products in a remote area of Southern Italy: The case of Castel del 
Giudice 
Like Greece, Southern Italy is considered in the literature as a paradigmatic case of 
a setting that is unfavourable to the emergence of cooperation among economic actors. 
Regarding formal institutions, the deficiencies of the Italian judicial system and its 
consequent difficulty to act as an effective enforcer of the law are well-known (Farrell 
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2009: 116). Regarding informal institutions, the basic conclusion of Putnam’s work on 
the performance of Italian democratic institutions was that their success in northern Italy 
can be explained by the existence, since the early Middle Ages, of social capital and a 
civic culture which are lacking in the south. In Putnam’s view, while northern regions 
like Emilia-Romagna are home to “an unusual concentration of overlapping networks of 
social solidarity” and are “peopled by citizens with an unusually well developed public 
spirit”, the “traditional southern villages” are characterised by “hierarchy and 
exploitation, not by share-and-share-alike”. In Italy’s “uncivic” southern regions, 
“political participation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by 
collective purpose” (1993: 114-115). 
Castel del Giudice is a remote village of 346 inhabitants at 800 metres altitude in 
the southern Italian province of Molise, bordering Abruzzo (Belliggiano et al. 2017: 68). 
Like Nymphaio, Ambelakia and many other remote inland villages, in recent decades 
Castel del Giudice has faced strong pressures of depopulation and economic decline. 
Despite Putnam’s depiction of southern Italian villages as loci where “interlocking 
vicious cycles” cause “nearly everyone [to] feel powerless, exploited, and unhappy” 
(1993: 115), since the late 1990s, Castel del Giudice has witnessed a series of remarkable 
collaborative efforts to reverse its declining fortunes. Firstly, at the initiative of the 
communal government, a residential care home was created in the village based on a 
private-public partnership, which hosts patients from a wider geographical territory and 
not only resolves local needs, but also attracts considerable funding from the Italian 
healthcare system (interview #38). Secondly, since 2000, the village has seen the 
establishment of a company for the production of organic apples in the village residents’ 
formerly abandoned fields, which was initially individually owned, but was later taken 
over by a group of local entrepreneurs and residents and was also transformed into a 
public-private partnership. The company, whose name is Melise, sells fresh organic 
apples directly to the market and also supplies inputs to a big German company that 
produces food for infants. Finally, the old stables of the village, which used to be owned 
by a large number of local actors, were restored and turned into a so-called albergo 
diffuso, namely a hotel that is spread in several small buildings across a formerly 
abandoned part of town. The hotel is managed by a company which is owned by two local 
entrepreneurs, who hold 40% of the company shares each, and the local commune, which 
holds 20% of the shares (interview #43).  
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The process through which a range of actors came together to create those 
innovative goods and services has remarkable similarities to the way in which an 
alternative tourism sector was created in Nymphaio, with an active communal 
government led by hybrid actors playing a central role in the incremental creation of local 
cooperative institutions and the attraction of funding. At the same time, the emergence of 
the entrepreneurial idea for the cultivation of organic apples bears resemblance to the 
upgrading process of Santorini’s wine sector, which was spearheaded by an outsider 
entrepreneur acting in collaboration with an influential local institution (in Santorini’s 
case, the obligatory wine cooperative, and in the case of Castel del Giudice, the communal 
government). Structured according to the four analytical steps outlined in the preceding 
four chapters, the remainder of this section demonstrates how the analytical framework 
developed in the dissertation illuminates the emergence of cooperation in Castel del 
Giudice. 
6.2.1 Obstacles to cooperation 
The stakeholders in Castel del Giudice faced a combination of initial obstacles 
related to the conceptualisation of the costs and benefits of alternative strategies and 
subsequent public-good provision problems that are familiar from the Greek case studies. 
Moreover, like in Greece, the pervasive perception of clientelism and ulterior personal 
and political motives generated an atmosphere of mistrust that made it harder to overcome 
those obstacles. 
As in other remote, rural settings, the first hurdle to the supply of collective 
entrepreneurial strategies in Castel del Giudice was the obstacle of entrepreneurial 
discovery. Indeed, as explained by my interviewees, planting a commercial apple orchard 
spanning several individual fields was far from an obvious idea in the Castel del Giudice 
context: 
“Here we only ever had family-based subsistence agriculture. It was not full-
time agriculture, but a type of part-time agriculture that was useful for families 
to produce small quantities of products, namely wheat and corn, more than 
beans or potatoes, which were consumed by the family. (…) Breeding goats 
or cows would have been normal. But planting twenty hectares of apple 
orchard was a very strange request, an absolute novelty.” (interview #38) 
More broadly, the issue was that as in other remote areas, the residents of Castel del 
Giudice “did not have an entrepreneurial capacity in agriculture” (interview #39). 
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Even if the hurdle of entrepreneurial discovery was overcome, providing the type 
of goods and services under discussion in Castel del Giudice required considerable 
upfront investments that had a public-good character. As the following anecdote shows, 
these investments were not easy to finance: 
“The idea of creating a retirement home was actually initiated by the former 
Mayor, unfortunately he has died now. But he relied too heavily on public 
funds, and he waited, and waited, and waited, years, years, years, and no 
funding ever arrived.” (interview #38) 
The difficulty of locating funding sources concerned not only the retirement and care 
homes that were constructed in Castel del Giudice, but also the albergo diffuso at the old 
stables, as well as the apple cultivation itself, which required considerable 
experimentation with a range of apple varieties, and the construction of an expensive drip 
irrigation system (interview #41).   
Overcoming those obstacles is particularly difficult in the presence of a generalised 
suspicion that actors who seek change are motivated by hidden ulterior political or 
personal motives, a challenge that, as was seen in Chapter 2, is also pervasive in rural 
Greece. As explained by the President of the Local Action Group for Alto Molise with 
reference to the wider area around Castel del Giudice, “here we resist, we continuously 
contest what is being decided at all levels. Because we always think there is an ulterior 
motive,” whether it is “to favour a company, a person or an organisation” (interview #45). 
Indeed, when the organic apple company was first founded in Castel del Giudice, many 
of the owners of the fields that were to be cultivated initially reacted with “scepticism” 
(interview #38) and “diffidence” (interview #40) to the venture, even though the fields 
they were being asked to rent were abandoned and generated practically no economic 
value to them. Similarly, when Lino Gentile, the mayor who later presided over the 
realisation of the aforementioned economic initiatives in Castel del Giudice, took office 
in 1999, “the village was split in half” and there were “many denunciations and 
complaints” (interview #41). 
6.2.2 Leadership and the supply of local-level cooperative institutions  
As in the Greek case studies, understanding how and why those obstacles were 
overcome in Castel del Giudice requires putting at the centre of the analysis the 
institutional work undertaken by a small group of leading actors, in this case Lino Gentile, 
the Mayor of Castel del Giudice, Gilberto Brigato, an entrepreneur from the northern 
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Italian region of Veneto who started the cultivation of apples in the village, and also 
Ermanno d’Andrea and Enrico Ricci, two other entrepreneurs who invested in many of 
the projects in question. As summarised by one interviewee, stakeholders in Castel del 
Giudice were successful in providing a series of innovative goods and services in the agri-
food and tourism sectors  
“for two reasons, in my opinion. The first one is linked to the fact that there 
are persons in Castel del Giudice who believe in a collective approach to 
development, and the other is because they were good in terms of acquiring 
resources, both public and private.” (interview #44) 
More specifically, a small group of leading actors disseminated innovative 
entrepreneurial ideas, generated a conception of shared interest anchored around those 
ideas by demonstrating in an incremental way that cooperative strategies could work, and 
attracted funding from a range of sources to put the collective entrepreneurial strategies 
to practice. 
Starting with the conception and dissemination of novel entrepreneurial ideas, the 
crucial contribution when it comes to the production of organic apples was made by an 
entrepreneur from Veneto, Gilberto Brigato. Brigato “saw in Castel del Giudice what he 
considered to be an optimal place for apple cultivation” (interview #38): 
“He reasoned as an agricultural entrepreneur, and he came here with a 
revolutionary idea, very different from ours, namely to rent 10-20 hectares of 
land – which for us were very many, because you must consider that one 
family, i.e. an average firm, would have cultivated half a hectare. (…) And so 
he introduced, he brought to Castel del Giudice – and to the whole of Alto 
Molise – the absolute novelty of an agricultural firm dedicated to fruits, i.e. 
an orchard of considerable dimensions. So something very different than what 
the local habits were, what the uses of these lands were.” (interview #38) 
Moreover, Brigato “decided from the beginning to cultivate organically”, and his choices 
in terms of the set-up of the orchard and the apple varieties that he planted were all geared 
towards that end: “and I have to say that on this he was far-sighted, because he was right. 
It became evident from the first hectares that he cultivated, that this area could guarantee 
a product of the highest quality and lowest environmental impact” (interview #38).  
On the other hand, the idea to create a residential care home in Castel del Giudice 
as a public-private partnership is associated with Mayor Lino Gentile and his 
collaborators, who “tried to turn what had become negative aspects, problems, into 
opportunities”: 
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“There was an ability to look ahead, because in those years there was a strong 
need to find alternatives to hospitalisation. And that’s where the idea was born 
to propose, through a regional project, to create a care home, which today has 
become the alternative to the hospital, essentially. (…) And so paradoxically, 
in a village of old people, where old age became a problem, through these 
structures we managed to make a contribution and to resolve a problem.” 
(interview #38) 
Once those ideas were introduced, the local leading actors and particularly Mayor 
Lino Gentile worked to gradually establish the ideas’ credibility and demonstrate that 
adopting a cooperative strategy could pay. The first step was to convince local residents 
to rent their fields to the entrepreneur from Veneto, which the communal government 
achieved in the face of some reluctance and resistance by “taking it upon itself, by 
exposing itself and saying publicly look, we endorse this initiative because it’s in the 
interest of the community” (interview #40). Given that, as the Mayor pointed out to the 
citizens, they had little to lose by renting their abandoned plots – “at the worst [the 
entrepreneur from Veneto] will just pay rent for ten years” (interview #41) – the first form 
of cooperation that was requested from the citizens came at a small cost. Once the 
viability of apple cultivation had been demonstrated, when the entrepreneur from Veneto 
withdrew from the project a few years later for health reasons, a critical mass of initially 
twenty and eventually over sixty local residents were ready to engage in a more 
demanding form of cooperation by participating as investors in the foundation of a new 
apple-producing company, Melise, which took over and expanded Brigato’s orchard.  
The citizens’ investment in Melise was also facilitated by their earlier experience 
of participation as investors in the similarly designed public-private residential care home 
project (Belliggiano et al. 2017: 70), whose aim was perhaps easier to understand 
originally, as it stemmed directly from local needs. As Mayor Lino Gentile explains, 
“The first experience that we did was a residential care home, where we 
transformed a former school building in a healthcare facility. So we already 
had the experience, because the important thing in small communes is that 
you also have to provide evidence that you can get things done. When the 
people saw that we implemented the initiative, they were convinced that we 
are in a position to keep our commitments.” (interview #40) 
Similarly, when the local residents were asked whether they agreed for the project of the 
“diffuse hotel” at the village’s old stables to begin, they gave their consent  
“at a historically particular moment, because the Mayor asked them at the 
same time as the residential care home was being inaugurated; so they knew 
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that the reality of the proposed project was concrete, and thus they agreed.” 
(interview #42; see also Belliggiano et al. 2017: 74)  
Indeed, “time showed that there was no malice” in the communal government’s 
initiatives, despite several residents’ original suspicion to the contrary: “things were truly 
done for the community, those people didn’t have a personal interest” (interview #42).  
As a result, at the moment “if Lino decides something, or if the entrepreneur decides to 
follow a path, to do a certain type of investment, it’s easier for the community to converge 
around and follow that decision” compared to what happens in the rest of the region of 
Alto Molise (interview #45). In other words, as in Greece, trust in the communal 
government and belief in the credibility of innovative ways of doing things were created 
gradually: “This method, [of going] step by step, [building on] each objective attained, 
created a trust and a perception of reliability” that are crucial for the engagement in more 
demanding forms of cooperation today (interview #45). 
Finally, the communal government during the tenure of Lino Gentile played a 
crucial role in terms of attracting resources for the realisation of the aforementioned 
collective entrepreneurial strategies. The first source of funding was EU rural 
development funds, which co-financed the drip irrigation system and apple re-plantations 
conducted by Melise, as well as EU structural funds, which co-financed the construction 
of the Borgotufi “diffuse hotel” (interview #38). However, given the need to provide co-
financing, the communal government also worked with two entrepreneurs, Ermanno 
d’Andrea and Enrico Ricci,  
“who believed in the Borfotufi project, in the residential care home, in Melise, 
and who invested very considerable resources in those projects. (…) When 
you want, you find people like Ermanno d’Andrea, Ricci, who understand that 
your project is good and that there is a future outlook in what you propose. 
They trust you, and in a way you essentially overcome the funding problem.” 
(interview #38).  
Additional resources were provided by smaller local investors in the residential care home 
and Melise projects, who invested sums in the region of €1000-5000 each. Finally, the 
communal government took out a loan and sold some of its property in order to cover the 
cost of creating the public infrastructure that was necessary for the realisation of the 
Borgotufi hotel project (interview #40). 
As aptly summarised by the General Manager of Melise, “when a group of persons 
initiates action because they have an idea and an ideal, then others also get involved, 
because they see that this ideal brings a return, it brings about an improvement. Then, 
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slowly slowly things expand: but it’s necessary to have a nucleus, a strong foundation of 
persons who have the idea to build” (interview #39). 
6.2.3 Characteristics and availability of successful leading actors 
But what are the characteristics of such “persons who have the idea to build”, and 
where are they most likely to be found?  
Like in Santorini, an outsider entrepreneur, who operated in “Trentino and Veneto” 
(interview #38), played a key role in the dissemination and early realisation of the idea to 
cultivate organic apples in Castel del Giudice. The General Manager of Melise explains 
the importance of the involvement of translocally embedded actors in Castel del Giudice 
precisely by referring to their ability to recombine elements from diverse environments: 
“many of the professional people who rotate around Melise are professional 
figures who live and work in other places, they don’t live here. Travelling, 
seeing realities that are much bigger and more important than this one, they 
have the capacity to compare [those realities to ours], to redraw them, to see 
them anew as a function of what are our possibilities and specificities. To give 
an example, if they find themselves observing realities where there is a strong 
industrialisation, if this is not well-suited for our area, they don’t copy it. But 
when they saw firms that were engaged in doing agri-tourism at the diffuse 
level, they brought back this idea here.” (interview #39) 
Moreover, like in Nymphaio, since 1999 the communal government has also been 
led by an administration of hybrid actors who originate from the village but studied and 
worked elsewhere before taking part in local government. The hybrid identity and 
educational and professional experience of the heads of the local government helped them 
not only in terms of bringing novel ideas such as the notion of the public-private 
partnership into Castel del Giudice (Belliggiano et al. 2017: 71), but also in terms of 
importing the know-how that would enable them to put those ideas into practice: 
“I, for example, and the Mayor, we can’t live here because we do a different 
job, in different places. But in a way we brought to the administration what 
was our professional experience, I as an agronomist, the Mayor as an 
accountant, the other as an entrepreneur. And so we made a strong 
contribution to bringing about change, in other words to creating an 
administration that was open to the citizen, open to innovation, capable above 
all to acquire EU resources, i.e. to develop projects.” (interview #38) 
Furthermore, the fact that actors like Lino Gentile and Giuseppe Cavaliere had a career 
outside Castel del Giudice and outside politics, distinguished them from the traditional 
“political class that was very linked to the old concept of managing public affairs, so to 
politics and favours”, and made it easier for them to gain their fellow citizens’ trust: “we 
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worked without ulterior aims, because, I repeat, I live from my work, the Mayor lives 
from his work, nobody lives from politics, nobody needed politics” (interview #38). 
Such observations led Belliggiano and his co-authors to conclude that the case of 
Castel del Giudice “has many characteristics that are associated with the ‘neo-
endogenous’ paradigm of rural development”, which highlights the importance of 
combining the valorisation of local resources with exogenous stimuli, “rather than the 
‘endogenous’ paradigm, with which it is often instead associated” (2017: 67). Indeed, the 
endogenous model, which emphasises the valorisation of local resources by local actors, 
“showed itself to be seldom effective in many rural areas, especially in the 
most vulnerable ones, to which it was primarily addressed. Such areas, in fact, 
having very weak economic and demographic foundations, cannot evade 
support by ‘exogenous’ interventions to start efficient processes of local 
development.” (Belliggiano et al. 2017: 76) 
This conclusion echoes the argument put forward in this dissertation that the involvement 
of a few outsider or hybrid actors is a necessary condition for collective entrepreneurial 
strategies to be supplied in unfavourable settings. 
The availability of hybrid actors in Castel del Giudice is linked to the emigration 
and return migration patterns of the local population. Particularly after the Second World 
War, when the village was completely destroyed, many residents emigrated in northern 
Italy or abroad. Some of them, or their children and grandchildren, later returned to the 
area, bringing along new habits and ideas. Among the return migrants from northern Italy 
was Remo Gentile, one of the founding members of Melise, and his son Simone Gentile, 
who is the current General Manager of the company. In turn, the vibrant projects and 
economic activities currently taking place in Castel del Giudice are reinforcing the 
village’s translocal links by attracting further hybrid and outsider actors, such as a couple 
from Turin and Sicily who chose to move to Castel del Giudice a few years ago, seeking 
a higher quality of life. The man from Turin is currently employed in Melise, while the 
woman from Sicily is the President of a local cooperative, and also manages a programme 
of refugee integration that Castel del Giudice participates in (interview #42).  
As in the remote Greek village of Nymphaio, an at least partly other-regarding 
desire to see a place prosper was a key element in the motivation of several leading actors 
involved in Castel del Giudice: “we were people who loved their area and their village, 
despite not living here” (interview #38). Ermanno d’Andrea’s investment in all the 
projects spearheaded by the Mayor of Castel del Giudice also contained an element of 
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other-regarding attachment to his region of origin, as by profession he was a successful 
entrepreneur in the sector of precision mechanics in Milan (interview #40). On the other 
hand, some of the entrepreneurs involved in Castel del Giudice were also motivated by 
conceptions of self-interest that encapsulated the interests of local stakeholders. As was 
seen already, the entrepreneur from Veneto who started cultivated apples in Castel del 
Giudice did so because he saw an entrepreneurial opportunity in the area. Similarly, 
Enricco Ricci, the co-owner (together with Ermanno d’Andrea) of the Borgotufi diffuse 
hotel, explains that when the communal government started looking for private-sector 
partners to get involved in the project, his family firm was well-placed to invest, as it 
specialised in construction and restoration: 
“And so we decided to do it because we are from here, but also as a gamble, 
in order to see if also in these areas we could think of doing this thing in a 
similar way as in more developed areas such as Tuscany and Umbria. That’s 
how we thought about the initiative.” (interview #43) 
In short, as in the Greek case studies, the profile of the leading actors in Castel del 
Giudice was that of highly skilled hybrid or outsider actors, who were motivated by an 
other-regarding desire to see the village develop, a broad conception of self-interest, or a 
combination of the two. 
6.2.4 Sectoral institutional frameworks and the emergence of cooperation  
Finally, EU rural development and regional funding programmes played an 
important facilitative role in the implementation of collective entrepreneurial strategies 
in Castel del Giudice by reducing the upfront costs of cooperation (interview #39). 
Indeed, as mentioned by an interviewee, Castel del Giudice was well placed to benefit 
from those funding programmes, as the initiatives that were undertaken in the village 
constitute precisely the type of activity that the EU typically seeks to promote: “being in 
a mountain zone and having an organic firm, we usually got many points [in competitive 
calls], so we didn’t have any problems getting financed” (interview #38). 
Beyond the reduction of upfront costs, there are some indications that the EU’s 
LEADER programmes are currently encouraging a diffusion of the Castel del Giudice 
model in the region of Alto Molise. Indeed, in the last four years, eighteen communes 
including Castel del Giudice have formed a Local Action Group (LAG), the public-
private institution that is required for being able to apply for LEADER funding. As 
explained by my interviewees, Local Action Groups must cover an area with at least 
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15,000 inhabitants, which is why eighteen communes decided to get together, and must 
include private-sector participation at a rate of at least 51 percent. The Local Action 
Group “Alto Molise” includes 120-130 members, most of which are firms (interview 
#44). Deliberations within the framework of the Local Action Group have the potential 
to encourage local stakeholders to think strategically at a wider scale and to diffuse the 
ideas and cooperative practices developed in Castel del Giudice, particularly as “in the 
context of the LAG partnership, Castel del Giudice is recognised as a virtuous example” 
(Belliggiano et al. 2017: 67). Nevertheless, it is too soon to tell whether the institution 
will in the end achieve this aim.  
Overall, the similarities in the factors underpinning the supply of collective 
entrepreneurial activities in Castel del Giudice in Southern Italy and Nymphaio in Greece 
are remarkable. In terms of outcomes, it is noteworthy that the degree of synergy between 
the agri-food and tourism sectors is far greater in Castel del Giudice than in Nymphaio, 
while in Alto Molise one also does not observe the type of social fragmentation that exists 
between Nymphaio and the surrounding villages, making it easier to imagine that the 
experience of Castel del Giudice could be scalable. On the other hand, the stakeholders 
in Nymphaio invested considerably more than their counterparts in Castel del Giudice in 
creating not only beautiful hotels, but also touristic attractions that could generate 
alternative tourism flow. As a result, Nymphaio was able to successfully address a 
challenge that the stakeholders in Castel del Giudice are currently facing, namely the fact 
that the region “is little known from the touristic point of view” (interview #43). 
6.3 Explaining the emergence of cooperation for upgrading in an 
established agri-food sector in Southern Italy: The case of buffalo 
mozzarella in Campania 
Buffalo mozzarrella is a product with high profit margins which has created “an 
impressive amount of wealth” in the region of Campania in recent decades (Bianchi 2001: 
129). Although the production of buffalo mozzarella has a long history in the region, the 
current high added value of the product is the result of a process of upgrading that has 
taken place in the sector since the 1980s, which has involved the adoption of a set of rules 
to guarantee quality, the implementation of a number of technical innovations, and the 
conduct of collective marketing efforts. Central to this process have been the formation 
and activities of the Consortium of the Producers of the Mozzarella di Bufala Campana, 
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which is based in the town of Caserta just north of Naples. In the words of Tito Bianchi, 
who has studied the case, 
“taken by itself, this is the kind of collective institution to protect and promote 
the producers’ interests that people from the Mezzogiorno usually envy in their 
compatriots from the North, and that is considered to be unfeasible in the 
South because of an overly individualistic mentality. The fact that such a 
voluntary organization exists, that it associates about 100 fee-paying firms 
[among a total of 200-250 firms in the sector], and works reasonably well, 
represents a surprise in small-scale manufacturing in the Mezzogiorno.” 
(Bianchi 2001: 134) 
Bianchi (2001) and Locke’s (2002) studies of the buffalo mozzarella sector reveal 
a remarkable degree of similarity regarding the factors that enabled upgrading in 
Campania and the path to cooperation followed in Santorini’s wine sector and Chios’s 
mastiha sector. In terms of process, the provision of incentives and the enforcement of 
sanctions played a key role in catalysing quality improvement. In terms of the factors that 
enabled change, a small group of highly skilled and well-connected actors spearheaded 
the formation of the consortium and the onset of the aforementioned cooperative 
activities. In turn, as both Bianchi and Locke clearly point out, the institutional work of 
those actors was made easier by the inclusion of the buffalo mozzarella in the Protected 
Designation of Origin system, which acted as a facilitative sectoral institutional 
framework. 
6.3.1 Obstacles to cooperation 
Quality improvement in the buffalo mozzarella sector faced two types of obstacles. 
Firstly, producers had a strong incentive to adulterate buffalo milk with cow milk, a 
practice which reduces production costs by five to ten percent but tarnishes the local 
product’s reputation and thus eventually decreases its price. Indeed, between 1987 and 
1993, a consumer group found that between 33 and 60 percent of local buffalo mozzarella 
samples that they analysed were adulterated (Locke 2002: 122). In fact, 
“the scarcity of buffalo milk and the economic incentives to cheat are still in 
place, and this creates a typical textbook example of a free-rider problem. 
Firms can pay to join the consortium and use its name and symbol, and then 
adulterate the product to increase their revenues.” (Bianchi 2001: 134) 
Secondly, quality upgrading in the buffalo mozzarella sector relied on technical 
improvements such as the mechanization of milking and the de-seasonalisation of buffalo 
births, which led to an improvement in productivity and resolved the problem of the 
 203 
seasonal character of milk production (Bianchi 2001: 131). Indeed, the technology used 
in the sector improved to such an extent in recent decades that “in no other country of the 
world does buffalo raising take the modern form that it has taken in Southern Italy” 
(Bianchi 2001: 138). Although this is not explicitly recognised by the scholars of the case 
study, coming up with such technological innovations required overcoming both an 
obstacle of entrepreneurial discovery, as the “mechanical milking of buffaloes was 
unheard of before 1970”, and a free-rider problem, as the de-seasonalisation of births was 
a costly process that required “more than 20 years of experimentation and development” 
(Bianchi 2001: 131).  
6.3.2 Leadership and the supply of local-level cooperative institutions  
As Bianchi observes echoing this dissertation’s argument about the role of 
leadership in the emergence of cooperation against the odds, 
“at the roots of both the technological modernization of the farming sector, 
and of the creation of the consortium, there has been the activity of a very 
restricted number of knowledgeable people [who] used their resources and 
connections to promote the sector’ s development. It is hard to look for 
explanations for how this process came about without talking about three 
specific individuals and about the relations between them.” (Bianchi 2001: 
137) 
Although Locke is reluctant to explicitly put forward an argument about the importance 
of leadership, he also remarks that in both of his case studies where cooperation emerged 
in an unfavourable context, namely the buffalo mozzarella sector in Campania and the 
mango sector in a region of north-eastern Brazil, “the initiative was taken by a small 
group of large producers” (2002: 129). 
In the buffalo mozzarella sector, those leading actors undertook two types of 
institutional work that were crucial for catalysing cooperation. Firstly, “a small number 
of large dairy firms” (Bianchi 2001: 134) formed the buffalo mozzarella consortium in 
1982. Among the central activities of the consortium was to set up a monitoring system 
of random inspections on individual producers, and to impose graduated sanctions on 
producers found mixing buffalo and cow milk: a 12 million lira fine at the first offense, 
twice that sum at the second offence, and expulsion from the consortium at the third 
offence (Locke 2002: 122). As a result, according to data published by the consortium, 
the share of adulterated samples in the total number of samples analysed has steadily 
declined over time: “Firms have begun to understand – maybe with the help of well- 
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designed deterrent measures – that their future well-being depends on the sacrifice of 
individual, short-term interests” (Bianchi 2001: 136).  
Secondly, the producers who spearheaded the creation of the consortium also 
undertook a disproportionate share of the cost and effort to introduce modern production 
techniques in the sector. According to Bianchi, “the owner of the most modern buffalo 
farm of the area”, who was one of the pioneers of the sector’s upgrading, 
“liked to experiment with new techniques and to show them proudly to the 
many people he invited to his ranch. He operated in close liaison with 
researchers from the university and from private institutions. For instance, he 
trained in his farm the current head of the veterinarian extension service of the 
University of Naples – a team that today provides technical advice to the great 
majority of the buffalo ranches and has contributed greatly to developing and 
diffusing the new ranching techniques described earlier.” (Bianchi 2001: 137) 
Cumulatively, this producer, together with a second leading actor, “did on their ranches 
most of the experimenting that was necessary for the technological improvements 
introduced later by all the other ranchers, even the smallest” (Bianchi 2001: 137). A third 
leading actor, who was a university professor, also made an important contribution by 
“offering free technical assistance to the largest enterprises, in exchange for the 
possibility of conducting experiments on their farms” –  a practice that was later taken up 
by the “very effective Extension Service of the University of Naples” (Bianchi 2001: 
138). The technical improvements that were thereby introduced constituted a club good 
that benefited most producers in the local buffalo mozzarella sector. Moreover, like in the 
Chios mastiha sector, those technical improvements enabled producers to increase 
production without compromising on quality, thereby functioning as a positive incentive 
for producers to abide by the stricter production standards (Locke 2002: 122). 
6.3.3 Characteristics and availability of successful leading actors 
While Bianchi and Locke’s case studies provide no information regarding whether 
the aforementioned leading actors were insiders, hybrid actors or outsiders, Bianchi’s 
study in particular makes it clear that they were highly skilled and well connected, and 
that these attributes were relevant for their ability to catalyse change in the sector.  
Indeed, in the concluding discussion of his article, Bianchi suggests that one of the 
salient differences between Campania’s tomato processing sector, which is characterised 
by low cooperation among economic actors, and Campania’s buffalo mozzarella sector, 
where demanding forms of cooperation have been achieved, is that  
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“in the tomato-processing sector all the producers see each other peers, 
although some are much smaller in scale than others, while in the mozzarella 
sector the few larger-scale farmers that are responsible for the creation of the 
producers’ consortium are seen by the others as higher in status, better 
informed and more powerful.” (140) 
Thus, Bianchi argues that “somewhat paradoxically, the higher social status of the large-
scale buffalo ranchers created room for trust instead of destroying it” (140).  
Without contesting that social status might, under some circumstances, increase the 
acceptability of novel norms and ways of doing things introduced by a small group of 
leading actors (though it could also conceivably have the opposite effect), I would 
nevertheless argue that in my reading of the case, the crucial difference that the social 
status of the leading actors made was that it correlated with the possession of know-how 
and linking social capital, facilitating the conduct of the institutional work outlined 
previously. On the one hand, the close professional and social ties of the leading actors 
with local universities enabled them to become embedded in international networks of 
expertise in buffalo raising, and they “contributed greatly to enhancing technical 
innovation and product quality” in the sector (Bianchi 2001: 138). On the other hand, the 
connections of the leading actors with the national-level authorities played an important 
role in terms of helping them benefit from facilitative national and EU-level legislation. 
Indeed, the second of the three leading actors identified by Bianchi was a large-scale local 
buffalo farmer who later became Minister of Agriculture, and it was he, as Minister, who 
signed off the buffalo mozzarella’s inclusion in the Italian Protected Designation of 
Origin system in 1993 (Bianchi 2001: 137). 
Finally, although the case studies do not directly address the question of the leading 
actors’ motivation, Locke’s observation that the actors who catalysed cooperation were 
“exactly those who had the most to lose if the situation [of deteriorating quality] wasn’t 
corrected” (2002: 129), suggests that it is plausible to hypothesise that some form of broad 
conception of entrepreneurial self-interest may have played a role in motivating their 
initiatives. 
6.3.4 Sectoral institutional frameworks and the emergence of cooperation  
Like in the Greek wine sector, being able to benefit from facilitative sectoral 
institutions played a crucial role in empowering the local leading actors in Campania’s 
buffalo mozzarella sector to catalyse cooperation for upgrading.  
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Firstly, in 1986, the buffalo mozzarella consortium manged to obtain national-level 
legislation that obliged buffalo mozzarella producers to wrap every piece of mozzarella 
individually, indicating the name of the producer on the package. This legislation enabled 
traceability and greatly facilitated the implementation of the consortium’s monitoring 
system (Bianchi 2001: 134).  
Secondly, in 1993, the Italian state recognised the buffalo mozzarella as a Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) product, a recognition that was also afforded by the EU in 
1996. Acquiring PDO status greatly facilitated cooperation in the buffalo mozzarella 
sector, as it provided a strong incentive for producers to abide by the strict quality 
standards drawn up by the consortium and stipulated by the PDO specification: only 
producers who abided by those quality standards would be able to sell their product as 
“buffalo mozzarella from Campania”. Moreover, the PDO regulation conferred to the 
Consortium “the responsibility to enforce the correct use of the [PDO], perform the 
necessary controls, and sue those who used it illegally”, thereby providing it with an 
important source of authority to engage in monitoring and to implement sanctions 
(Bianchi 2001: 134). As a result, the PDO logo greatly enhanced the visibility and 
perceived importance of the consortium, leading to an increase of its members from 15 
to 95 within two years of the PDO recognition (Bianchi 2001: 134). Finally, the PDO 
regulation protected the local buffalo mozzarella production from low-quality imitation 
by producers in other areas, thereby providing assurance that if the local stakeholders 
engaged in cooperation for quality improvement and marketing, they would be able to 
reap the rewards, rather than having their collective reputation tarnished by opportunistic 
new entrants from outside (Locke 2002: 121).  
Locke is correct to point out that the fact that the PDO label can be acquired by any 
local producer who follows the relevant quality specifications rather than being the 
privilege of a small group, ensures that the benefits conferred on the sector by the PDO 
logo do not only help “a select few”, but foster inclusive economic development (2002: 
129). Locke attributes the inclusive nature of this governance framework to an 
“exchange” between the Italian government and the consortium, whereby the government 
provided a quasi-public good to the consortium, namely the PDO logo, and in return the 
consortium kept its doors open to new members (2002: 129). However, as seen in Chapter 
5, the principle that the PDO logo can be acquired by any local producer who follows the 
rules is a core feature of the PDO system more generally, and one of the reasons why EU-
 207 
style protected designations of origin function as a facilitative political regime for 
cooperation in the agri-food sector.  
On the other hand, to the extent that the consortium was able to obtain the special 
national-level legislation mentioned previously due to the political acquaintances of some 
of its leading members, the Italian national institutional framework bears some 
resemblance to the Greek regulatory framework, which, as was seen in the previous 
chapter, has also on occasion been activated through political acquaintances. While the 
national legislation in question facilitated broad-based local-level cooperation in both 
instances, a more transparent and accessible way to obtain such legislation could extend 
its benefits to a wider range of actors across the country.  
Overall, based on the detailed examination of two case studies on the emergence of 
cooperation among economic actors in Molise and Campania, it is possible to conclude 
that when cooperation for upgrading arises in the Southern Italian agri-food and tourism 
sectors, it tends to do so in a similar way as in Greece, through a combination of specific 
types of institutional work conducted by a small group of boundary-spanning actors and 
the availability of a facilitative sectoral institutional framework. Beyond the agri-food 
and tourism sectors, Burroni and Trigilia also conclude that in cases where “dynamism 
and local development” are observed in the Southern Italian manufacturing sector, a 
“leader firm” tends to play “an important role in local governance”, which is a notable 
difference from the more horizontal “networks of firms” observed in the Third Italy 
(2001: 70, 74). Nevertheless, I would add as a caveat to this argument that I would not 
expect local leading actors to be able to catalyse cooperation for upgrading in a similar 
way in local sectors of direct interest to the Mafia. This is because the combination of the 
“world of deep distrust” actively promoted and sustained by the Mafia as a “robust pillar 
of [its] business”, and the Mafia’s “ability to use violence, whether direct or in the form 
of a credible threat” to prevent change that challenges its interests (Gambetta 1988: 168), 
constitute obstacles that are far more difficult to overcome than the obstacles posed by 
the non-violent form of clientelism that permeates much of Southern Italy and Greece. 
6.4 Exploring paths to the emergence of cooperation in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is also generally portrayed in the literature as 
having “low or even missing social capital” (Hurrelmann et al. 2006: 226), albeit for 
different reasons than Greece and Southern Italy. On the one hand, it has been argued that 
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within the context of a planned economy, “voluntary cooperative engagement” was 
“eroded and destroyed”, while “individuals associated their political leaders with 
corruption and self-interested behaviour” (Hurrelmann et al. 2006: 226). On the other 
hand, the transition process is said to have systematically destroyed “most economic as 
well as non-economic institutions that existed before 1989. Countries in CEE thus entered 
the post-socialist era with very ‘thin’ institutions and without a relevant recent history to 
build on” (Hancké 2011: 8). 
This section examines two studies on the emergence of cooperation in different 
sectors of different Central and Eastern European countries. Although the studies do not 
provide sufficient detail to examine the extent to which every aspect of the argument 
developed in the dissertation can also be observed in cases in a CEE context, they point 
to the direction that the key conclusions from Greece and Southern Italy can also travel 
in some Central and Eastern European areas and sectors. On the other hand, how far the 
relevance of those arguments would extend in different Central and Eastern European 
geographical and sectoral settings than those examined here, and what role the different 
transition experiences and institutional set-ups play in facilitating or hindering 
cooperation in different Central and Eastern European countries, are interesting questions 
that lie beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
6.4.1 Three case studies of rural cooperation projects in Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia 
Hurrelmann, Murray and Beckmann examined the factors underpinning success 
and failure in “various rural development initiatives that require collective action” in 
Central and Eastern European countries (2006: 227). Their paper draws on three case 
studies. Starting with the most successful case of cooperation, they firstly studied two 
agricultural cooperatives in a town of Eastern Hungary, which “can both be said to have 
developed successfully since the beginning of transition” (Ibid.: 230). Secondly, they 
studied a business association in the rural tourism sector in central Latvia, where a limited 
degree of cooperation can be observed, as members “perceive little gains from 
cooperation but also give only a small input” (Ibid.: 234). Thirdly, the case where the 
degree of cooperation was lowest concerns the management of a national park in north-
eastern Slovakia, which is plagued by the “splitting of competences among various (often 
antagonistic) organisations at different levels” and “weak public participation”, as “the 
park administration is regarded by most of the other actors in the region with a degree of 
scepticism” (Ibid.: 230, 236). 
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According to Hurrelmann and her co-authors, “two main obstacles for collective 
action in rural CEECs [Central and Eastern European Countries] are low bridging social 
capital and unclear gains from cooperation” (2006: 219), or, in the terminology used in 
Chapter 2, social fragmentation and the hurdle of entrepreneurial discovery. On the one 
hand, economic actors have “little trust in” and engage in little “communication with 
authorities and sometimes other actor groups”. On the other hand, the local actors tend to 
lack a clear picture of the payoffs associated with following a cooperative strategy (Ibid.: 
220). In the Slovakian case study, “communication, trust and exchange of information” 
are “very limited” between the relevant stakeholders, namely the fifteen municipalities 
and two regional governments that are responsible for the management of the national 
park, and the farmers and forest owners of the region. At the same time, “most 
municipalities, farmers and tourism organisations” regard the national park “as an 
obstacle to economic development”, and mostly “do not see rural tourism or agro-tourism 
as a solution to the problems of the region” (Ibid.: 236-237).  
Echoing the dissertation’s argument about leadership, according to the authors of 
the study, in such situations 
“well-connected local leaders who provide credible information and establish 
links among different actor groups and with authorities are of crucial 
importance in achieving collective action. This finding is interesting because 
most of the literature on social capital does not acknowledge the need for a 
‘mediating agency’ but expects cooperation to happen ‘automatically’ where 
enough social capital is present.” (Hurrelmann et al. 2006: 220) 
In particular, in the case of the two successful Hungarian agricultural cooperatives, 
“leaders occupy a central role in the provision of information” (Ibid.: 232). On the one 
hand, at the initial stages of cooperation, those leaders played a crucial role in terms of 
organising “many general meetings” and “persuad[ing] individual farmers of the benefits 
of collective action”, while on the other hand, still today, “leaders are responsible for the 
external contact of the cooperatives and members are found to know relatively little about 
markets” (Ibid.: 231-232).  
In turn, the Latvian rural tourism association “was founded on the initiative of one 
individual, a farmer who himself runs a multifunctional farm business including rural 
tourism”. However, one of the reasons for the association’s limited success is that no 
leading actor currently seems to be available to provide a long-term strategic vision for 
the association, acquire funding, and introduce cooperative norms to encourage higher 
degrees of contribution by the members. Indeed, the funding for the salary of the 
 210 
association’s coordinator, who “clearly plays the main role in keeping up the cooperation” 
in the association, has run out, and “there seems to be the danger that, over time and 
without external support, the coordinator may give up and the initiative will die” (Ibid.: 
233-235).  
Similarly, in the case of the Slovakian national park, “there is also a lack of 
leadership, as no local or regional leader could be identified who would manage to initiate 
cooperation among the different groups and identify or communicate common aims”. 
Although the park administration has taken some initiatives to promote ecotourism, its 
failure to build bridges and trust-based relations with the municipalities and the relevant 
economic stakeholders meant that those initiatives did not succeed in overcoming the 
obstacles of social fragmentation and entrepreneurial discovery that hinder cooperation 
in the area. In terms of the argument put forward in Chapter 3, leading actors will only 
succeed to trigger cooperation if they perform all three types of necessary institutional 
work.  
While Hurrelmann et al. do not provide much information about the characteristics 
of the “local leaders” that they consider to be “of crucial importance as a mediating 
agency to provide the ‘gear’ necessary for collective action”, the portrayal of those leaders 
as “motivated, well-educated and well-connected” actors (2006: 239) is very much in line 
with the argument put forward in Chapter 4. 
Finally, in terms of policies, the prospects for cooperation in the Slovakian case 
seem to be further aggravated by the fact the national park “itself is not a product of 
collective action but is regarded as imposed on the actors by the authorities” (Hurrelmann 
et al. 2006: 239). To use the terminology of Chapter 5, the institution of the national park 
lacks a crucial characteristic of facilitative political regimes, namely the involvement of 
local stakeholders in the process of drawing up cooperation plans and rules. In contrast, 
one of the successful Hungarian agricultural cooperatives reached its highest point of 
cooperation after it was re-established in 1999 in its current form, a reorganisation that 
was done “in order to qualify for government support” (Ibid.: 232). 
6.4.2 The emergence of business coordination in complex manufacturing in the Viségrad 
countries 
The final case study that will be examined in this chapter takes us away from the 
agri-food and tourism sectors, and concerns the unexpected emergence of business 
coordination in Central European complex manufacturing. Specifically, Hancké studied 
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the emergence of inter-firm coordination for the purpose of upgrading worker skills and 
supplier capabilities in the complex engineering sector of the Czech Republic, south-west 
Poland, western Slovakia and north-western Hungary. According to Hancké, these are all 
areas with “historically ‘thin’ (...) institutional environments”, where “states and private 
associations were weak” (2011: 3-4). 
Hancké identifies as the main obstacle to cooperation among the relevant firms a 
classic coordination problem, where all firms would benefit if a collective good such as 
a suitable training system for workers existed, but none of them were willing to “initiate 
the production of the collective good in the first place”, as they preferred to benefit from 
the other firms’ contributions rather than making a contribution themselves (2011: 21). 
To give a concrete example, when the French car manufacturer PSA created a new plant 
in Trnava, Slovakia in order to benefit from “the positive network externalities associated 
with being a second-mover”, Volkswagen, which had already established a plant in the 
area and had already provided training to many local workers, had many of its workers 
poached by PSA (Ibid.: 22). In such a context, collective goods like training and 
technology transfer tend to be underprovided. 
Yet, in this case, it turned out to be possible to provide the aforementioned 
collective goods, triggering a process of industrial upgrading that had important positive 
consequences for the local economy. The crucial institutional work for enabling 
coordination was conducted by a small number of multinational firms working together 
with the Chambers of Commerce of their respective country. Firstly, those multinational 
firms were able to use their domestic Chambers of Commerce in order to create the 
deliberative setting required to “allow actors to understand, even in one-shot games, how 
their collective goal can be furthered” (Hancké 2011: 9). Characteristically, Volkswagen  
“used its close relations with the local German Chamber of Commerce to start 
conversations with the French Chamber first – thus opening indirect 
communication with PSA – and other Chambers, especially the Slovak and 
the American Chambers, afterwards. Once agreement on cooperation had 
been reached between the main companies, these Chambers then set out to 
organize a de facto industry-wide training system with them (…) using their 
local political clout to induce the local and national governments to fill in the 
institutional and policy holes.” (Hancké 2011: 22) 
Secondly, the Chambers of Commerce of the multinational firms’ countries of origin were 
able to use their role as mediators in disputes between multinational companies and local 
suppliers – a service that they provide as a way to help firms avoid the delay and 
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unpredictability associated with going through the local court system – in order to impose 
sanctions on parties that reneged from the agreed arrangements regarding the provision 
of collective goods (Hancké 2011: 24). 
Although Hancké’s case study is situated in a sectoral setting that is very different 
from the sectors that were examined in my dissertation, the story that he tells about the 
emergence of cooperation in Central European complex manufacturing contains all the 
key elements of my dissertation’s argument. Firstly, the emergence of coordination in the 
sector is inextricably linked with the institutional work performed by a small group of 
multinational firms. Secondly, in line with the argument put forward in Chapter 4, it was 
crucial that the multinational firms which acted as leading actors in the case were 
outsiders, as this enabled them to import cooperative solutions to joint problems from 
their countries of origin, and embed them in Central Europe in a way that made economic 
sense in light of the area’s productive resources. Thirdly, one can see the Chambers of 
Commerce of the multinational firms’ countries of origin as a type of externally provided 
facilitative institution that substantially reduced the difficulty of triggering coordination 
in the complex engineering sector of the Viségrad countries. 
Overall, the two papers on the emergence of cooperation in the agri-food, tourism 
and complex engineering sectors of specific areas in Central and Eastern Europe indicate 
that one can plausibly argue that the key conclusions of this dissertation about the nature 
of the obstacles to cooperation, and the role and characteristics of leadership operating in 
a facilitative political regime in overcoming them, can also shed light on the emergence 
of cooperation in European post-socialist settings. Nevertheless, a more complete model 
about the emergence of cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe would also need to 
take into account the differences in the transition experiences and institutional set-ups of 
different post-socialist countries, which have important consequences in terms of 
facilitating coordination among economic actors in some countries, and fostering 
fragmentation in others (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).  
6.5 Concluding remarks 
At the end of our interview, a resident of Castel del Giudice concluded: 
“That’s the thing with Castel del Giudice: all the activities that were born in 
Castel del Giudice, that are being born and that will be born, are things that 
can be done in many other places. It often happens that people tell me: ‘it’s 
because Castel del Giudice is a particular place’ – I say no: If you see Castel 
del Giudice from another point of view, it’s not ‘mamma mia how great are 
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you in Castel del Giudice, it’s ‘if you can do it in Castel del Giudice, you can 
do it anywhere.’” (interview #42) 
While this view is a bit too voluntaristic, I have argued that the path to the emergence of 
cooperation among local stakeholders in Castel del Giudice is structurally similar to the 
path followed by local actors in my high-cooperation Greek case study areas. As my 
interviewee in Castel del Giudice mentioned, if this path is available in low-trust, 
institutionally thin settings like Greece, Southern Italy, and even Central and Eastern 
Europe, then there is a good case to be made that it should be expected to be available in 
other similar settings as well. 
In particular, in fragmented economies where for a number of reasons the 
contextual conditions are unfavourable to the emergence of cooperation, a small group of 
motivated, highly skilled, boundary-spanning leading actors who have access to a 
domestically or externally provided facilitative political regime, should in principle be 
able to catalyse cooperation at the local level if they follow the appropriate strategies. I 
would expect this to be the case as long as the unfavourable contextual conditions are not 
insurmountable, as they would be, for example, in the presence of a civil war or of 
organised violent criminal networks with an interest in perpetuating the non-cooperative 
status quo. Moreover, I would expect the importance of the mechanism described in this 
dissertation to be smaller, but still not negligible, in settings where state institutions are 
so effective, and cooperative norms so deeply ingrained, that the institutional work 
required by leading actors to trigger cooperation is less costly. But particularly in the 
multitude of fragmented economies that fall within those scope conditions, it is plausible 
to argue that the path to cooperation outlined here should, in principle, be available and 
important for our understanding of the political economy of local development. Whether 
this is actually the case, and what other factors should be taken into account to modify or 
complete the model presented here in order to best suit different geographical and sectoral 





7.1 Summary of the findings 
This dissertation set out to address the puzzle of the emergence of cooperation 
among economic actors in unfavourable settings. Cooperation is typically viewed in the 
literature as an outcome that can be achieved either in countries with an overarching 
framework of robust formal institutions, or in places with a cultural propensity towards 
trust-based relations. A framework of robust formal institutions allows states to act as 
effective third-party enforcers of the local actors’ agreements, while a cultural propensity 
towards trust-based relations alleviates the difficulty of overcoming the obstacles to 
cooperation at the local level.  
The idea that it is difficult for cooperation to emerge in the absence of those two 
conditions gives rise to pessimistic expectations about the potential for increased 
cooperation, and thereby also for economic upgrading, in many fragmented economies 
around the world. Several countries with fragmented ownership structures in the semi-
periphery are considered to have neither robust formal institutions nor a cultural bent for 
cooperation. Nevertheless, on a number of occasions, sustained cooperative activities 
among economic actors can be observed, even in such unfavourable settings. This has 
profound implications for local economic development and, as a result, for averting the 
political alienation that often follows when people’s economic life chances collapse in 
particular places.  
In the most general formulation of my argument, I have addressed the puzzle of 
the emergence of cooperation in unlikely settings in two steps. Firstly, I have argued that 
the inheritance of cooperative cultural norms from the longue durée matters much less 
for the prospects of the emergence of cooperation than is presumed by some academics 
and policymakers. Instead, it is the observed patterns of behaviour by members of 
different classes of actors in the recent past that shape prevailing local-level informal 
institutions. By implication, those informal institutions are also subject to change in 
relatively short time periods. For cooperative norms to be introduced in places where they 
were previously absent, the crucial variable is leadership.  
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Secondly, I have pointed out that even in countries with weak formal institutional 
frameworks, economic actors may have access to externally provided institutional tools 
that facilitate cooperation. This can happen in a number of ways in different parts of the 
world. In the EU context, in sectors that fall at least in part under EU competence, the EU 
institutions themselves have the potential to act as “facilitative political regimes” (Ostrom 
1990), by providing to local actors the tools required to collectively draw up and 
implement their own plans and rules for cooperation. Therefore, EU-provided sectoral 
institutional frameworks can at least in part make up for the lack of national-level 
facilitative political regimes in institutionally weaker member-states. 
In order to substantiate this argument empirically, I adopted a comparative case 
study approach, and I exploited differences in the degree of observed cooperation among 
economic actors across time, across otherwise similar cases, and across sectors within an 
overall unlikely setting for the emergence of cooperation, namely Greece. In order to 
capture the degree of cooperation among economic actors, I collected information about 
the extent to which a set of sector-specific cooperative activities were observed in each 
case study area during the last 35 years. I summarised this information using as a heuristic 
device a cooperation score out of 10, where a score of 10 denoted a high degree of 
cooperation over time, and a score of 0 denoted that no cooperative activities had taken 
place in the local sector in question during the last 35 years. Table 3 in the introduction 
summarised the cooperation scores of my eight case studies.  
Based on the argument that the emergence of cooperation in unfavourable settings 
requires both leadership of a particular type and access to a facilitative institutional 
framework, looking again at this summary information in Table 11 below, it is possible 
to explain the lower degree of cooperation in the case studies at the right-hand column 
compared to their matching pairs at the left-hand column as a result of deficits in local-
level leadership. In turn, the lower extent of cooperation at the bottom two rows of the 
table, compared to the top two rows, can be attributed to a combination of a less 
facilitative overarching institutional framework applying in the tourism sector, and the 






Table 10: Extent of cooperation in each case study area and summary of the reasons for 
the observed variation across the cases 
 
Note: The cooperation score is a heuristic device that summarises the cumulative degree of 
cooperative activities in each case study since 1985. A score of 10 denotes a high degree of 
cooperation over time, while a score of 0 denotes no cooperation. 
More specifically, I have argued that for cooperation to emerge in places where it 
was previously absent, a small group of boundary-spanning leading actors must perform 
three types of institutional work. Firstly, they must introduce cooperative informal and 
formal institutions, as well as project a vision that creates a conception of shared interest 
among actors at the local level. Secondly, they must disseminate new ideas about 
collective entrepreneurial strategies, particularly in cases where cooperation takes a 
highly innovative form. Thirdly, they must provide ways to cover part of the upfront costs 
of cooperation, which are often substantial. All three types of institutional work are 
necessary for local-level cooperation to emerge, but they cannot be performed 
endogenously in low-cooperation areas in the absence of a small group of leading actors. 
In turn, the leaders who successfully catalyse the emergence of cooperation at the local 
level tend to be translocally embedded, well-connected, highly skilled actors, who are 
motivated by a subjective conception of their self-interest as encapsulating the interests 
of others, place-based group altruism, or a combination of those self- and other-regarding 
preferences. 
The presence of boundary-spanning leading actors who undertook the three 
aforementioned types of institutional work is the crucial feature that differentiates my 
high-cooperation case study areas from the low-cooperation case study areas within each 
pair of matching cases. In Santorini’s wine sector, an outsider winemaker working 
together with the management board and employees of the obligatory wine cooperative, 
many of whom were hybrid actors, catalysed vertical cooperation with the producers for 
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quality improvement. They did so by introducing new local-level cooperative institutions, 
particularly trust and price incentives for upgrading; by importing French wine-making 
techniques and adapting them to suit the local Assyrtiko grape varietal; and by covering 
the upfront costs associated with opening new markets for Santorini’s wines. During the 
Eurozone crisis, a US wine importer and the wine cooperative took the lead in terms of 
supplying the idea for a collective marketing project in the US; accessing EU funding to 
subsidise its cost; and carving out marketing as an area of common interest among 
winemakers, whose relations are otherwise characterised by competition. At least partly 
as a result of this institutional work, Santorini’s wine sector continued to grow throughout 
Greece’s long economic crisis. In contrast, in Lemnos’s wine sector, which was 
characterised by a dominance of insider actors for much longer, quality upgrading efforts 
started significantly later. In addition, in Lemnos there is still a remarkable deficit of 
leadership when it comes to triggering potentially highly beneficial forms of horizontal 
cooperation among the island’s wineries. 
The story of the rise of Chios’s mastiha sector is analytically similar to the case 
of upgrading in Santorini’s wine sector, with a difference of emphasis in the relative 
weight of the different types of institutional work that were required for cooperation to 
emerge in the two islands. This difference stems from the more radically innovative 
character of cooperative activities in the non-established agri-food sub-sector, namely 
mastiha, relative to wine. In Chios, the managers of the obligatory mastiha cooperative 
together with a hybrid actor whom they hired, catalysed the creation of a whole ecosystem 
of firms that started using mastiha as an input to produce a range of innovative products. 
They did so by supplying a range of entrepreneurial ideas about the potential uses of 
mastiha; by projecting their vision about the potential of the mastiha sector in an effective 
and innovative way through a newly established series of MastihaShops; and by investing 
much costly effort to prove the cooperative’s utility as a guarantor of the mastiha’s 
quality, which was crucial for forging a conception of shared interest with private agri-
food firms. The Chios cooperative also established trust and a system of transparently 
enforced sanctions to trigger a process of quality improvement in raw mastiha. In 
contrast, in Kozani’s saffron sector, which remains dominated by insiders, a sense of 
social fragmentation among the cooperative and private agri-food firms and an 
atmosphere of mistrust between the cooperative and the producers continue to dampen 
the sector’s progress. 
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Nymphaio’s remarkable rise as a winter tourism destination can also not be 
explained without taking into account the institutional work conducted by two hybrid 
actors, an entrepreneur who established the village’s first two hotels, and the long-serving 
former President of the local commune. These two actors projected a vision for the 
development of Nymphaio through what they called “mild tourism”, and a path for the 
achievement of that goal; they located funding from multiple sources in order to subsidise 
the provision of a range of public goods required to implement their vision; and they 
supplied positive and negative selective incentives to encourage the locals to contribute 
to the provision of public goods and punish non-cooperative behaviours, respectively. 
Unlike most of the leading actors in my other high-cooperation case studies, but like most 
leading actors in other remote villages like Castel del Giudice, the two leading actors in 
Nymphaio were not motivated principally by a broad conception of self-interest, but also 
by an other-regarding attachment to their place of origin. Compared to Nymphaio, 
Ambelakia is more inward-looking, and it suffers from lacking know-how, linking social 
capital and a concrete collective entrepreneurial plan for local development. These factors 
are exacerbated by perceived social divisions among different groups of actors. All of 
those weaknesses can be overcome, but for this to happen, leadership of a particular kind 
is required.  
Finally, to the extent that coordination has been observed in Santorini’s mass 
tourism sector, this has also been catalysed by the institutional work of a few boundary-
spanning leading actors. A small group of outsider and hybrid entrepreneurs triggered 
broader processes of upgrading in Santorini by undertaking the cost of upgrading first. 
As a result, they generated demonstration effects which altered the other actors’ mental 
models and provoked imitation. Moreover, the same group of actors, on occasion working 
with the former Mayor of Santorini, supplied the ideas, covered many of the costs and 
provided wider arenas for discussion to coordinate the creation of niche upscale markets 
such as wedding tourism, conference tourism and gastronomical tourism. These processes 
of upgrading and niche market creation resulted in higher per capita spending by tourists 
and a remarkable lengthening of Santorini’s tourism season, compared to the rest of 
Greece. In contrast, in Chalkidiki’s tourism sector, there are only few forces in operation 
to help overcome the public-good provision problems and sense of social fragmentation 
that inhibit a better management of the touristic product in the area. Indeed, the presence 
of a considerable share of outsider actors in the local tourism sector does not translate 
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into broad-based cooperation for upgrading, as the contact among insiders and outsiders 
remains minimal.  
Regardless of the achievements of Santorini’s tourism stakeholders, if one 
considers the low share of local economic actors involved in cooperative activities on the 
island, the frequent occurrence of opportunistic behaviours, and the failure to collectively 
address the challenge of overtourism, the degree of cooperation in Santorini’s mass 
tourism sector remains clearly lower than that in my other three high-cooperation case 
studies. Indeed, it would be appropriate to characterise the extent of cooperative activities 
in Santorini’s tourism sector as similar to the degree of cooperation in Lemnos’s wine 
sector and Kozani’s saffron sector, where a number of steps towards greater coordination 
have also taken place over time, but without ever resulting in sustained cooperation across 
the whole sector.  
I have argued that the much greater difficulty of finding examples of clear-cut 
high-cooperation cases in the mass tourism sector compared to the agri-food sector, is in 
part related to differences in the two sectors’ governance frameworks. Indeed, the 
institutional work of a small group of local-level leading actors alone cannot catalyse 
broad, sustained cooperation if it is not nested within a broader framework of facilitative 
overarching institutions. In the agri-food sector, such a facilitative framework is provided 
by the EU, which plays a crucial role in the governance of the European agricultural 
sector. In particular, the Common Agricultural Policy provides a set of carefully designed 
tools that encourage local actors to define their own cooperation plans and rules. 
Crucially, it also requires member-states to set up administrative structures that enable 
the enforcement of those locally defined rules, thereby making up for what is arguably 
the single biggest deficiency of institutionally weak states, namely their lack of 
enforcement capacity. At the same time, by generously subsidising cooperative activities, 
the Common Agricultural Policy provides to local actors opportunities to discover that 
cooperation can be beneficial, thereby dynamically opening up possibilities for even more 
ambitious forms of cooperation in the future.  
Some – though not all – of these functions are also performed by the EU’s regional 
policies, influencing positively the prospects for cooperation in the alternative tourism 
sector of remote, disadvantaged areas. In contrast, the overarching institutional 
framework in the mass tourism sector, which is defined almost exclusively at the national 
level, is characterised by all the deficiencies that one would expect to typically encounter 
in an institutionally weak state: hyper-centralisation, administrative incapacity, 
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incomplete implementation of the rule of law, an inadequate regulatory framework, and 
a lack of organisational vehicles to enable local actors to collectively take decisions about 
matters that affect them. The impact of those deficiencies on the prospects for cooperation 
is aggravated by sector-specific attributes, and particularly the large number of economic 
actors involved in the mass tourism sector, as well as the public-good character of most 
collective goods in the tourism industry. Cumulatively, those factors make it very difficult 
for broad-based, sustained cooperation to emerge in the mass tourism sector, regardless 
of the efforts and institutional work conducted by a small group of leading actors. 
Beyond my four pairs of matching case studies in Greece, I examined the 
emergence of cooperation among economic actors in two case study areas in Southern 
Italy and in selected settings in Central and Eastern Europe. I did so in an attempt to 
explore whether my argument about the role of boundary-spanning leading actors 
operating in the framework of a facilitative political regime could travel to other similar 
geographical areas, and indeed I identified remarkably similar patterns as those observed 
in Greece. If the path to cooperation outlined in this dissertation can shed light on 
occasions where cooperation among actors emerged, against the odds, in Greece, 
Southern Italy, and even in some post-socialist settings, then a good case can be made 
that its relevance may also extent to other fragmented economies around the world. The 
argument of the dissertation is expected to be applicable as long as no insurmountable 
aggravating factors are in place, such as a civil war or the operation of organised, violent 
criminal networks with an interest in perpetuating the non-cooperative status quo. 
Moreover, I expect the argument’s relevance to decrease, but not disappear, in settings 
with highly effective state institutions or deeply ingrained cooperative norms, where the 
cost of the institutional work required to initiate a cooperative effort is comparatively 
small. Nevertheless, many economies with fragmented ownership structures fall within 
those scope conditions, and in such places, the path to cooperation outlined in this 
dissertation can contribute to our understanding of the political economy of local 
development.   
7.2 Implications for the academic literature  
7.2.1 Studying the emergence of cooperation and processes of institutional change   
As a detailed study of why, when and how local-level cooperative institutions 
emerge in places where they were previously absent, this dissertation has implications for 
the way in which we approach the question of institutional change more generally. This 
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is important because despite the contribution of highly sophisticated analyses of the 
constraining nature of institutions by the neo-institutionalist literature, our understanding 
of institutional innovation remains overall less advanced (Crouch 2005: 3). This 
observation also holds for the cooperation literature, which has provided valuable and 
highly influential insights about the nature of the local-level institutional tools that 
economic actors have used to overcome the obstacles to cooperation in a variety of 
settings, but is generally thinner when it comes to explaining under what conditions those 
institutional tools are supplied in the first place.  
My dissertation proposed putting the concept of leadership at the centre stage of 
our analysis of the supply of local-level cooperative institutions. Following a similar 
approach as Crouch (2005), I sought to contribute to our understanding of institutional 
change by developing a theory of action within the constraints of structure. On the one 
hand, I proposed that by systematically studying the concrete types of institutional work 
that leading actors undertake in order to reshape institutions, it is possible to observe 
recurrent patterns. Based on those recurrent patterns, one can abstract from the particular 
cases at hand and reconstruct the mechanisms of institutional change towards a 
cooperative equilibrium at a higher level of generality. On the other hand, I argued that 
an examination of the characteristics and motivation of the leading actors, as well as the 
place-based features that they draw on in order to be in a position to successfully catalyse 
institutional change, can help us move away from a view of leadership and institutional 
change as purely random phenomena. Instead, institutional change can be viewed as being 
to an extent linked to particular features of place, even though the local availability of 
well-endowed and also suitably motivated leading actors also entails an important 
stochastic element. 
Beside contributing a theory about the supply of local-level cooperative 
institutions, my argument has two other important implications for the cooperation 
literature. Firstly, based on a broad conception of rational action, I took a more expansive 
view of the nature of the obstacles to cooperation than is typical of many studies of 
cooperation. Specifically, I argued that in order to understand the constraints that 
economic actors face in pursuing mutually beneficial cooperative activities, it is 
important to take into account both cognitive obstacles, which arise when the relevant 
actors face true uncertainty regarding the strategies that are available to them and their 
expected payoffs, and classic collective action problems, where actors have the cognitive 
capacity to engage in best-response maximization, but in pursuing their individual utility-
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maximizing responses, they fail to produce socially optimal outcomes. Those two types 
of obstacles must be resolved sequentially for cooperation to emerge. I have shown that 
although the relative importance of the two types of obstacle varies depending on the 
characteristics of the cooperative activity in question, more often than not, both must be 
addressed by the actors involved in novel cooperative efforts. Therefore, in order to 
understand under what conditions cooperation emerges in unfavourable settings, 
entrepreneurial discovery, processes of forging a shared conception of interest, and the 
resolution of hold-up problems, public-good provision problems, coordination problems 
and distributional conflicts must be studied not in isolation, but jointly. More generally, 
both cognitive obstacles to cooperation and collective action problems are relevant for 
understanding how cooperation can emerge in a range of sectoral and geographical 
settings.  
Moreover, I have argued that not only can local-level cooperative institutions be 
created within relatively short time periods, but their creation is most likely to be 
spearheaded by actors who are in some way outsiders to the area in question, whether 
they are locals with significant translocal experience or non-local settlers. Actors who are 
in some way outsiders have a broader repertoire of institutional solutions and 
entrepreneurial ideas to draw on, which they can innovatively recombine with local 
strengths and local ways of doing things. Such actors are thereby uniquely well placed to 
catalyse cooperative upgrading processes. This argument depicts the role of translocal 
links and outsider or hybrid actors as not only compatible with, but also essential to the 
emergence of cooperative efforts, a point that is not typically recognised in the 
cooperation literature, which often portrays cooperation as a phenomenon that most easily 
arises in tightly-knit, stable and homogeneous communities. Instead, I portray the 
emergence of cooperation as a phenomenon that is more likely to happen in translocally 
embedded, socially mobile, dynamic societies. Indeed, a systematic and micro-founded 
examination of the emergence of cooperative institutions reveals that not only can shared 
conceptions of interest and cooperative norms emerge among heterogenous actors whose 
interaction started in the recent past, but also that it is precisely such actors who are best 
placed to innovatively recombine elements of diverse institutional frameworks, allowing 
cooperation to emerge in unfavourable circumstances.  
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7.2.2 Studying the political economy of local economic development  
The importance of cooperation and increasingly also of institutions is frequently 
acknowledged in studies of local economic development in a variety of disciplines (e.g. 
see Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2006; Gertler 2010). I suggest, and I hope that my thesis 
demonstrates, that the concepts and theoretical models of political economy, including on 
formal and informal institutions, institutional change, governance, collective action 
problems, clientelism and beyond, have the potential to make an important contribution 
to our understanding of how cooperation and well-designed institutions can be supplied 
in places where they were previously absent. A number of studies in political economy 
have significantly advanced our knowledge of those subjects, including, among others, 
McDermott’s (2007) study of upgrading in the Argentinian wine industry, Hancké’s study 
of endogenous coordination in the Central European complex engineering sector, and 
Bruszt and McDermott’s (2014) book on transnational regulatory integration and 
development. By systematically analysing the emergence of local-level cooperative 
institutions, which are of central importance for upgrading in fragmented economies, my 
dissertation highlighted a particular type of path towards local economic development in 
unfavourable settings, aspiring to make a contribution of a similar type. Nevertheless, 
without doubt, there remains a considerable untapped potential for cross-fertilization 
among disciplines in the study of the political economy of local economic development. 
The potential for inter-disciplinary cross-fertilisation concerns not only the use of 
concepts and theoretical models, but also methods. Drawing on the tradition of 
comparative politics, my dissertation’s comparative case study approach allowed me, on 
the one hand, to combine analysis at the micro and macro levels, to examine the 
configurations of factors that allowed local stakeholders to overcome the obstacles to 
cooperation, and to study the mechanisms through which local-level cooperative 
institutions were supplied. On the other hand, by complementing within-case with across-
case analysis, I was able to distinguish features that were analytically relevant from 
elements that were case specific, thereby making an argument with wider relevance.  
Given the multiplicity of factors that must converge for institutional change to 
take place and the non-linear way in which those factors typically interrelate (Goertz and 
Mahoney 2012: chapter 4), I would suggest that it is very difficult to understand the 
emergence of cooperation and the supply of well-designed institutions without 
conducting any qualitative case study analysis. At the same time, comparative case study 
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analysis can sometimes give rise to theoretical propositions that are testable 
quantitatively, such as with regard to the place-based characteristics that are associated 
with the emergence of cooperation. In the Appendix to Chapter 4, I propose a way to 
begin conducting such a quantitative analysis, on which it is possible to build using 
additional data. Overall, there is much scope for productive collaboration among scholars 
coming from different methodological traditions, who can utilise the strengths of their 
methodological tools to approach the study of the political economy of local development 
from complementary angles.  
Political scientists and political economists also have much to gain from greater 
collaboration with economic geographers and other scholars who have long studied local 
economic development as an outcome in itself. Recent electoral outcomes have made it 
increasingly apparent that profound political instability can be triggered by the collapse 
of people’s economic life chances not only along the lines of social class, but also along 
the lines of place (Jennings and Stoker 2019; Rodrik 2018). Economic geographers have 
built sophisticated models explaining how the internationalisation of the economy affects 
areas with different characteristics, and what types of factors and interventions can 
mitigate those effects (see Capello 2016). Should the interest of political scientists in the 
effects of “place” on political behaviour persist, then the study of the factors that influence 
economic performance and economic distribution at the local level must also acquire a 
more central position in the discipline. 
7.2.3 Studying how the EU reshapes domestic governance arrangements  
Finally, by combining a micro-level analysis of the effects of the institutional 
work conducted by a small group of leading actors with an analysis of the implications 
of macro-level sectoral frameworks for the prospects of cooperation at the local level, my 
dissertation proposes a novel angle from which to study the daily operation of EU 
regulatory and expenditure policies.  
Political scientists often approach the EU’s agricultural and regional policies as 
pure rent-allocation arrangements or mere side-payments for the acceptance of policies 
in other fields. Instead, I analysed the EU’s ordinary expenditure and regulatory policies 
through the prism of the concept of facilitative political regimes, and argued that in 
sectors that partly fall under the EU’s competence, EU policies have the potential to help 
reshape domestic governance arrangements in a way that reduces the barriers to local-
level cooperation. As a result, the EU’s policy frameworks can be seen as structural 
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constraints which, in interaction with the micro-level processes associated with the 
institutional work of local stakeholders searching for new degrees of freedom, shape the 
available opportunities for local institutional innovation. In other words, there is a 
considerable scope to enrich our analysis of the EU’s regulatory and expenditure policies 
by studying them not just in terms of their place in national- and EU-level political 
bargaining, but also in terms of the effects that they have on the ground when actors 
deploy the resources and rules as tools associated with those policies to either reinforce 
the local-level institutional status quo or catalyse institutional change.  
Moreover, my analysis of EU policies as overarching institutional frameworks 
that have the potential to encourage local-level cooperation, implies that facilitative 
political regimes can also be supplied by other actors than the national government. This 
argument can be made not only with reference to the EU, but also in the context of other 
“transnational integration regimes” (Bruszt and McDermott 2012), development aid 
programmes, and perhaps even private certification arrangements. In analysing the 
strength or weakness of overarching institutional frameworks, political economists 
typically focus on domestic rather than supranational institutions: if a state has weak 
national institutions, the prospects of cooperation are considered dim. The literature on 
the EU’s role in fostering reforms to improve domestic economic performance constitutes 
a partial exception to this trend, but it tends to focus on the role of conditionality in the 
context of the accession process or of externally imposed reforms during crisis, rather 
than the governance implications of the daily operation of EU policies. By analysing the 
effects on local-level governance arrangements of the full range of domestic, 
supranational and transnational institutional frameworks that can function as facilitative 
political regimes, we can improve our understanding of how to foster cooperation for 
upgrading in fragmented economies. One way in which future studies can contribute to 
that end is by examining, through the study of carefully matched pairs of case studies, 
under what conditions local actors sometimes successfully deploy the tools of 
overarching policy frameworks to catalyse positive local-level institutional change in 
different types of regions. Such an analysis would have the potential to enable us to design 
macro-level policies that are better tailored to regions with different types of actors and 
resources, facing different types of obstacles. 
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7.3 Policy implications  
As the preceding discussion suggests, my dissertation’s analysis at two levels 
(micro and macro) also yields a number of policy implications. Indeed, some of the 
favourable conditions for the emergence of local-level cooperation analysed in the 
dissertation can be created directly through policymaking and policy implementation. On 
the other hand, it is important to note from the outset that the emergence of cooperation 
in unfavourable settings also relies crucially on spontaneous patterns of interaction among 
a range of stakeholders which cannot be forced upon the relevant actors from the top, but 
can only be influenced in indirect, long-term ways. 
What policymakers can influence in a direct way is the structure of the 
overarching institutional frameworks within which local-level patterns of interaction are 
nested. I have argued that the concept of facilitative political regimes can usefully inform 
policy and institutional design for the promotion of local development in economies with 
fragmented ownership structures. Facilitative political regimes create “collective-choice 
arrangements” (Ostrom 1990: 93) where economic actors can draw up their own plans 
for cooperation and define the rules governing their interaction; they provide institutional 
structures that make it easier to enforce those rules; and they subsidise the upfront costs 
of cooperative activities. Facilitative overarching institutions do not prevent new entrants 
in the market, as diversity and competition are characteristics of a thriving local economy: 
they do, however, create a framework that incentivises or compels new entrants to abide 
by previously agreed local rules of cooperation, and that deters them from 
opportunistically benefiting from local collective goods while undermining their 
provision. In so doing, facilitative political regimes considerably reduce the difficulty of 
overcoming the obstacles to cooperation at the local level. Indeed, being nested in an 
overarching institutional framework that is to some extent facilitative can be considered 
as a necessary condition for cooperation to emerge among more than a minimal number 
of economic actors.  
If, as I have argued, overarching institutional frameworks that operate as 
facilitative political regimes can be provided not only at the domestic, but also at the 
transnational level, then the design principles of facilitative political regimes can usefully 
inform policymaking in transnational integration institutions such as the EU, as well as 
in a range of public or private institutions aiming to promote inclusive economic 
development. Many of the EU’s policies have long aimed to foster network-formation 
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and cooperation among local stakeholders and have on several occasions done so 
successfully. Nevertheless, the concept of facilitative political regimes as it was 
introduced by Ostrom, developed through meticulous empirical analysis in this 
dissertation, and as it will further evolve through future studies, can provide insights about 
ways to achieve those goals more effectively in the future through well-designed policies 
for rural development, industrial transition, and the promotion of innovation in low- as 
well as high-tech sectors. Moreover, it is interesting to note that even though the 
promotion of cooperation among economic actors in the agri-food sector is only an 
indirect aim of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), several aspects of the CAP 
satisfy more of the characteristics of facilitative political regimes than is typical of the 
EU’s regional policies. While different sectors are governed differently and regulatory 
frameworks cannot simply be copied from one sector to another, considering the effects 
of both agricultural and regional politics on the prospects for local-level cooperation using 
a common theoretical framework can contribute to the aim of making the agricultural and 
regional policies work “in tandem for cohesion” (Crescenzi et al. 2015). 
Naturally, the governments of institutionally weak states can also implement 
improvements in domestic institutional frameworks to facilitate local-level cooperation 
and thereby foster local economic development. The difficulty is that lobbying the 
government for the adoption of facilitative institutional frameworks requires of small 
firms and small producers to have precisely the capacity for organisation and coordination 
that they lack, and that facilitative overarching institutions can help them acquire. 
Nevertheless, institutional reform to facilitate cooperation among economic actors is of 
paramount importance for upgrading and inclusive economic development in fragmented 
economies, and should therefore be part of any economic policy programme pursuing 
those aims. By suggesting this, I am not contesting the argument that in highly fragmented 
economies, an increase in the share of large firms is also important for economic 
development: I think that this is true, though it is truer in some sectors than in others. But 
be that as it may, fragmented economies are unlikely to shed their dependence on small 
firms overnight. As a result, considering ways to empower economic actors to jointly 
develop new upgrading capabilities remains imperative for inclusive economic 
development in countries with many small firms and small farms. 
In the case of Greece, an important priority to make the domestic framework of 
overarching institutions more facilitative for cooperation is to increase the state’s capacity 
to assist in the implementation of the rules, not only through judicial reform but also by 
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setting up adequate administrative structures. Among the many problems that it creates, 
the widespread non-implementation of the law in Greece generates powerful incentives 
for opportunistic behaviour and it undermines any cooperative efforts that may bring 
small economic actors under the radar of the state. As was seen in Chapter 5, by providing 
a series of important benefits to well-defined and well-monitored groups of cooperating 
actors, the EU’s Protected Designation of Origin system helps to alleviate this problem 
in the agri-food sector. Thinking creatively about how to replicate this result in other 
spheres of economic life is important for fostering cooperation in more sectors. 
Additionally, Greece must think of ways to provide collective-choice arenas where 
economic actors can collectively take decisions about matters that affect them, thereby 
reducing somewhat the hyper-centralisation of decision-making. The challenge here is to 
successfully encourage broad-based participation in such collective-choice arenas and 
shield them from being taken over by party politics and clientelistic networks. An 
examination of the institutional models followed in robust coordinated economies with 
many small and medium-sized firms could be useful in this regard. Finally, it would help 
if Greece established a more transparent process for accessing specific regulatory tools 
that permit the adoption of locally applicable rules, such as architectural protection 
legislation. This would somewhat reduce the dependence of local cooperative efforts on 
the availability of linking social capital and make facilitative regulatory tools more widely 
accessible in the country.  
While facilitative overarching institutional frameworks can be created as a matter 
of policy design, policymakers cannot simply supply places with successful leading 
actors. What enables leading actors to catalyse local cooperation is a set of multifaceted 
local and translocal experiences and webs of relationships, combined with a self- or other-
regarding motivation to not only succeed entrepreneurially, but to also carry along an 
entire local sector in that success. Those elements cannot be imposed from above or 
created from scratch, but they occur spontaneously, more often so under certain 
conditions than under others. Nor is it appropriate to simply recommend that “donors” 
should “identify actors who actually are in an adequate position to act as leaders” and 
provide them with support (Hurrelman et al. 2006: 240). More often than not, 
policymakers and administrators will find it hard to distinguish between suitably 
equipped and motivated potential leaders, and actors who lack the capacity and 
motivation to trigger cooperation for upgrading. The most policymakers can do to directly 
assist leading actors is to provide a facilitative political regime that makes it easier to 
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undertake the institutional work required for catalysing cooperation. Beyond this, it could 
be useful for policymakers to be aware of the role of leadership in catalysing cooperation 
in unfavourable settings, though they should also take precautions to ensure that the 
benefits of government-supported projects are not captured by a small sub-group of 
actors, but are broadly distributed in the local sector in question (Locke 2002: 129). 
Nevertheless, the policy implications of the centrality of leadership for the 
emergence of cooperation in unfavourable settings principally have to do with indirect 
ways of increasing the chances that a critical mass of leading actors will be available in 
particular places in the long term. This can be achieved by promoting the place-based 
characteristics associated with the availability of local leading actors, and especially by 
fostering the formation of translocal links among the inhabitants of particular locations 
and outside actors, and by ensuring that opportunities for social mobility are well 
distributed across space. While there is a good chance that many actors who will benefit 
from these networks and opportunities will leave their place of residence to seek better 
life chances elsewhere, a few may set it as their goal to show that a different path to 
prosperity is possible in their area, which requires synergies. Ultimately, this is how 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW INDEX 
 
 Position Duration  Location Date Time 
A) Mani - Olive Oil 
1 Founder of the Bläuel firm 1.5 hours Bläuel factory, Lefktro 
Messinias 
12 July 2017 12.30 
2 Employee at the Bläuel firm 1 hour Bläuel factory, Lefktro 
Messinias 
13 July 2017 11.00 
B) Chalkidiki – Table olives 
3 Producer of table olives 25 minutes Office of the local 
cooperative  
18 Aug. 2017 10.00 
4 Producer, founder of a new 
cooperative  
10 minutes Office of an agronomist, 
Olinthos  
18 Aug. 2017 10.35 
5 President of a first-degree 
cooperative  
50 minutes Office of the local 
cooperative 
22 Aug. 2017 12.00 
6 Producer of table olives and olive 
oil 
40 minutes Producer’s house, Kalives  22 Aug. 2017 13.30 
7 One of the founders of the 
“Kalantzis Olives” firm 
10 minutes Company shop, Kalives  22 Aug. 2017 14.45 
C) Crete – Olive oil 
8 Employee at the firm “Latzimas 
S.A.” 
35 minutes Latzimas factory, 
Rethimno 
31 Aug. 2017 14.00 
9 Member of the management team 
of a second-degree cooperative 
1 hour and 
15 minutes 
Office of the second-
degree cooperative 
1 Sept. 2017 9.40 
10 Producer who is part of Bläuel’s 
Naturland fair network 
10 minutes Village coffeeshop, Asimi 
Irakliou 
1 Sept. 2017 12.00 
11 Producer of olive oil and table 
olives 
1 hour Producer’s house, Chania 4 Sept. 2017 19.15 
12 Producer of olive oil 1 hour Producer’s house, Chania 5 Sept. 2017 20.00 
D) Nymphaio – Alternative tourism 
13 Yannis Boutaris, founder of the 
first hotels in Nymphaio  
1.5 hour Mr. Boutaris’ house, 
Chalkidiki 
8 Aug. 2017 11.30 




Mr. Mertzos’s house, 
Nymphaio 
23 Aug. 2017 11.00 
15 
Nymphaio’s village priest since 
2000 
50 minutes Church of Nymphaio 23 Aug. 2017 19.30 
16 Yorgos Boutaris, current 
Secretary of the Nympahio 
Community 
30 minutes Office of the Community 
of Nymphaio 
24 Aug. 2017 10.30 
17 Hotel owner in Nymphaio 25 minutes Hotel in Nymphaio 24 Aug. 2017 18.30 
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 Position Duration  Location Date Time 
E) Chalkidiki – Beach tourism 
18 Owner of a camping business in 
Sithonia 
15 minutes Camping business, 
Sithonia 
7 Aug. 2017 17.15 
19 General manager of a camping 
business in Sithonia 
15 minutes Camping business, 
Sithonia 
7 Aug. 2017 17.45 
20 Director of a camping business in 
Sithonia 
25 minutes Camping business, 
Sithonia 
20 Aug. 2017 11.00 
21 President of the “Ammon Zeus” 
and “Kassandros” rental room 
associations 
1 hour Rental rooms business, 
Kallithea  
9 Aug. 2017 10.00 
22 Owner of rental rooms, Kallithea 25 minutes Rental Room business, 
Kallithea 
9 Aug. 2017 11.30 
23 Owner of rental rooms, Kallithea 15 minutes Rental Room business, 
Kallithea 
9 Aug. 2017 12.15 
24 President of the Hotel Association 
and Tourism Organisation of 
Chalkidiki 
45 minutes Hotel in Psakoudia 11 Aug. 2017 11.30 
25 Owner of a large hotel in 
Psakoudia 
20 minutes Hotel in Psakoudia 17 Aug. 2017 19.20 
26 Owner of a hotel near 
Vourvourou 
30 minutes Hotel near Vourvourou 16 Aug. 2017 18.30 
27 Owner of a hotel in Vourvourou 10 minutes Hotel in Vourvourou 21 Aug. 2017 11.30 
F) Santorini – Wine and tourism (part A) 
28 Markos Kafouros, President of 
the Santo Wines Cooperative and 
Vice-Mayor of Santorini 
45 minutes Santo wines oenotourism 
centre, Santorini 
15 April 2018 19.00 
29 Marketing Manager at the Santo 
Wines Cooperative 
1 hour Santo Wines offices, 
Santorini 
16 April 2018 10.00 
30 Oenologist at a private Santorini 
winery and winemaker 
1 hour Coffeeshop near Pyrgos, 
Santorini 
16 April 2018 12.00 




16 April 2018 14.00 
32 Two grape producers 50 minutes Coffeeshop, Pyrgos, 
Santorini 
17 April 2018 11.10 
33 Oenologist and Sales 
Representative at a private 
Santorini winery 
1 hour Private winery, Santorini 17 April 2018 13.00 
34 Winemaker and oenologist at a 
private Santorini winery 
45 minutes Private winery, Santorini 17 April 2018 14.30 
35 Founder of the Selene Restaurant 45 minutes Selene Restaurant, Pyrgos 17 April 2018 19.00 
36 General Director of the of the 
Santo Wines Cooperative 
30 minutes Santo Wines offices, 
Santorini 
18 April 2018 9.15 
37 Employee at the Santorini branch 
of the Agriculture Directorate of 
the Ministry of Agriculture  
1 hour and 
30 minutes 
Offices of the Santorini 
branch of the Agriculture 
Directorate 
19 April 2018 9.45 
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 Position Duration  Location Date Time 
G) Castel del Giudice – Alternative tourism 
38 Giuseppe Cavaliere, former 
Mayor of Castel del Giudice  
1 hour and 
45 minutes 
Borgo Tufi hotel, Castel 
del Giudice 
1 July 2018 10.30 
39 General Manager of Melise  1 hour Melise, Castel del Giudice 3 July 2018 10.30 
40 Lino Gentile, Mayor of Castel del 
Giudice 
40 minutes Town hall, Castel del 
Giudice 
4 July 2018 12.00 
41 Producer and one of the founding 
members of Melise 
1 hour  Central square, Castel del 
Giudice 
4 July 2018 18.15 
42 President of the Artemisia co-
operative, employee at the 
SPRAR programme for refugees 
1 hour and 
30 minutes 
Central square, Castel del 
Giudice 
4 July 2018 20.00 
43 Co-owner of the town’s only 
functioning hotel 
25 minutes Borgo Tufi hotel, Castel 
del Giudice 
5 July 2018 8.30 
44 Director of the Local Action 
Group “Alto Molise” 
35 minutes Municipal centre, Agnone 5 July 2018 11.30 
45 President of the Local Action 
Group “Alto Molise” 
35 minutes Municipal centre, Agnone 5 July 2018 12.15 
46 Co-founder of a local company in 
the agri-food sector 
50 minutes Skype 6 July 2018 15.00 
H) Ambelakia – Alternative tourism 
47 Konstantinos Tsergas, Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of 
Tempi 
40 minutes Town Hall of the Tembi 
Municipality, Makrichori  
16 July 2018 9.50 
48 President of the Museum of 
Folklore and History of 
Ambelakia 
 
50 minutes Museum of Folklore and 
History, Ambelakia 
16 July 2018 13.00 
49 Sotiris Kourias, Owner of the 
town’s only functioning hotel 
40 minutes Hotel Kouria, Ambelakia 16 July 2018 16.00 
50 President of a local association  1 hour and 
30 minutes 
Hotel Kouria, Ambelakia 16 July 2018 19.00 
51 President of a local association 1 hour  Coffeeshop at the central 
square of Ambelakia  
20 July 2018 15.30 
I) Kozani – Saffron 
52 Entrepreneur in the aromatic 
plants sector  
25 minutes Entrepreneur’s house 17 July 2018 19.00 
53 Emmanouil Patsilias, former 
President of the Saffron 
cooperative 
1 hour and 
30 minutes 
Offices of the Regional 
Development Agency of 
Western Macedonia  
18 July 2018 9.30 
54 Saffron producer 1 hour and 
20 minutes 
Producer’s house, Krokos 18 July 2018 17.30 
55 Director of the Saffron 
cooperative 
20 minutes Saffron cooperative, 
Krokos 
19 July 2018 10.30 
56 Lefteris Ioannidis, Mayor of 
Kozani 
30 minutes Town Hall of Kozani 19 July 2018 17.00 
57 Co-owner of a company that 
makes agri-food products with 
saffron 






   
 Position Duration  Location Date Time 
J) Chios – Mastiha 
58 Yannis Mandalas, CEO of 
Mediterra SA, the Mastiha 
cooperative’s subsidiary 
1 hour and 
15 minutes 
Offices of Mediterra SA, 
Athens 
12 July 2018 10.00 
59 Alternate Director at the Mastiha 
cooperative 
50 minutes Offices of the Mastiha 
cooperative, Chios Town 
23 July 2018 9.00 
60 Former Director of the Mastiha 
cooperative 
50 minutes Coffeeshop at Chios Town 23 July 2018 12.00 
61 Mastiha producer, former 
President of a first-degree 
cooperative 
30 minutes Coffeeshop at Pyrgi, Chios 23 July 2018 17.30 
62 Employee at the Mastiha 
cooperative, responsible for 
quality control 
30 minutes Factory of the Mastiha 
cooperative, Kardamada 
19 July 2018 9.00 
63 Kostas Ganiaris, Former President 
of the Mastiha Cooperative 
(1994-2011) 
50 minutes Interviewee’s office, Chios 
town 
24 July 2018 10.30 
64 Mastiha producer  50 minutes Interviewee’s office, Chios 
town 
24 July 2018 16.30 
65 Dimitris Steinhauer, Founder and 
CEO of Concepts S.A., pioneer in 
mastiha liquor production 
30 minutes Offices of Concepts S.A., 
Athens 
17 Sept. 2018 13.30 
66 Aristeidis Belles, Former 
President of the Mastiha 
cooperative (1982-1987) 
40 minutes Interviewee’s office, 
Athens 
18 Sept. 2018 10.00 
K) Santorini – Wine and tourism (part B) 
67 Owner of a café  1 hour Café in Athens 10 April 2019 10.30 
68 Employee in the cruise industry, 
candidate Mayor  
1 hour and 
15 minutes 
Café in Athens 12 April 2019 13.00 
69 Chef at the Selene restaurant 15 minutes Selene Restaurant, Pyrgos 15 April 2019 11.00 
70 Owner of a hotel in Pyrgos, 
President of the cultural 
association of Pyrgos 
1 hour and 
30 minutes 
Café in Pyrgos 15 April 2019 17.00 
71 Paris Sigalas, wine-maker 45 minutes Sigalas winery, Oia 16 April 2019 12.00 
72 Christophoros Zorzos, producer 
and long-time President of the 
primary cooperative in Pyrgos 
1 hour Pyrgos bakery 16 April 2019 17.30 
73 President and employees at the 
municipal company GEOTHIRA 
40 minutes GEOTHIRA offices 18 April 2019 12.00 
74 Director at a hotel in Pyrgos 40 minutes Hotel in Pyrgos 18 April 2019 14.00 
75 Kostas Kostantinidis, owner of 
the hotel Heliotopos and pioneer 
of conference tourism in Santorini 
1 hour and 
15 minutes 

























 Position Duration  Location Date Time 
L) Lemnos - Wine 
76 Dimitris Skalkos, Professor at the 
Food Science Department of the 
University of the Aegean in 
Lemnos 
1 hour Skype 26 Aug. 2019 14.30 
77 Vice-President of the 
environmental association of 
Lemnos, Anemoessa  
40 minutes Café in Myrina 30 Aug. 2019 10.00 
78 Director of the wine cooperative 50 minutes Offices of the wine 
cooperative, Myrina 
30 Aug. 2019 11.00  
79 Oenologist at a private winery 40 minutes Winery premises 30 Aug. 2019 14.30 
80 Owner and oenologist at a private 
winery 
50 minutes Winery premises 31 Aug. 2019 12.00 
81 President of the honey co-
operative of Lemnos 
1 hour and 
15 minutes 
Café in Myrina 31 Aug. 2019 15.00 
82 Director of the General Chemical 
Laboratory of the state for the 
Lesvos prefecture 
1 hour Café in Myrina 1 Sept. 2019 11.00 
83 Owner of a private winery 30 minutes Winery premises 1 Sept. 2019 15.00 
84 Agronomist at the Lemnos local 
authorities 
2 hours Office of the local 
authorities (Eparcheio) in 
Myrina 
2 Sept. 2019 10.00 
85 Marketing manager at the Lemnos 
wine cooperative 
45 minutes Offices of the wine 
cooperative, Myrina 
2 Sept. 2019 15.00 
86 Two grape producers in Agios 
Dimitrios 
1 hour Their field in Agios 
Dimitrios 
3 Sept. 2019 8.30 
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APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTARY, NEWS AND 
CASE-SPECIFIC SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
A) Chios – Mastiha  
S1 Secondary source Lioukas, S. (2013) ‘Συνεταιριστική Κοινωνική Επιχειρηματικότητα: Η Ανάπτυξη 
Δικτύου Καταστημάτων Λιανικής Πώλησης της Ένωσης Μαστιχοπαραγωγών Χίου 
και οι Επιπτώσεις της’ (‘Cooperative Social Entrepreneurship: The Development of a 
Network of Retail Shops of the Chios Mastiha Growers Association and its 
Consequences’), report. Athens: Economic University of Athens. 
S2 Secondary source Tsouhlis, D. (2011) ‘Ένωση Μαστιχοπαραγωγών Χίου και Μαστιχοπαραγωγοί: 
Πολιτικές Διαχείρισης του Περιβάλλοντος και του Τοπίου μέσα από την διοικητική 
πολιτική της ΕΜΧ (1939-1989)’ (‘Union of Mastiha Producers of Chios and Mastiha 
Producers: Policies for the Management of the Environment and the Landscape 
through the Administrative Policy of the Union of Mastiha Products of Chios (1939-
1989)’), PhD dissertation. Mytilene: University of the Aegean. 
B) Kozani - saffron 
D1 Documentary 
evidence 
Business Plan for the saffron cooperative written by the then President Emmanouil 
Patsilias in March 1999  
D2 Documentary 
evidence 
PDO application for the ‘Kozani saffron PDO’ designation, 24/2/1997.  
D3 Documentary 
evidence 
Annual report 2000’, information leaflet provided to by the Kozani saffron cooperative 
to its members ahead of the General Assembly meeting of 20/1/2001. 
D4 Documentary 
evidence 
‘LEADER II examples – Kozani saffron’, information leaflet produced by the 
LEADER European Observatory, 1997. 
N1 Local news Kyriakatikos Chronos newspaper, 2000-2004 
N2 Local news O Ptolemaios newspaper, selected issues 2000-2012 
S3 Secondary source Voutsina E. (1999) Κρόκος – Σαφράν: Ιστορία και Μαγειρική (Saffron: History and 
Cuisine). Kozani: Kozani Saffron Cooperative. 
S4 Secondary source Siampanopoulos K. (1993) Ο νομός Κοζάνης στο χώρο και στο χρόνο: Φύση-  Ιστορία- 
Παράδοση (The Kozani Prefecture in Time and Space: Nature – History – Tradition). 
Kozani: Association of Letters and Arts of the Kozani Prefecture. 
C) Santorini - wine 
D5 Documentary 
evidence 
Minutes of the meetings of the Santo Wines Cooperative’s General Assembly, 1984-
2005 
N3 Local news Thiraïka Nea newspaper, 1982-1997 
S5 Secondary source Venizelou, A. (2015) ‘Μελέτη των σταδίων του κύκλου ζωής της Ένωσης Θηραϊκών 
Προϊόντων – Santo Wines’ (‘Study of the stages of the life cycle of the Union of 
Cooperatives of Theran Products – Santo Wines’), Master’s dissertation. Athens: 
Agricultural University of Athens. 
S6 Secondary source Iliopoulos, C. and I. Theodorakopoulou (2014) ‘Mandatory cooperatives and the free 
rider problem: the case of Santo Wines in Santorini, Greece.’ Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics 85(4): 663-681 
S7 Secondary source Vlahos, G., P. Karanikolas and A. Koutsouris (2016) ‘Farming System Transformation 
as Transition to Sustainability: a Greek quality wines case study’. Paper presented at 






D) Lemnos - wine 
S8 Secondary source  Dimopoulos, T., G. Dimitropoulos and N. Georgiadis (2018) ‘The Land Use Systems 
of Lemnos Island’, Terra Lemnia Project/ Strategy 1.1/ Activity 1.1.1. Athens: 
Mediterranean Institute for Nature and Anthropos (MedINA). 
S9 Secondary source Kalmouti, S. (2014) ‘Οργάνωση και Λειτουργία της Ένωσης Αγροτικών 
Συνεταιρισμών Λήμνου του Νομού Λέσβου’ (‘Organisation and Operation of the 
Union of Agricultural Cooperatives of Lemnos of the Lesvos Prefecture’), Bachelor’s 
dissertation. Thessaloniki: Alexander Technological Educational Institute of 
Thessaloniki. 
S10 Secondary source Lagopoulos, A. (2016) ‘Τα Πολιτιστικά και Περιβαλλοντικά αποθέματα, ως εργαλεία 
οικονομικής και κοινωνικής “ανάπτυξης”, μέσα από το μοντέλο της κοινωνικής 
οικονομίας: Η περίπτωση του νησιού της Λήμνου’ (‘The Cultural and Organisational 
Reserves as Tools for economic and social “development”, through the model of the 
social economy: The Case of Lemnos’), Master’s dissertation. Patra: Greek Open 
University. 
S11 Secondary source Mimi, M. (2013) ‘Η Εφαρμογή της Κ.Π. LEADER για τη Λήμνο’ (‘The 
Implementation of the Community Initiative LEADER for Lemnos’), Master’s 
dissertation. Athens: Agricultural University of Athens. 
S12 Secondary source Bakalis, C. (2007) ‘Λήμνος: Οργάνωση του Αστικού Χώρου (19ος-20ος αιώνας), 
κοινωνικός μετασχηματισμός, μεταναστευτικά δίκτυα και αστικοί “αντικατοπτρισμοί”’ 
(‘Lemnos: Organisation of the Urban Space (19th-20th century), social transformation, 
migration networks and urban “reflections”’), PhD thesis. Mytilene: University of the 
Aegean. 
S13 Secondary source Chaska, E. (2018) ‘Διερεύνηση της Επίδρασης των Καιρικών Συνθηκών στη Δυνητική 
Μεταβλητότητα της Τιμής Ελληνικού Οίνου ΠΟΠ’ (‘Study of the Impact of Weather 
Conditions on the Potential Variability of the Price of Greek PDO Wine’), Master’s 
dissertation. Samos: University of the Aegean. 
E) Nymphaio – alternative tourism 
D6 Documentary 
evidence 
Selected minutes of the meetings of the Nymphaio Commune, years 1991 and 2007. 
D7 Documentary 
evidence 
‘Νυμφαίον: Παραμύθι με Όνομα’ (‘Nymphaio: Fairy-tale with a Name’), information 
leaflet produced by the Municipal Company of Nymphaio in September 2007 and re-
printed with some modifications by the Municipality of Amyntaio in 2012 
D8 Documentary 
evidence 
‘Νυμφαίον: Η αναγέννησή του σε Εικόνες’ (‘Nympahio: Its revival in Images’), 
information leaflet produced by the Nymphaio Commune for an international 
conference on mild tourism in 2004. 
D9 Documentary 
evidence 
‘Τουρισμός: Αναψυχή, Ξενώνες, Εστίαση’ (‘Tourism: Entertainment, Guest houses, 
Food Provision’) and ‘Παραγωγικές Δραστηριότητες της Περιοχής: Τοπικά Προϊόντα 
και Εκδηλώσεις, Κτηνοτροφία, Αλιεία, Οινοποιία, Ενέργεια’ (‘Productive Activities of 
the Area: Local Products and Events, Animal-Herding, Fishing, Wine-making, 
Energy’), information leaflets produced by the Municipality of Amyntaio in 2017 
[estimated date]. 
S14 Secondary source Tsalkou, A. (2007) ‘Πορτραίτο Νυμφαίου: Πρότυπο Εναλλακτικού Τουρισμού’ 
(‘Portrait of Nymphaio: Paradigm for Alternative Tourism’), Bachelor’s dissertation. 
Thessaloniki: Alexander Technological Educational Institute of Thessaloniki. 
S15 Secondary source Kalfas, D. (2007) ‘Η ανάλυση της ελκυστικότητας του τουριστικού προορισμού 
ορεινών περιοχών, η περίπτωση της Κοινότητας Νυμφαίου Νομού Φλώρινας’ 
(‘Analysis of the attractiveness of touristic destinations of mountain areas: the case of 
the Nymphaio Commune of the Florina Prefecture’), Bachelor’s dissertation. Mytilene: 
University of the Aegean. 
S16 Secondary source Andrikopoulou, E., C. Kakderi, G. Kafkalas and A. Tasopoulou (2015) ‘Διαδρομές 
περιφερειακής ανθεκτικότητας: Επιπτώσεις της κρίσης και προοπτικές χωρικής 
ανάπτυξης στην Περιφέρεια Δυτικής Μακεδονίας’ (‘Itineraries of peripheral resilience: 
Impacts of the Crisis and Prospects for Spatial Development in the Periphery of 
Western Macedonia’), Aeichoros 20: 4-31. 
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F) Ambelakia – alternative tourism 
D10 Documentary 
evidence 
‘Ετήσιο Πρόγραμμα Τουριστικής Προβολής’ (‘Annual Programme of Tourism 




Information leaflets on the ‘Centre of Cultural Heritage of Ambelakia’, the ‘Folk Art 
and Historical Museum of Ambelakia Larissis’, ‘Ambelakia of Thessaly’, and ‘The 
Cultural Herigate of Ambelakia: Rizari Programme’, collected at the Centre of Cultural 
Heritage of Ambelakia. 
D12 Documentary 
evidence 
Conference proceedings of the ‘First Conference of Ambelakiot Studies, 13-15 August 
1994’, organised by the Cultural Association of Ambelakia. 
S17 Secondary source Stroulias, P. (1998) Τέμπη και Συνεταιρισμός Αμπελακίων: Καταβολές/ Ιστορία – 
Προοπτικές (Tembi and the Cooperative of Ambelakia: Origins/ History – Prospects. 
Larissa: Ella. 
S18 Secondary source Papadimitriou, Z. (2012) ‘Hθική της διάσωσης και διαχείρισης της βιομηχανικής 
κληρονομιάς και του συνανήκοντος πολιτιστικού τοπίου ως φορέα της συλλογικής 
μνήμης: Η περίπτωση των θεσσαλικών Αμπελακίων’ (‘The Ethics of Rescuing and 
Preserving the Industrial Heritage and Relevant Cultural Landscape as a Carrier of 
Collective Memory: the Case of Ambelakia of Thessaly’), Master’s dissertation. 
Kalamata: University of the Peloponnese and National and Kapodistrian University of 
Athens. 
G) Santorini – mass tourism 
D13 Documentary 
evidence 
‘Οι δράσεις που πραγματοποιήθηκαν στο πλαίσιο της πρωτοβουλίας «2013 Έτος 
Γαστρονομίας στη Σαντορίνη»’ (‘The activities that were realised in the framework of 
the initiative “2013 Year of Gastronomy in Santorini”’), information leaflet of the 
Municipality of Thera 
N4 Local news Thiraïka Nea newspaper, 1982-1997 
S19 Secondary source Nikos Schmitt consulting firm (2019) ‘Master Plan της Πολιτιστικής Διαδρομής 
Σαντορίνης’ (‘Master Plan of the Cultural Itinerary of Santorini’), Deliverable A.2, 
project commissioned by Diazoma. 
S20 Secondary source Spilanis, Y. (2017) ‘Αποτύπωση της κατάστασης της τουριστικής δραστηριότητας και 
των επιπτώσεων της στον προορισμό, ανάλυση SWOT και εναλλακτικά σενάρια 
πολιτικής’ (‘Depiction of the Situation of Touristic Activity and its Impacts on the 
Destination, SWOT Analysis and Alternative Scenarios for Policy’), report. Mytilene: 
Tourism Observatory of Santorini, University of the Aegean. 
S21 Secondary source European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2019) ‘Destination Management 
Plan for Santorini’, report. London: EBRD. 
S22 Secondary source Papageorgiou, M. and G. Pozoukidou (2014) ‘Οι παραδοσκιακοί οικισμοί της 
Ελλάδας: ζητήματα χωροταξίας και προστασίας’ (‘The Traditional Settlements of 
Greece: Issues of Spatial Planning and Protection’), Γεωγραφίες (Geographies) 24: 
107-125. 
S23 Secondary source Dekavallas, K. (2013) ‘Η αντισεισμική ανοικοδόμηση της Σαντορίνης 1956-1960’ 
(‘The earthquake-proof reconstruction of Santorini 1956-1960’), lecture at the 
Architectural School of the National Technical University of Athens, 21/3/2013. 
S24 Secondary source Polyvou, K. and K. Ritzouli (2014) Αρχιτεκτονικές Επεμβάσεις Μικρής Κλίμακας σε 
Παραδοσιακούς Οικισμούς της Σαντορίνης: Το Παράδειγμα του Πύργου Καλλίστης 
(Architectural Interventions of Small Scale at Traditional Settlements of Santorini: The 
Example of Pyrgos Kallistis). Santorini: Thera Municipality. 
S25 Secondary source Danezis, M. (1940) Σαντορίνη 1939-1940: Γενική έκθεσις της γεωλογικής, ιστορικής, 
κοινωνικής, οικονομικής, τουριστικής και πολιτιστικής εν γένει εξελίξεως της νήσου 
(Santorini 1939-1940: General Exposition of the Geological, Historic, Social, 
Economic, Touristic and Cultural General Development of the Island). Athens: 




H) Chalkidiki – mass tourism 
D14 Documentary 
evidence 
OAOM consulting firm (1977). ‘Χαλκιδική: Τεχνική Μελέτη Χωροταξικού Σχεδίου 
και Προγράμματος’ (‘Chalkidiki: Technical Study for a Spatial Planning Design and 
Programme’), Land Planning Study No. 3, 3rd stage, archive of Konstantinos Gartzos. 
S26 Secondary source Gounaris, B. (2015). ‘Introduction’, in B. Gounaris (ed.) ‘Mines, Olives and 
Monasteries: Aspects of Halkidiki’s Environmental History’, project report. 
Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publishers and PHAROS books. 
S27 Secondary source Tsoulidou, E. (2013). ‘Βιώσιμη Τουριστική Ανάπτυξη και Παράκτιο Τοπίο.Η 
περίπτωση της Κασσάνδρας Χαλκιδικής’ (‘Sustainable Touristic Development and 
Coastal Landscape: The Case of Kassandra in Chalkidiki’), Master’s dissertation. 
Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. 
S28 Secondary source Deltsou, E. (2007). ‘Second Homes and Tourism in a Greek Village: A Travelogue’, 
Ethnologia Europea: Journal of European Ethnology 37(1-2): 124-133. 
S29 Secondary source Antoniou, G. (2015). ‘A Place of Inconceivable Beauty: The Housing Cooperative of 
the Professors of the Aristotle University in Vourvourou, Halkidiki’, in B. Gounaris 
(ed.) ‘Mines, Olives and Monasteries: Aspects of Halkidiki’s Environmental History’, 
project report. Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publishers and PHAROS books. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
